



The Danger Zone of Europe

Henry Charles Woods

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THE DANGER ZONE OF EUROPE



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MAHMOUD SHEVKET PASHA.

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THE DANGER ZONE OF EUROPE

CHANGES AND PROBLEMS IN
THE NEAR EAST

BY

H. CHARLES WOODS, F.R.G.S.

AUTHOR OF

"WASHED BY FOUR SEAS"

WITH THREE MAPS AND FIFTY-TWO ILLUSTRATIONS

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PREFACE

THE proper function of a modern preface, especially of one to a volume of this kind, appears to be to explain the objects for which the book has been written, to state the manner in which the information obtained in it has been acquired, and to help the reader who lacks either time or inclination to make close acquaintance with the whole book, to discover what portions of it will be the most interesting to him.

Before endeavouring to fulfil these functions, let me, however, first give the reasons which have induced me to call this book "The Danger Zone of Europe." In the past, history has proved that the Near East has been both the scene of and the reason for war after war. For a variety of reasons this quarter of the universe is still a continual source of danger to the peace of the world. The Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor may always be the scene of insurrection or massacre, on account of the many diverse peoples who inhabit the different districts of which they are composed. In Turkey the various elements of the population are widely separated from one another owing to differences

of race and of religion. Some of the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire are backed up by the support of various neighbouring States, whilst others are compelled to face the alternative of either remaining peaceful subjects of the Sultan or of rebelling unaided against his Government.

Since 1908 the Near East has become more than ever the "Danger Zone of Europe." The rivalry concerning things Near Eastern which exists between the Powers of the Triple Alliance and those of the Triple Entente becomes daily more markedly apparent. Such is the competition between the Great Powers to secure the favour of the Young Turks that scarcely a word has been said by any of them to enforce the punishment of those who, even according to the Young Turks themselves, are responsible for the murder of thousands of Ottoman Christians and the destruction of the possessions belonging to foreign subjects. Whether this rivalry will either be the cause of war between any of the parties amongst which it exists, or whether the attitude of any of the Great Powers will encourage the more Chauvinistic Young Turks to bring about war with any of their neighbours, time alone will prove. Again, notwithstanding the fact that the four Protecting Powers are supposed to be agreed in all matters appertaining to the Cretan Question, yet it seems probable that it is largely owing to a secret discord existing among the Governments of England, France, Russia, and Italy that this complicated international problem still remains unsolved.

Although the conditions prevailing in Asia Minor may not, strictly speaking, be within the scope of a book entitled "The Danger Zone of Europe," yet as the future of the Turkish Empire largely depends upon the attitude of the seventeen or eighteen million Ottomans who reside in the Asiatic Provinces of the Sultan, I have devoted four chapters of this volume to a history of some events which have occurred in certain parts of Asia Minor and to an account of certain things which came to my notice whilst travelling from the southern coast of Anatolia to the shores of the Bosphorus. Moreover, as Asia Minor is ruled by and is dependent upon the Government of Constantinople, the conditions actually prevailing in this part of the Ottoman Empire actually influence the fate of European Turkey, and thus affect the question as to whether or not the Balkan Peninsula is "the Danger Zone of Europe."

My most important motive in publishing this volume has been to explain some of the changes which have occurred, and to draw attention to a few of the problems which have arisen in the Near East as direct or indirect results of the Young Turk revolution of July, 1908. This book, therefore, makes no pretensions to be a learned and exhaustive dissertation upon any international problem. It claims merely to be the result of observations which I have made during two extended tours in the Near East since the advent of the Constitutional Régime in Turkey. I have endeavoured honestly to record information acquired and to give impres-

sions gained by personal intercourse with all classes of people who inhabit different parts of the Near East, rather than to collect facts, or supposed facts, from statesmen or religious chiefs, each of whom, however honest he may wish to be, undoubtedly has some political party to support or some personal object to attain. As far as possible, too, I have avoided making prophecies, or predicting the future political development of affairs in the Near East, because, even if the events which I might have foretold actually should occur, as all future events in the Near East are always uncertain, my prophecies would have proved to be correct more by chance than by good judgment.

Out of the twelve chapters into which this book is divided, seven are given up to an account of events which have occurred in the Turkish Empire. In the first of these I have endeavoured to give an idea of "Some Aspects of the New Régime in Turkey." Here I have also enumerated briefly a few of the problems which have yet to be solved by the Young Turks. In the second chapter, if I have devoted too much space and given too many technical details concerning the Turkish Army, I hope that my non-military readers will understand that I have been induced to adopt this course, not only on account of the extreme importance of the Turkish Army from a military point of view but also because of the political part which that Army has played, is playing, and will play in the development of a strong Ottoman Empire. In Chapters IV., V., and VI. I have provided my readers with a short

account of the "Armenian Massacres of 1909," and also given a very brief summary of the "Causes and Results of the Massacre." I have ventured to write at greater length upon this subject than it might otherwise have merited, not only because, as far as I can ascertain, no other consecutive account of this awful outbreak has yet been published in English by any visitor to the scene of the disaster, but also because of the immense effect which these massacres have had upon the non-Turkish, and especially upon the Christian, population of the whole Empire. Chapter VII. contains an account of some reforms which I noticed had been introduced by the Young Turks in Asia Minor.

In Chapters VIII., IX., and X. I have discussed the Cretan Question, and dealt with matters which concern the Greek and the Cretan Governments. Chapters XI. and XII. are devoted to a brief history of the circumstances under which Bulgaria secured her independence, and to a few events which have occurred in Servia, Montenegro, and Bosnia in and since 1908.

To those in England and in the countries of which I have written who have given me their valuable assistance, I owe my most hearty thanks. In view of the official positions which they hold, and for many other obvious reasons, most of these people must, unfortunately, remain nameless. In like manner I have thought it advisable, when quoting conversations with and giving the opinions of some of the many men with whom I have talked, not to give any clue to the identity of the persons to whom I refer or to the

localities in which they reside. I must, however, make special mention of the assistance afforded to me by Mr. W. W. Peet—the Treasurer of the American Missions in Turkey—to whom I am indebted for allowing me to have access to many letters written by those who were actually present during the massacres at Adana and in the surrounding district. I also owe my thanks to those who have signed their photographs for publication in this volume. Finally, I must acknowledge the courtesy of the Editors of *National Defence*, the *Nation*, *Sunday Times*, *Westminster Gazette*, *Daily Express*, and *Manchester Daily Despatch*, in permitting me to reproduce in the following pages certain passages which have from time to time appeared in the publications which they edit.

H. CHARLES WOODS.

WARNFORD PARK,
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I

SOME ASPECTS OF THE NEW RÉGIME IN TURKEY

Changes which are noticeable to the every-day traveller—Personal security—The Committee of Union and Progress—Parliamentary elections—Difficulty of finding competent officials to fill Government appointments—Some officials described—The fanaticism of the Mohammedan population—Turkish finance—The necessity for the construction of Public Works—Railways proposed and under construction—Privileges of Christians in Turkey—The Brigandage Law—Attitude of the Bulgarians and Greeks towards the New Régime—The disarmament of the Christians of Macedonia—The law dealing with the allotment of the disputed churches and schools in Macedonia—Decentralisation.

IN July, 1908, the Young Turks successfully brought about the wonderful revolution as a result of which the Ottoman Empire was endowed with a Constitution by the ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid. In April, 1909, occurred the counter-revolution which, had it been successful, would certainly have favoured the cause of reaction. As both these events were already matters of history when I returned to Turkey, from the moment of my arrival in Constantinople, and during my many excursions into the interior of the country, I set myself to study the changes which were markedly apparent owing to the establishment of the New Régime, and also to discover what real reforms in the government of the country had already been introduced, or were about to be introduced, by the Young Turks.

First, I propose to consider some of the changes which are noticeable to the everyday man who is not

interested in the political situation in the country. The fact that the New Régime certainly brought with it the downfall of at least a large number of spies is markedly apparent to the traveller immediately he enters Turkey. Largely owing to this, the horrors and discomforts of the passage through the custom-house on the frontier or at Constantinople have been reduced almost to a minimum. Although, of course, the Committee of Union and Progress has its secret agents, yet that odious crowd of spies who were wont to hang about the Pera hotels, or who volunteered their assistance to every stranger as he walked through the streets of the capital, or travelled in the interior of the country, are now practically non-existent. Although, too, there are still complaints about the manner in which letters are delivered in the interior, yet in the capital and in the larger cities at least, the Ottoman subject—be he Moslem, Jew, or Christian—can now receive his letters without being liable at any moment to disclose their contents to the casual agent of the Yildiz tyrant, who often waited on the very doorstep of a foreign post-office to note the names of those receiving or posting letters under the protection of Europe.

Since the advent of the New Régime personal security has, no doubt, been far greater than it was during the days of absolutism. In the course of my several visits to Turkey under the Old Régime, I was never permitted to travel in the interior without an escort of at least two gendarmes. Under the New Régime I have driven across little-visited districts of the interior of European Turkey unaccompanied by any representative of the Turkish Government. Owing to this greater personal security, the Ottoman peasant can now not only travel with more safety and freedom, but he is able to gather his crops and attend to his sheep with a feeling of greater confidence than he has done for many years. Although, too, a man must still be provided with a

teskéké, or local passport, before he can move from one district of the country to another, yet this permission is now seldom refused. In order to understand the advantages of this increased liberty, it is necessary to have heard from the people themselves what it means to them. Under the Old Régime a friend of mine was once compelled to waste two whole years in trying to obtain permission to travel a distance of between two and three hundred miles. "Imagine what it means to me," he said, "to be able to go where I like without fearing that once I leave my family I may never be allowed to return to them."

Men may now meet and speak together more freely than they have done for many a decade. There is no doubt that the movements, actions, and probably even the conversations of famous and notorious people are noted, perhaps even reported to the Government, or to the Committee of Union and Progress, but in the words of an Asiatic Christian, "It is unpleasant to have your actions watched and reported to the Government, but it is far worse to be arrested and thrown into prison on account of those reports." In other words, men are certainly arrested for imaginary offences at least far less often than they were during the Old Régime.

Although the Press Law itself and the manner in which it is put into force still leaves much to be desired, yet there is no doubt that considerable improvements have been introduced in this respect since 1908. This change is noticeable from the large number of newspapers of all sorts which have now come into existence. So strict was the censorship during the reign of Abdul Hamid that representatives of the Government would often order editors to cut out what they considered to be objectionable words or phrases before the paper was published at all. According to the terms of the Constitution, newspapers can now under no circumstances be subjected to preliminary censorship prior to

publication. At present the manager of a paper, who according to the Press Law must be an Ottoman subject, is responsible for and liable to punishment on account of any improper news or comments which appear in his columns. Several papers published in Turkey have been either suspended or suppressed by order of the courts-martial established under martial law, whilst other organs published abroad have been forbidden entrance to the Ottoman Empire. The fact that these papers have been suspended or suppressed because they have criticised the policy of the Government, or perhaps only that of the Committee of Union and Progress, is sufficient to prove that the Press Law ought to be subjected to alteration. Moreover, what is still worse is the manner in which the censorship upon the Press is enforced. There are cases where papers published in Constantinople have been suspended or suppressed altogether on account of the appearance of some harmless publication, whilst other organs, renowned for the support which they are wont to give to the Committee of Union and Progress, even if suppressed at all, have been allowed to reappear at once, under a slightly different name, perhaps, from the very same office, and presided over by the same editor as formerly.

With regard to the position of Moslem women in Turkey, although many years must necessarily elapse, and although several generations must rise and decline before anything perceptible can be brought about in the direction of the emancipation of women, yet I think that certain minute changes have already been effected since the advent of the New Régime. In spite of the fact that I believe Turkish women are now no more free than they were thirty or forty years ago, yet on my return to Turkey after the establishment of the Constitution I observed a distinct tendency amongst the women to go about a little more openly than they had been allowed to do during the final years of

absolutism. In Constantinople I have noticed Turkish ladies driving with their husbands, and in the provinces I have found a husband and wife travelling in the same railway compartment. A certain number of women, too, are perhaps slightly less careful to arrange their headgear so that it entirely protects their hair from view. These things are unimportant in themselves, but that they should occur at all is a distinct sign of the times. Moreover, in order to fit women of the future to take a more important position in Turkey, efforts are now being made to improve the education of at least a certain number of Turkish girls. The movement has been set on foot and is supported by Turkish ladies, some of whom have received valuable assistance from Miss Isabel Fry, who went to Turkey early in 1909 with the object of advising the promoters of the women's movement. The Young Turks, too, have shown their desire to do something to further education amongst Moslem women by effecting some improvements in the Dar-Ul-Mahlyumat school at Constantinople, and by sending five orphan girls to the American College in Constantinople to be educated as Government teachers.

In approaching a discussion as to the real reforms which either have been or still must be effected by the New Régime, it is advisable first to consider the organisation of and position which has been occupied by the Committee of Union and Progress. Much as has been written on this subject by authorities who are far more qualified to discuss it than the humble observer who pens these lines, it is safe to affirm that but few except the inner ring of Young Turks themselves even now understand more than the vaguest details of the manner in which this mysterious organisation attained the power which enabled it to bring about the revolution. Still less is known of the methods by which the Committee has spread and maintained its

influence since 1908. In spite of the fact that I have conversed in various parts of the Empire with many Young Turks upon these subjects—men who have been and are actively mixed up in the movement—I have never been able to ascertain more than the most hazy outline of how the Committee of Union and Progress not only effected the revolution, but subsequently how it established itself as the most powerful influence existing in the country.

It was in 1891, prior to which date the Young Turk party did not possess any real organisation, that a body known as the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress was founded at Geneva. Subsequently the headquarters of this Society were moved to Paris, finally to be established in Salonika in 1906. When the Committee began its active work in Turkey the sympathisers with liberalism were formed into small groups, each made up of from five to seven members. Each group was connected with one other group by one of its members—a sort of messenger, who knew the man holding a like office in another group. Thus no ordinary member of the Committee except these messengers was supposed to know more than his own group. These little parties were formed into sort of district communities and, in addition, every vilayet had a superior organisation. Elaborate precautions were taken to ensure the fidelity of each Ottoman to the cause of liberalism before he was permitted to become a member of the Committee of Union and Progress.

After the Constitution had been firmly established, the organisation of the Committee was somewhat changed, and its programme is now carried out largely by clubs to which the members of the Committee always belong. Every caza, or district, has a club. Each sanjak possesses a superior club, and every vilayet has a still more important club. At Salonika, in addi-

tion to the vilayet club, there is a club or Committee for the whole Empire. Although for the most part the members of these clubs and of their committees are known, yet there is no doubt that either in connection with this headquarter club or else as a separate organisation, there exists a Central Committee whose members are not known for certain except to the initiated few. In spite of the decision taken at a general meeting held at Salonika in October, 1909, at which it was decided that the Committee should henceforth cease to be a secret association, yet as far as one can ascertain it is upon this "inner council" that all the ordinary clubs and committees depend. This central organisation appears not only to maintain its influence and to issue its orders through the medium of the clubs which I have already described, but also to send secret inspectors to different parts of the Empire to see that those orders are being properly carried out. Sometimes these inspectors travel incognito and only disclose their identity if they discover that abuses are being committed, whilst on other occasions men who are known to those they inspect are sent to enforce the orders of this secret organisation.

For many months after the advent of the Constitution the Committee was for all practical purposes the Government of Turkey. After the revolution of July, 1908, the patriots who had overthrown the despotism of Abdul Hamid did not, and rightly did not, entrust the government of the Empire to men many of whom were either notoriously corrupt, as a result of lifelong training under the ex-Sultan, or hopelessly incompetent owing to inexperience. What, therefore, happened was that the best men available were nominated to fill the Cabinet, and to act as the figure-heads of the Government in the provinces, whilst the actual and real power remained with the members of the secret Committee of Union and Progress, in whose

hands the ministers and officials were mere puppets. In view of the difficulties of the situation it is quite possible that it was necessary for the Young Turks to follow this course, but the fact that such a policy was adopted certainly lost to the State the services of more than one official well known for his honesty and for his experience. As a result of the influence of the Committee, Kiamil Pasha, in my opinion—old as he is—the greatest Turkish statesman, was removed from office for quite inadequate causes and in a most unconstitutional manner. Subsequently the position of Nouradounghian Effendi, who occupied the post of Minister of Public Works from July, 1908, until August, 1909, was made untenable by the intrigues of the Committee and its supporters in order that his place might be taken by a man who would be more obedient to the orders of this secret organisation.

As time wore on, the Committee, having obtained an enormous majority for its supporters in the Chamber of Deputies, and having spread its influence in the Army, began openly to fill the Ministry and all the Government appointments with men recruited from its ranks. Thus, although the Committee may have become somewhat less of an "influence behind the throne" than it was prior to the retirement of Hilmi Pasha from the post of Grand Vizier at the end of 1909, yet, as whatever his qualifications may be a man is but seldom appointed to fill any important post unless he is a member of the Committee, it is clear that this body is still endowed with enormous power. Bad as this state of things may be, it is better that a minister or a local governor should be the nominee and representative of a more or less secret organisation than that every official should nominally be responsible to the Government, and at the same time really be subjected to the supervision of a body of men of whose names and identity he is in ignorance. In short, the power of the Committee



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KIAMIL PASHA.

Grand Vizier, August, 1904, to February, 1909.

To face p. 26.

still exists, but its influence is used through the medium of its members who are now officials, instead of to terrorise over men who were not really its supporters, but who filled the appointments of the Government.

Although it is obvious that the Young Turks, whose opinion was then largely voiced by the Committee of Union and Progress, were anxious to secure and did really obtain a large majority in the Chamber, yet I found that the fact of the parliamentary elections not having been fairly, or at least more or less fairly, carried out is certainly responsible for a large amount of the discontent which exists, especially amongst the non-Turkish elements of the population of the Ottoman Empire. The people, and in particular the Christians, feel as the absolutism of Abdul Hamid and that of his agents in the provinces has been abolished, and as they have not got fair representation in Parliament, that they now possess no medium through which to make known their complaints and wishes to the Government. In other words, the fact that the tyrant of Yildiz has been removed but that he has not been replaced by a representative Government gives the people the opportunity of saying that they now possess nobody to whom to go in case of need. Such a condition of affairs can naturally be utilised by more than one class of men hostile to the New Régime in Turkey.

I do not think that either anybody who knew the conditions prevailing in Turkey, or even the non-Turkish elements of the population themselves, expected that the first Ottoman Parliament under this Régime would really represent the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of the Empire. What was expected was that the elections would be carried out with some degree of fairness, and that the Government would take the leaders of the various races into their confidence and discuss how the electoral campaign should be carried out in the best interests of the Empire as a whole.

Whatever may have been the attitude of the majority of the non-Turks towards the Old Régime, the manner in which at least the large proportion of these people joined in the revolt of 1908, and assisted the Young Turks to accomplish what is one of the most wonderful revolutions of history, undoubtedly warranted that these men should not have been treated as mere suspects both during and subsequent to the elections.

The Electoral Law itself is sufficiently definite to ensure tolerably fair representation to the population. The system of choosing deputies is by indirect election. Every group of from 500 to 750 male Ottomans elects by ballot an elector of the second degree, who in his turn registers his vote in favour of a deputy. According to the law, however, when an administrative district only possesses from 250 to 500 males eligible to vote this number is allowed to elect an elector of the second degree. In spite of these regulations every form of abuse took place during the elections. In order to lessen the number of non-Turkish voters it is said, and I fully believe, that as many Christians as possible were struck off the register by the commissioners who were appointed to revise the list of voters prepared locally by the heads of each community. Besides this in places where Moslems and especially Turks were in the ascendancy, the primary electors were classed in groups so that only just over 250 voters chose an elector, whilst in places where the Christians were in the ascendancy it was so arranged that nearly 750 voters chose one of these electors. In the towns, when a big population was entitled to elect a considerable number of electors, the district was always so divided as to secure to the Turks the majority of voters in each group destined to nominate an elector. In a town containing, as many towns do, several distinct quarters, instead of arranging the voters by districts, into each group of Moslem voters would be intro-

duced a certain number of Christians, always so arranged that the Moslems were in the majority.

Again, non-Turkish voters were often obliged to travel great distances in order to vote. This arrangement naturally caused many men to sacrifice their votes rather than lose the time which was necessary if they desired to register them. During the elections of 1908 it was no uncommon thing for a voter domiciled in a village A to be obliged to pass right through a township B in order to vote at village C. In some cases men were even forced to travel as much as six hours (12 to 15 miles) to record their votes, when they might have taken part in an election close at hand.

Young Turks of all classes confess that one of their greatest difficulties is to find enough competent and at the same time honest men to fill the Government appointments which either have been or should be rendered vacant by the retirement of officials who are either openly or secretly the supporters of the Old Régime. Under the ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid an honest official was always regarded with suspicion, and therefore such a man had become rare. Consequently the complete reform of the whole Civil Service and the wholesale dismissal of a large number of corrupt and incompetent officials, who held their posts owing to favouritism, was absolutely necessary. If, however, all the men who held office under the absolutism of Abdul Hamid were dismissed, it is obvious that the affairs of the State would be directed by men without any experience, and that those discharged would form a huge army of malcontents, always ready to throw in their lot in favour of reaction. If, on the other hand, these men are allowed to remain in office, in spite of the support which they now give openly to the Young Turks, there will always be a danger that they will secretly use their influence in favour of despotism.

As I have described elsewhere a few of the officials

whom I found carrying out the mandate of the Young Turks in parts of Asia Minor, I will here confine myself to making a few remarks about some of the men with whom I talked and of whom I heard during my journeys in the interior of European Turkey. When I was in Monastir, in September, 1909, that important province was governed by Fakri Pasha, an intelligent, liberal-minded man of about forty-five years of age. As a result of several conversations which I had with his Excellency, I was greatly impressed with the manner in which he was undoubtedly trying to govern his province for the welfare of its inhabitants, and for the good of the Empire at large. Almost immediately after my departure from Monastir, I heard that Fakri Pasha had been withdrawn from his province. Whether the change was due to the fact that Fakri Pasha—a good Moslem—was popular amongst the Christians of Monastir, or whether he desired to take upon himself more power than the Committee of Union and Progress desired to delegate to him, I am unable to say. The fact remains that his Excellency, who was subsequently sent to govern a somewhat remote province of Asiatic Turkey, was succeeded by an official whose sole qualification appears to have been that he was secretary to Hilmi Pasha during the time that his Highness was Inspector-General of the Macedonian vilayets, prior to the establishment of the Constitution. Those who visited Turkey during this period can judge for themselves whether this was a satisfactory qualification or not.

In the course of a visit to Salonika I had the honour of meeting Ibrahim Bey—then Governor-General of this vilayet. His Excellency, who is the son of an ex-Sheik Ul Islam, was, prior to his appointment, a judge of the Court of Appeal at Constantinople. Honest as this official may be—I have no reason to suppose that he is otherwise—he can hardly have sufficient ex-

perience to enable him to govern one of the most important, if not the most important district in the Empire. Mazhar Bey, the Governor of Uskub at the time of my visit to that town, is the son of the deputy for Ipek. Judging from the reports which I heard, and drawing my conclusions from subsequent events, there seems every reason to suppose that his Excellency, who had been secretary to the Vali of Uskub under the Old Régime, was himself appointed as Governor of the Kossovo vilayet solely because he is an active member of the Committee of Union and Progress.

I will only allude to the case of one other official who has held important appointments under the New Régime. I refer to Mustafa Zihni Pasha, who was, and I believe still is, Governor of the vilayet of Yanina. Prior to his arrival in Yanina, Mustafa Zihni Pasha was Governor of the province of Adana, where his administration left much to be desired. Whether his Excellency is carrying out his duties better at Yanina than he did in Adana I am not in position to state from personal observation, but the fact remains that the appointment of such a man to administer a province populated by inhabitants belonging to at least three races, and divided both by religious beliefs and political aspirations, certainly renders the Young Turks liable to criticism. The opponents of the party at present in power at Constantinople are not slow to seize the opportunity of affirming that Mustafa Zihni Pasha was sent to Yanina on account of his relationship to people who possess influence in the Committee of Union and Progress.

The fanaticism of the Mohammedan population of the Empire is probably one of the greatest obstacles which has to be encountered by the Young Turks. Whether or not equality is in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Koran is a matter upon which I will not attempt to give any opinion. I have talked with

Young Turks and learned expounders of the Mohammedan religion who state that liberal ideas are supported by the Koran. I have met Young Turks who have not only affirmed that the people, even of Asia Minor, are not fanatical, but who have stated that the Koran can easily be explained and re-interpreted to suit the spirit of Liberalism. There is no doubt that the Young Turks are not fanatical, and that many of them are even "Free Thinkers." One of these gentlemen—a thoroughly enlightened man, and one who had done and was still doing much for the cause of liberty, once explained to me that in his opinion religion was essential to nations in the past, but that it could not be allowed to affect the destiny of the world and its inhabitants to-day. It is difficult to believe that the ignorant people of the Empire will accept this view, or that the majority of khojas would ever allow the Koran to be interpreted for political purposes. In a country where the population is mixed, and where there is, therefore, always a special danger of an appeal to religious sentiment, it will certainly necessitate the lapse of a considerable period of time before the uneducated peasants can be persuaded to believe that equality, which will endow the Christian with so many privileges formerly only possessed by the "True Believer," is not in contravention of the traditions written or unwritten upon which Mohammedan teaching is based.

The question of finance presents great difficulties for the Young Turks—difficulties which these reformers have not at present made any adequate efforts to overcome. The improvement in the manner of collecting revenue and certain economies which have been introduced in the administration will enable some saving to be effected. In spite of this, even if due care is exercised, it will, at least for many years to come, be difficult for the Turks to prevent a considerable margin occurring between the necessary annual expenditure and

the actual revenue of the country. If officials are to be honest, they must receive their legitimate salaries, whilst if the Army and the Navy are to remain loyal to the New Régime, soldiers and sailors must not only be properly fed and clothed, but they must be regularly paid.

Whilst the estimates for the year 1910-11 showed a revenue of slightly over £T26,000,000, and an expenditure of more than £T35,000,000, those for the year 1911-12 show a revenue of over £T28,500,000, and an expenditure of more than £T35,000,000. To cover these and other deficits and to enable the Young Turks to carry out certain parts of their programme of reform, the Ottoman Government has, since the advent of the New Régime, borrowed nearly £T19,000,000. This includes the principal portion of the 1910 loan, but excludes the £T3,960,000 practically arranged for by Djavid Bey. In addition, the Turkish exchequer either has or should have been in receipt of £T2,200,000—the amount paid by Austria in exchange for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, besides at least £T1,000,000 found at Yildiz amongst the treasures of Abdul Hamid. This does not include the wealth of Abdul Hamid deposited in the German banks. It is, moreover, uncertain what proportion of the Treasury bonds issued on various occasions has been renewed. The amounts acquired by this method are not considered under the above headings.

With the exception of the loan of 1910, the Young Turks have had no serious difficulty in obtaining the money which they have required. In spite of this, it must not be lost sight of that every million borrowed not only places Turkey still further in the hands of her creditors, who will sooner or later insist on absolute control of the finances of the country, but it also increases the burden of taxation which has to be borne by the population, so large a proportion of which is

made up of penniless agriculturalists. Unfortunately, too, the millions of pounds thus obtained by Turkey have not been devoted to any object which will either increase the prosperity of the country or give employment to its inhabitants. Vast sums of money have been allotted to the improvement of the Army and to the remodelling of the Navy. It is generally believed that at least the fortune of Abdul Hamid, to which I have already alluded, never entered the exchequer at all, but was handed over to the military authorities. It is certain, too, that the balance of the riches of the ex-Sultan—lodged in Germany (and only acquired by the Government during the year 1910) was at once devoted to the purchase of two German warships. Although this system of spending enormous sums of money upon preparations for war may tend to maintain the popularity of the Government in the eyes of the Army and of the Navy, as well as of the more Chauvinistic members of the population, it will not conduce to establish the financial position of Turkey upon a sound basis.

For financial as well as for other reasons, the Young Turks desire the abrogation of the Capitulations, under which, amongst many other privileges, foreigners resident in the Ottoman Empire enjoy immunity from so many taxes. In spite of the rivalry between the Powers of the Triple Alliance and those of the Triple Entente, such a change can hardly be permitted until some signs are apparent that the reforms already promised by the Young Turks either have been or are about to be effected. Besides many other things, justice must be introduced in the law courts, which, at least as far as European Turkey is concerned, have been but little reformed by the New Régime. Moreover, before the Great Powers sanction the abolition of the Capitulations, some guarantee should be extended to Europe that the money, subsequently to be collected from foreigners, will be devoted to objects which will im-

prove the welfare of the people, instead of solely to the development of an Army and of a Navy which are not only detrimental to the good government of the Ottoman Empire, but which are dangerous to the peace of Europe. Guarantees of a like nature may well be exacted before the Great Powers allow Turkey to increase her general import duty from eleven to fifteen per cent.—a change which, although it may benefit the exchequer, may well carry with it considerable disadvantages to at least a large proportion of the population of the Ottoman Empire, who for many years to come must be so largely dependent for their daily wants upon foreign manufactured, and consequently upon imported, goods.

One of the most urgent needs in Turkey is the construction of Public Works. The building of roads and railways will carry with it economical as well as political advantages to the State. New means of communication, especially in the interior of Asia Minor, would not only help the inhabitants to bring their produce to the local markets, or to transport it to the sea coast, but they will be the means of enabling the Turkish Government to maintain its influence over the population and also to restore order in case of any disturbance in the interior. Moreover, the coming of roads and railways will show the people of the country, and especially those of Eastern Anatolia, that the New Régime is really doing something, and that they themselves are going to gain real advantages from it. At the present time, the people of the interior have nothing which they can see is the result of the reforms introduced by the Young Turks. As one travels about (especially in Asia Minor), and converses with the village *hanji* (hotel-keeper), or the local cab-driver, one finds that they have all heard of the *Hurriet* (Constitution), but that the majority of the more ignorant people do not understand its meaning. The construction of Public Works,

which will carry with it employment for the people, will not only give real force to the Constitution, but it will rob the reactionaries of the argument, which is so useful to them, that the people have benefited nothing from the overthrow of despotism.

I have said enough to prove the advisability of constructing roads and railways in Turkey. Economically, other species of Public Works—irrigation schemes, telephones, electric light, and waterworks are almost equally necessary. Since the establishment of the Constitution, various reports dealing with the proposed construction of Public Works have been drawn up by Gabriel Nouradounghian Effendi and by Haladjian Effendi, who have both at different periods held the position of Minister of Public Works in the Ottoman Cabinet. In spite of these schemes—excellent in themselves—the Government has granted but few concessions under which some of the more important of the proposed works might easily have been constructed. This governmental indolence, although in some degree due to the ignorance on the part of its members about all things appertaining to business, is far more largely the result of the fear of the Ministers to take responsibility. Notwithstanding the fact that this fear is not unreasonable—the fall of Hilmi Pasha was undoubtedly partly caused by the attitude which he and his colleagues took up towards one commercial scheme which was not received with favour by the Committee of Union and Progress—yet as long as such a state of thing exists, the development of the many resources possessed by Turkey must remain almost at a standstill.

Prior to the spring of the year 1910, the Young Turks did not attempt to make any adequate provision for road construction. It was then that the Turkish Chamber voted nearly two million pounds to be devoted to this purpose during the ensuing two years. Whether the programme which provides for the building of



HILMI PASHA.

Hilmi Pasha was Grand Vizier from February, 1909, until the commencement of the counter revolution in April, and from May 5, 1909, until December 28, 1909.

between six and seven thousand miles of *chaussée*—partly in European but mostly in Asiatic Turkey—will ever be realised time alone can prove. Although, too, a large number of railway schemes have been under discussion, the Ottoman Government has only actually sanctioned the construction of two new lines. In European Turkey the Oriental Railway Company has obtained a concession to build a line about thirty miles in length, from Baba Eski—on the main route from Constantinople to Adrianople—to Kirk Killissé. It is proposed that this railway should subsequently be continued as far north as the Bulgarian frontier, and that a line should be built to connect Rodosto on the Sea of Marmora with the main Orient Express route. In Asia Minor, with the exception of the Bagdad line, with which I shall deal briefly elsewhere, the only important railway which is at present under construction is that from Panderma, on the Sea of Marmora, to Soma. This line, which will be about one hundred and fifteen miles long, and which will bring Smyrna into direct railway communication with the Sea of Marmora, is being constructed by the Smyrna Cassaba Railway Company—a French syndicate which has already opened (as a branch of its main line from Smyrna to Afium Karahissar) a railway as far north as Soma.

The most important lines in European Turkey the construction of which is under discussion are those which would respectively provide direct communication from Sofia to Salonika, and which would join the Greek railway system with that of Turkey. I shall deal later on in this volume with the lines which would affect Bulgaria. The Greek Government has already completed a line from Larissa to Karalik Devene—a small village on the Græco-Turkish frontier. In order that Greece may be placed in direct communication with Europe, it therefore only remains for Turkey to build a line about fifty miles in length which would connect the Greek

frontier station with the existing railway from Salonika to Monastir. Such a line must carry with it great commercial advantages to Turkey. Two more or less rival schemes exist for this new railway. The delay in sanctioning the construction of this small section appears to be caused by the fact that the Turks wish to have a line running inland which would connect Larissa in Greece with Karaferia in Turkey. The Greeks on their part would like a new line running along the coast of the Gulf of Salonika, which would join Karalik Devene with Gidia on the existing railway from Salonika to Monastir. If the rumour that the Turkish Government has decided to build a line from Karaferia to Ellassona be true, it is probable that the Greek Government will build another short section to connect Larissa with the Græco-Turkish frontier to the South of Ellassona. As far as Asia Minor is concerned the only two important lines the construction of which is contemplated in the near future is that from Samsoun to Sivas, and that from Ada Bazaar to Boli by way of Duzjé.

Since the advent of the Constitution, the Young Turks have made determined attempts to withdraw many of the privileges possessed in a greater or a lesser degree by all the Christian races of the Ottoman Empire. These attempts are and have been the cause of much of the resentment felt by the Christians towards the New Régime. Although it is not unnatural that the Young Turks should wish, as far as possible, to place all members of the population under the same law, yet it is clear that the Christian communities cannot be expected to surrender their privileges, many of which they have possessed for centuries, at least until reforms have been introduced in the law courts, and until a fair proportion of the posts in the Civil Service are filled by Christians. Moreover, in view of the nature of many of the privileges, it would be difficult for the matters with which they deal to be adjudicated upon by Moslems. As I shall discuss



JOACHIM III., GREEK PATRIARCH OF CONSTANTINOPLE.

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the position of the Armenians elsewhere, I will here confine myself for the most part to the case of the Greeks and Bulgarians who form the most important Christian communities in European Turkey.

From the date of the Turkish conquest, the Greeks have lived in Turkey under privileges granted to them by the successors of Othman. These people have been permitted to deal with all matters concerning churches, schools, convents, and hospitals, besides making all legal as well as religious arrangements appertaining to marriages, divorces, and dowries. The Patriarch, assisted by his various councils, has been a religious and semi-independent monarch within the Turkish Empire, his flock has formed a sort of *Imperium in Imperio*. His Holiness, in addition to being a supreme court of appeal, has been the channel by which all matters of importance concerning Greeks have been brought to the notice of the Sublime Porte. In the provinces, too, the representatives of the Patriarch have held a somewhat special position by virtue of their offices. Whether it be the local bishop, vicar, or priest, he has been, and is, an *ex-officio* member of the governmental council of the vilayet, sanjak, or caza in which he resides. Although the Servians in the Kingdom of Servia belong to a practically independent branch of the Eastern or Orthodox Church, yet the Ottoman Servians, who possess three Servian bishops, are considered Patriarchists and form therefore part of the Orthodox community.

As a result of efforts which had been in progress for many years, it was in 1870 that the Sultan by a firman recognised the existence of a semi-independent Bulgarian Church, whose head was to be the Exarch. I cannot here attempt to outline even the main points of the struggle which preceded the granting of the firman of 1870 or to show how the Exarchists finally became entirely independent of the Patriarchate. Sufficient is it to say that the privileges of the Exarch were gradually

increased, and that in 1893 an Imperial decision was sent to his Holiness stating that in dioceses where no Bulgarian bishop existed, the Exarchist schools were to be placed under the supervision of the highest Bulgarian ecclesiastical authority of the district. In spite, however, of the fact that by the above-mentioned firmans, besides other orders issued on the subject, the Exarchists were practically placed in the same position as the Patriarchists, the Turks have never really recognised the right of any Bulgarian ecclesiastical authority other than the seven bishops, whose appointments have been sanctioned by firman, to sit on the local governmental councils of the Empire. At the headquarters of a vilayet where there is no Exarchist bishop (for instance, at Salonika) although there is a large Bulgarian population, the chief Bulgarian ecclesiastical authority, who takes the place of a bishop, is not an *ex-officio* member of the Administrative Council of the vali. In dioceses where there is a Bulgarian bishop (for instance, at Monastir) this bishop sits as an *ex-officio* member of the vilayet council, but the local vicar or priest who represents and acts under the said bishop is not allowed to take his place on the council of the smaller district in which he resides. In addition, the Bulgarian priests have only been allowed as a favour to act as intermediaries between their flocks and the Turkish authorities, whilst as a fact this privilege has always been enjoyed as a right by the Greeks.

Since the granting of the Constitution, the Young Turks have desired and have made definite attempts to curtail many of the privileges of the Patriarch and of the Exarch, and in addition a renewed tendency has arisen to bring home the fact to the Bulgarians that they never really enjoyed the same favourable position as that occupied by the Greeks. While the programme for the instruction in Christian schools has always been submitted to the Government, the reformers of Turkey



+ L'Exarque Bulgare Joseph
24/x 1910 Constantinople

have tried to impose a programme of tuition drawn up by them upon the schools supported by the Christian communities. In addition, too, the Young Turks have not only endeavoured to insist on Turkish being made the language of the Greek and Bulgarian schools, but they have forbidden the appointment of foreigners as teachers in these educational establishments. In some cases schools have been forcibly closed because the professors, instead of supplying the governmental officials with information which they demanded, referred the Turkish authorities to their ecclesiastical chiefs, who, as I have already said, in accordance with the ancient privileges of the Church, possess supreme control of the schools in their districts. In other cases schools, some of which have been open for many years, have been closed for trivial and insufficient reasons. In addition to endeavouring to interfere with the management of the Christian schools, which are supported entirely by the Christian population, the Young Turks have endeavoured to prevent the Patriarch and his representatives acting as intermediaries between the members of the Orthodox population and the Government, and to hinder the practice by which the priest had always taken the place of a legal adviser to a man accused of crime.

In spite of all the improvements which have undoubtedly been introduced by the Young Turks, the situation in Turkey, and especially in European Turkey, after more than two years of Constitutional government is certainly less hopeful than one would have expected from the manner in which the revolution was originally carried out. During my stay in the Ottoman Empire I paid two distinct visits to Macedonia. I found the condition of affairs much worse on the second occasion than on the first. The promise of equality for all Ottomans, made directly after the revolution, was probably the most incautious pledge yet given by the Young Turk reformers. This promise was believed and

consequently well received by the population of the country. The leaders of the bands came in from the mountains, and on receiving a guarantee of a general amnesty decided to throw in their lot with the Young Turk reformers. At first a kind of millennium seemed to have come. As a result of this, when I visited the provinces which make up what is generally known as Macedonia, in the summer of 1909, I found the people still in a state of expectancy. Everybody hoped that some real reforms would be introduced, and that the Christian population would be permitted to play its part in the government of the country.

During the months which followed the advent of the Constitution it appeared to me, from what I saw whilst travelling about the country, that the leaders of the various races in Macedonia were honest in their endeavours to support the Young Turks as long as there remained any hope that these patriots were about to introduce real reforms in the country. In September, 1909, one of the then leaders of the Bulgarian Constitutional Clubs (a most moderate man) even informed me that the Macedonian Question was a thing of the past, and that if constitutionalism were established there need be no strife between the different races making up the population. The same gentleman, owing to events which had then already taken place, was much less sanguine as to the future state of the country when I saw him again some months later, and still more hopeless when I heard from him just before sending these pages to be printed.

As I have already said, the condition of the people inhabiting the European Provinces of the Ottoman Dominions became worse after the Constitution had been in force for about a year. Under the Old Régime, owing to the activity of the different Christian bands, Mussulman brigandage was rendered practically impossible. This again became prevalent after the dis-

appearance of the bands. Moreover, in consequence of the more peaceful state of the country, the great land-owners and their agents, who are principally Moslems, are now able to return to their properties and to enforce the payment of their rents, which, from the tenants' point of view, are calculated on the most unsatisfactory basis. In addition, the Agricultural Clubs, which are organised and supported by the landed proprietors, have renewed their activity, thereby rendering it extremely difficult for a tenant labourer, dismissed by one landowner, to obtain land, and consequently to earn his daily bread, from another proprietor. In spite of the opposition of the inhabitants, and especially of the Bulgarians, Moslems have in almost every case been re-appointed as *gardes champêtres*, or village policemen. These men, who are of course responsible for the personal security of the people and for safeguarding the lands of the villages, are naturally permitted to carry arms. Under the Old Régime the manner in which these guards carried out their duties is notorious. The abuses which might under the circumstances again become rife are too evident to require any explanation here.

Notwithstanding the fact that I believe the Turkish Chamber subsequently relaxed some of the more severe clauses of the Brigandage Law, the effect which this law produced upon the people of Macedonia cannot be ignored when considering the condition of the European Provinces of Turkey. This so-called law, which was actually enforced during many months, was in reality nothing but a project for a law, as it had not been sanctioned by the Chamber. Under this project the Government, amongst other things, obtained the power to arrest the wives and families of men who were accused of brigandage. If these people refused to state (perhaps really not knowing) the whereabouts of their men-folk, they were removed from their homes and taken to Salonika or elsewhere.

Even if this law had been sanctioned by the Chamber, it is obvious that the difficulties of applying it fairly would have been enormous. The law was not only put into force in the vilayet of Monastir, where undoubtedly a few political bands have on several occasions been active since the establishment of the Constitution, but the families of men who were not guilty of brigandage at all were arrested in the vilayet of Salonika and removed from their homes. For example, when I was in Salonika I found that some Bulgarians who had been brought from the interior of the country were under detention, and had only narrowly escaped banishment to Asia Minor owing to the energetic action of Talaat Bey—Minister of the Interior. Although Ibrahim Bey, the Governor-General of the vilayet of Salonika, assured me that the houses and estates of these people were being carefully guarded during their absence, it is hardly to be supposed that on their return these Bulgarians would find their property in the same condition as when they left it. In spite of the fact, too, that it would have been possible to place the vilayets of Macedonia under martial law, this was not done until many months after the imposition of the Brigandage Law. Instead of adopting such a course, the Turks, by virtue of some power conveyed or said to be conveyed by the Brigandage Law, established courts-martial for the trial of prisoners. These courts, which were usually composed of three military and two civil members, and which tried prisoners for offences not punishable by civil law, held their sittings in private. Moreover, counsel for the defence, when allowed to appear at all, were not permitted to have adequate access to the evidence utilised against the prisoner.

The Bulgarians, partly owing to the strong foreign support which they might obtain in case of need, form the element of Macedonian population of which the Young Turks are the most afraid. These Bulgarians



SANDANSKY, THE GREAT BULGARIAN BRIGAND.

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are divided into two more or less separate parties—men who used to belong to the Constitutional Clubs, and who are known as the Constitutional Club party, and Bulgarians who are led by Sandansky. During the first months of the New Régime the policy of these two parties was slightly different. The Constitutional Club party, which is the stronger, was always accused by the Young Turks of endeavouring to further the cause of Bulgaria in Macedonia. I believe that this accusation was for the most part unjustifiable, and I think until the closing of the Constitutional Clubs towards the end of 1909 that these Bulgarians were really anxious for the development of a strong Ottoman Empire ruled by a constitutional Government. Sandansky, on his part, largely for personal reasons, always proclaimed that Macedonia for the Macedonians was the chief plank of his programme. The Young Turks naturally lost the sympathy of many of the Constitutional Club party, by accepting the support of Sandansky (the well-known brigand, who dare not enter his own country) and of his followers. Moreover, the sympathies of the Constitutional Club Bulgarians were still further alienated by the enforcement of a law forbidding the formation of clubs upon a national basis. Whatever may have been the real policy of the leaders of these clubs, it is obvious that a society—the members of which were largely recruited from men who formed the Bulgarian bands under the Old Régime—holding its meetings in recognised places, under the leadership of well-known men, is far less dangerous to a country than a secret organisation, the promoters and members of which are unknown to the Government. The Bulgarian Constitutional Clubs may be closed, but the internal organisation is still in existence. How soon this organisation will again become active depends entirely upon the manner in which the Young Turks carry on the government of Macedonia. At the time of

writing, outrages have already been committed, trains have been wrecked, and it is reported that bands have taken to the hills.

The Greeks have probably benefited less from the establishment of the Constitution than have the members of any other race. I have already explained some of the questions which have arisen between the Young Turkey Government and the Patriarchate. Moreover, during the final years of absolutism the Ottoman Greeks were often supported by Abdul Hamid against the other races which so largely make up the population of European Turkey. In addition, when corruption was countenanced by everybody, the Greeks, who are generally richer than their fellow-countrymen, were able to secure greater benefits from the emissaries of the Yildiz Government than were other Ottomans. In some respects, therefore, owing to a kind of uncertainty which now exists, trading, in which so many Greeks are engaged, has become more difficult than it was under the Old Régime.

The position of the Greeks in Turkey has also been greatly affected by the Cretan Question. In spite of the correct attitude which these people—both Hellenes and Ottomans—have maintained throughout the last stages of the Cretan Question, a kind of *méfiance* towards the Greeks has arisen amongst the Turks. The Ottoman authorities have certainly not only encouraged this distrust, but as each new crisis has arisen concerning the future status of Crete, the Turks have vented their ill-feeling upon their Greek fellow-countrymen. At several distinct periods since the establishment of the Constitution a systematic boycott of Greek ships and Greek goods has been arranged by the Turks. Although this boycott, which is not only detrimental to Greeks, but to Ottomans in general, is supposed to be the outcome of the feelings of the everyday Turk towards the Greek, yet there is no doubt that it is

supported by the Government and by the Committee. The fact that the boycott could at any time easily be stopped by the Government is clearly proved by the action which it took in reference to the removal of some pontoons from the Stamboul Quays at Constantinople during the early days of August, 1910. The Government, in order to favour the *hamals* who are wont to lead the boycott, authorised them to remove certain pontoons on which British as well as other ships had a right to discharge their cargoes. The ships were consequently bound to unload into lighters which belonged to the *hamals*. As this system of unloading was at the charge of the ship or cargo, the British Ambassador at Constantinople informed the Government that when this occurred he would expect an indemnity of £70 per day. As this matter was at once stopped, and as massacres under the Old Régime were always begun and ended by order, so could the Greek boycott be terminated were the Young Turks honest in their endeavours to bring about such an end.

During my travels in the interior, too, I have found that the Greeks were being subjected to various petty injustices and annoyances. Cases were brought to my notice where owners of hotels and shops were compelled by the Government to repaint their houses because their names or trades were printed in blue and white letters—the national colours of Greece—and where tradesmen were compelled to recolour such articles as water-barrels, because they, also, had been decorated in white and blue. My readers may contend that such trivial things are not worthy of notice, but it is these things and thousands of a like nature, when taken in conjunction with many more serious matters, some of which I have already discussed, that enable the Ottoman Greek to say that his lot under the New Régime is no better than it was in the days of absolutism.

The unrest caused in Macedonia largely as a result of the Brigandage Law has been greatly increased by the manner in which people have been forced to surrender their arms. The confiscation of arms has been accompanied, not only by the beating of ignorant peasants but by the chastisement of well-to-do merchants. Men were beaten on the feet as well as on other parts of their bodies. The greater proportion of the Christians only want to retain their rifles and revolvers for self-preservation, and were they once confident of the good intentions of the Turkish Government they would give up their arms willingly. There is no doubt that the question of disarmament is in itself excellent ; but if disarmament has once been decided upon, it should be disarmament for the whole population, and not for Christians alone. Not only, however, have Moslems been allowed to retain their rifles, but in some cases it is said that those actually taken from Christian peasants have been issued to Mohammedan *mouhaggirs* (emigrants). In addition to stirring up the Christians of Macedonia itself, the effect of this disarmament has been to create a great feeling of hostility towards the Young Turks amongst the people of the neighbouring countries. This is specially important in the case of Bulgaria, which, as a result of the arbitrary and cruel acts which accompanied the disarmament of Christians in Macedonia, became infested by thousands of Macedonian refugees, who were not only a burden to the State but also an element of disturbance amongst the population.

In order to explain what has taken place the more clearly I will give one or two examples of the manner in which the disarmament has been carried out. At Karaferia, on the railway between Salonika and Monastir, two former leaders of bands were each ordered to surrender three rifles to the authorities. These men, who did not, in fact, each possess

more than one rifle, having been ordered to find six weapons, took refuge in the mountains rather than face the punishment which they knew would be inflicted upon them if they could not produce the six rifles which they did not really possess. Again, in the caza of Gevgeli, between Salonika and Uskub, the disarmament was accompanied by the ill-treatment of Christian peasants. As a result of a complaint made by the Vicar of Gevgeli, the local Turkish authority said that he was unaware of these acts of barbarity. In the Yenidge Vardar district Bulgarians were arrested as a consequence of an investigation carried out by the *Kamaikam* (Turkish Governor) on a charge of supplying money to insurrectionary bands. The sole proof urged against these people seems to have been some almost unreadable figures inscribed on scraps of paper said to have been found by the authorities.

As far as the condition of this part of the country is concerned, one of the most important laws yet passed by the Turkish Chamber is that regulating the allotment of the disputed churches and schools in Macedonia. Prior to the constitution of the Exarchate by Imperial firman in 1870, all the Christian churches and schools in Macedonia had been built in the name of the Patriarch, and as a result of firmans granted to the Orthodox Church. These firmans are still held by the Greek Patriarch. Although, therefore, these buildings were constructed by and for the use of the population, they were all officially Greek until the establishment of the Exarchate, which became independent of the Greek Church in 1872. In accordance with the Imperial firman constituting the Exarchate, a large number of churches and schools then existing were taken over by the new Bulgarian Church. Partly because the Greek Patriarch excommunicated the first Exarch and all his flock in 1872, a large

number of Christians in Macedonia who were Bulgarian by race did not join the Exarchist community. This, coupled with the fact that on various occasions the populations of whole villages have changed their religion or more correctly have desired in future to owe their spiritual allegiance to the Exarchate instead of the Patriarchate, caused the possession of the churches and schools in many villages to be in dispute between the Greek and the Bulgarian ecclesiastical authorities. As a result of these struggles between the two Churches, whose doctrines and beliefs are identical, many churches and schools were closed by the Government during the days of the Old Régime. It is largely in order to decide the future ownership of these buildings, and of some other churches and schools, that the new law has been framed.

According to the most important provisions of the new statute, the churches and schools in a village possessing an entirely Patriarchist or an entirely Exarchist population are to be allotted to the community of which the population is composed. Where the population is mixed, and therefore where there are or may be two claimants to the ecclesiastical buildings, the present existing church and school are to be allotted to the community in whose name they were originally built, unless the population belonging to that community is less than one-third of the total population of the place, in which case the existing buildings are to be given to the majority. At the same time, the Government at its own expense has undertaken to build churches and schools for the members of the population to whom the old buildings are not allotted under the law. When there is more than one church in any place, the community in whose name the churches and schools were built is to be allowed to retain the buildings which it prefers, unless it numbers less than one-third of the total population of the place, in which case



THE BULGARIAN CATHEDRAL AT MONASTIR.

the people who did not originally own the churches are to have their choice.

Whether the effect of this law will be good or bad largely depends upon the manner in which it is put into execution. In the past, the people of Turkey, and especially of Macedonia, have been classed for the most part by religions rather than by races, and therefore it is obvious, if the Ottoman Government is actuated by the best possible intentions, that many disputes are sure to arise, as they have arisen in the past, concerning who are Bulgarians and who are Greeks. The fact, therefore, remains to be proved whether these questions will be fairly settled or whether Greeks and Bulgarians will be indiscriminately numbered as Patriarchists or Exarchists according to whether at any particular moment the Turks wish to favour the propaganda of Greece or of Bulgaria. In addition, time alone will demonstrate whether, in the present state of the Turkish finances, the Ottoman Government will either be in a position to, or even desirous of providing those divested of their place of worship with buildings for devotional and educational purposes which will prove any adequate recompense for those which they will lose according to the new law.

I cannot attempt here either to discuss the political aspects of the church and school questions in Macedonia or to examine the fairness or unfairness of the new law. My readers will probably agree that buildings devoted to religious services or instruction ought not to be utilised to further a political propaganda, but they will disagree as to what does, or should, constitute a proper claim to the ownership of a religious or endowed building. The Greeks contend, by virtue of the firmans granted to, and still possessed by, the Patriarch, that they have a right to all schools in places where there are still any Patriarchists and which were constructed

before the creation of the Exarchate. The Bulgarians, on their part, hold that the Church and the clergy are only the tenants and not the possessors of religious buildings, which they contend belong to the people for whom and by whom the churches and schools were actually constructed, before the split occurred between the Greek and the Bulgarian Churches.

It is probable that I have already said enough to prove to my readers that at least the non-Turkish elements of the population have some reason for discontent, owing to many of the actions of the Government which came into power as a result of the establishment of the Constitution. In the course of the following pages I shall describe other events which will demonstrate the attitude of the Turkish Government towards some of the subject races over whom it rules. That little has been heard of this discontent may at least be partly due to the fact that martial law has gradually been proclaimed in so many districts of the Empire. The Christians, who are the most vehement in their complaints, might be to a great extent appeased were they admitted to a reasonable proportion of posts in the Government, and were they given a large voice at least in their own municipal affairs. On more than one occasion I have discussed this question with high officials of state. My questions, directed to discover why hardly any Christians are employed in the governmental offices and in the local administration, were invariably answered by statements framed with the object of making me believe that these gentlemen do not know the Turkish language sufficiently well to enable them to carry out the duties of civil servants. As a matter of fact, nearly all educated Christian Ottomans, domiciled in Turkey, know the Turkish language as well as the Turks themselves, and therefore it is obvious that the reason given why but few Christians have been appointed to fill Government posts is hardly satisfactory.

The remedy for many of the abuses which undoubtedly still exist in Turkey and the means by which a large number of difficulties can be overcome by the Ottoman Government is to introduce some form of decentralisation in the administration of the country. Decentralisation, if accompanied by reforms in the local administration, would not only guarantee the peasant or citizen—be he Moslem or Christian—a voice in the manner in which at least part of the taxes to which he is liable are expended, but it would provide positions to which men who had gained the respect of their fellow-countrymen could aspire. During the days of the Old Régime, and especially as communication by telegraph grew easier, centralisation had become more and more complete. Scarcely the smallest change could be effected in the most remote part of the Empire without an Imperial *iradé* from Yildiz. Although Abdul Hamid is a captive, and the Government of Yildiz has disappeared, yet centralisation in almost every case remains. I have visited even the offices of Cabinet Ministers at Constantinople, and found them crammed with foreign consuls, men, women, children, journalists who were for the most part waiting for interviews with the chiefs of departments who were already so overworked that they were totally unable to accomplish one-half the business which it was absolutely necessary for them to perform in person.

By proposing decentralisation I do not mean to suggest the introduction of any scheme which would be destined to carry with it the separation of one part of the Empire from another. The Young Turks are certainly right to maintain their objections to any such scheme. There must be unity of government but diversity of administration. To draft laws and to introduce conditions which will place the Arab, Kurd, Armenian, Greek, Slav, or Albanian under the same conditions of life is a task which can hardly be accom-

plished by any Turkish statesman. When once a vali has been appointed to govern a province he should be given fuller powers to carry out his duties as the local representative of the Central Government. If the administration of a district is not satisfactory, its governor must be held responsible and if necessary he must be recalled. At present the only province in which any scheme of decentralisation has been tried is Bagdad, where Nazim Pasha has been nominated as Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief, with powers which greatly exceed those usually conferred upon a governor of a Turkish province.

Decentralisation, if it is to be effective and successful, must be accompanied by reforms in the local administration of the provinces. These reforms and changes could at first not be introduced in any smaller subdivisions of the country than the vilayet. The extra power conferred upon the vali should, of course, be subject to the veto of his local councils. At present the vali of an ordinary province is supposed to be assisted by two councils—the Administrative Council and the Council General of the vilayet. The Administrative Council is made up of a certain number of officials and dignitaries, who sit by virtue of their offices, and of a few notables of the province who are nominated by the Governor-General. The *ex-officio* members of this council include the vali, who is its president, the local finance minister, the chief judge, the secretary-general of the province, and in some places one, or at most two, dignitaries of the Christian Churches. The Council General of the vilayet, which is composed of a certain number of members elected by the population of each sanjak, only sits for a small part of the year. If, therefore, the Administrative Council, which in the past has always been the only body of the smallest importance, is to assist the vali in his work, and is also to be the means by which the

will of the people is to be demonstrated in the conduct of local affairs, it is clear that this body, even if composed of some *ex-officio* members, must also possess a certain proportion of men elected by the people.

The difficulty of finding a solution of the Macedonian Question has perplexed many a European statesman. It is certain that the Young Turks are wrong in supposing that the importation of Moslem emigrants from Bosnia, Bulgaria, or Russia will improve the situation. It is evident, without even resorting to history, which explains what has happened in the past, and without considering the obstacles to be encountered by the Turkish Government from a financial point of view, that the difficulties of first obtaining desirable emigrants, who are willing to leave their own homes, and then of settling them upon suitable lands, are practically insurmountable. The establishment of good government alone can ensure the development of a strong Turkey and prevent the Macedonian Question from again becoming as acute as it was during the closing years of the reign of Abdul Hamid. To endeavour to outnumber the Christian population of any particular province by importing *mouhaggirs* is not only wrong from a humanitarian point of view, but it will not accomplish the object for which it is intended by the Young Turks.

II

THE TURKISH ARMY AND NAVY

General importance of the Army in Turkey—Army system—Infantry—Cavalry—Artillery—Engineers and Details—Medical Services—Officers—Training—Discipline of the Army—Enlistment of non-Moslems—Delay in mobilisation caused by present Army system—Peace and war strengths—The Turkish Navy.

SINCE the day when Ertoghrlul first advanced westwards through Armenia, and since Sulieman Pasha established the Crescent in Europe, the Osmanlis have not only been compelled to secure and retain control of both their Asiatic and European dominions by constant strife, but they have been little more than an army of occupation in the Empire over which they have ruled. As each new province has been conquered by or wrested from them, the Turks have either settled down among the existing population, or they have vacated the country no longer ruled by their Moslem master. A belief in "fate" and a sort of indescribable, secret, unknown discipline rule the whole race, and, by their rule, make it possible for the Turks to accept fortune or misfortune as if it were all in the ordinary course of life's short day. Every Osmanli forms a member of that great racial fighting machine, the core of which is the actual Turkish Army, which is, and always has been, the backbone of the power of the Empire.

Whatever beneficial changes have or have not been introduced in Turkey since 1908, it is certain that the Young Turks have not only devoted both energy and

money to the improvement of their Army, but that drastic reforms have, in fact, been introduced in the military forces of the country. It is not unnatural, too, that the Army should have been the first public service to receive the attention of those who have liberated their country from the absolute form of government under which it had existed for years. During the days of the Old Régime the training of the Army was completely neglected. Even if they were paid at all, the salaries of both officers and men were always months in arrear. Under these circumstances, the members of an Army who nearly always resent the neglectful treatment of politicians were not averse to accepting the ideas of any reformers, whatever was their special programme.

Although the practical and moral strength which the support of the Army gives to the politicians of any country must always be of enormous importance, yet this power, however great it may be in more civilised countries, cannot be compared to the omnipotence which is vouchsafed to the party maintained by the Army in a country like Turkey. The reformers had, as we know, been planning the revolution for years prior to 1908, but it was only when at least an important part of the Army threw in its lot with liberalism that the New Régime became a reality.

The Army which enabled the Young Turks to triumph in July, 1908, and which empowered the Committee of Union and Progress party to recapture Constantinople in April, 1909, is still the controlling factor which regulates both the internal and foreign policy of the Turkish Government. Whether the influence of the military party continues as a sort of secondary influence behind the throne, or whether the country is administered by what amounts to a military government, in either case there is no doubt as long as the political views of the Turkish officers receive consideration from the

Government, and as long as the men are well clothed, receive good food and regular pay, that the Army will support a Young Turk Government. Although, therefore, it is safe to assume that the awful tyranny which existed during the reign of the ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid can never again become a reality, yet should the Army transfer its allegiance either from the present to another form of liberal Government, or should it decide in favour of more or less despotic rule (headed by a royal personage or a military dictator), then, unless any external influence should change the trend of events, it is practically certain that this militarily-supported Government will become predominant in Turkey.

It is difficult to ascertain the population of the Ottoman Empire with any degree of certainty. Still more perplexing is it to discover what proportion of the total population is made up of those professing Christianity. It is estimated, however, that out of a total population of some 25,000,000 (excluding Egypt), between 6,500,000 and 7,000,000 people belong to the Christian races inhabiting Turkey. Prior to the advent of the Constitution, Christians were entirely exempt from the burden of military service and were, instead, subjected to an annual tax of two megidiehs (about 6s. 8d.). In addition, although military service was nominally compulsory for all "True Believers," yet in the past the Moslems of Constantinople, besides the inhabitants of nearly the whole vilayet of Scutari in Albania and of Arabia, in addition to the Kurdish and Arab tribes of Asia Minor (only subject to service in the Hamidieh Cavalry), and the men of the vilayet of Tripoli were exempted from military duties. Moslems were and probably still will be able to purchase the privilege of passing straight into the reserve for £T50 and to avoid service even on mobilisation on a further payment of £T50.

The present army system was introduced into Turkey



THE GATEWAY OF THE SERASKERAT (WAR OFFICE) AT CONSTANTINOPLE.



THE SERASKERAT AT CONSTANTINOPLE.

by General Von du Goltz in 1886. Liability to service begins at the age of twenty and lasts twenty-five years. Between 160,000 and 170,000 Moslems reach the military age every year. From this number about 70,000 are taken for actual colour service, whilst about 30,000 pass straight into the second-class Redif after a few months' preliminary training. The remainder are either medically unfit or are exempt for various other reasons. The military life of a Turkish soldier is divided as follows :—

1. For the infantry a continuous period of three years' service with the colours, and for the cavalry and artillery four years passed under the same conditions. Under the Old Régime this period of colour service was often extended, and men were therefore retained with their regiments when their proper period of service had, in fact, expired. This manner of treating the conscripts caused considerable discontent, and was probably one of the factors which caused the Army to throw in its lot with the liberals of the Empire. As a result, after the advent of the Constitution, all the "time-expired" men were allowed to return to their homes, leaving the active Army, therefore, largely composed of young soldiers.

It may be, too, a matter of considerable political import that all the men who were recruited under the Old Régime, and who, therefore, understand that the present conditions of military service are considerably better than those which existed in the past, either have already completed their period of active military life, or will complete it in 1911, according to the branches of the Army to which they belong. Although it is probable that the Army of the future will not be disloyal to liberalism, yet it is conceivable that young men, perhaps recruited from a village which has gained but little from the Constitution, and who have not had personal experience of the former conditions of

military service, will be less loyal to the reformers of the Empire than men whose every wish and desire receives the immediate attention of the Government, and who thoroughly realise the advantages they have gained from the events which occurred in 1908.

2. For the infantry six years, and for the cavalry and artillery five years in the reserve of the active Army. This reserve has in the past been nominally subjected to six weeks' training, a training which was but seldom actually carried out. In lieu of these drills, however, it is and was only too common for a large number of men serving in the reserve of the active Army to be called upon to join their battalions in order to assist in quelling a rebellion in the Yemen or elsewhere.

3. Nine years in the Redif or reserve Army. The Redifs, which are divided into two classes, known as the first and second class, and which for the most part only consist of cadres, have always nominally been subjected to one month's training every other year. Whether this regulation will be strictly enforced under the New Régime remains to be proved.

4. Seven years in the Mustafiz or territorial Army. This force has no organisation and forms a reserve for the Redif.

The Turkish Empire is divided into seven Army Corps districts:

1st Army Corps, headquarters Constantinople. This district includes in its recruiting area, besides the environs of the capital, the sanjak of Ismid, the greater part of the vilayet of Brousa, besides the whole of the vilayets of Angora and Kastamouni.

2nd Army Corps, headquarters Adrianople. This district comprises the whole of the vilayets of Adrianople and Konia, besides certain other sanjaks which extend its recruiting area from north to south of Asia Minor.

3rd Army Corps, headquarters Salonika. This dis-

tract embraces, not only the remaining vilayets of European Turkey, but also that of Smyrna, besides many of the islands which make up the Archipelago vilayet of the Empire.

4th Army Corps, headquarters Erzingan. This district includes the whole of Eastern Asia Minor, and, owing to its proximity to the Russian and Persian frontier, is one of extreme importance to the Turkish Empire. That the importance of this Army Corps is realised by the Turks will be shown by the troops which are allotted to it.

5th Army Corps, headquarters Damascus. This district is made up of Syria and Palestine.

6th Army Corps, headquarters Bagdad. This district includes Mesopotamia and extends down the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates as far as the Persian Gulf.

7th or Yemen Army Corps, with headquarters at Sanaa.

In addition to the seven Corps districts, the Ottoman Army possesses one divisional area in the Hedjaz and another at Tripoli in Barbary.

Although each of these Army Corps districts is nominally supposed to provide the Turkish Government with an Army Corps of two or more infantry divisions, a cavalry division, and a division of field artillery, besides the usual complement of details, yet as the Army Corps organisation is, at any rate in most instances, very incomplete, and as Turkish troops are generally mobilised by divisions or even by brigades, I propose to deal separately and as carefully as possible with different branches of the service, and then to show how many of the described units, be they infantry, cavalry, or artillery, are located in each Army Corps district.

Infantry.

The infantry of the Turkish Army is actually made up of fifty-five and a half divisions. Of these

divisions twenty-one and a half belong to the Nizam or regular Army, whilst thirty-four are composed of Redif regiments. These thirty-four Redif divisions are again divided into two parts, twenty-four divisions belonging to the first-class Redif and ten divisions to the second-class Redif. Although the above-mentioned half-division of Nizam infantry is now practically non-existent, it is proposed to fill its place by newly-formed battalions. This half-division was composed of the two Zouave regiments (four battalions) of the Imperial Guard which were disbanded after the deposition of the ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid.

A division of infantry, in war nominally possessing 16,000 men, contains two brigades, each composed of two regiments. A regiment is made up of four battalions, each of which in turn possesses four companies. The war strength of a battalion should be something between 1,000 and 1,082 of all ranks, but ordinarily battalions only contain a number varying from 300 to 600 of all ranks, according to the districts in which they are quartered. The whole of the Nizam (regular) infantry is armed with the 7.65 mm. Mauser magazine rifle of the 1890 pattern. Some of the Redif regiments are provided with the same weapon, whilst others possess Mausers of different kinds, or arms of other older patterns. The Turkish Government has recently ordered a very large supply of ammunition (it is said 100,000,000 rounds) for the modern Mauser, and according to the latest estimates of Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, 66,000 modern rifles are to be purchased immediately or have already been delivered.

The twenty-one Nizam divisions are distributed amongst the seven Army Corps approximately as follows:

1st Army Corps	2 divisions
2nd " "	4 divisions
3rd " "	5 divisions



TURKISH AND BULGARIAN INFANTRY FORMED UP ON THE FRONTIER BETWEEN EGRI PALANKA AND KOSTENDIL.

4th Army Corps	3 divisions
5th " "	1 division
6th " "	2 divisions
7th " "	2 divisions
The district of Tripoli in Barbary	1 division
The district of the Yemen...	1 division

To each of the first six Army Corps are allotted four divisions of the first-class infantry Redif. The ten divisions of second-class Redif all form part of the European Army, two and a half divisions belonging to the Adrianople district, whilst the remaining seven and a half divisions are on the strength of the Salonika Army Corps.

Cavalry.

Each Army Corps, as I said above, is supposed to possess a cavalry division composed of three brigades. Each brigade is made up of two regiments. A regiment in its turn possesses five squadrons. A squadron should contain about 120 men in peace and 150 of all ranks in war. At present the actual strength of squadrons varies from 60 to 80 of all ranks. After his Nizam service the cavalryman passes into the Redif infantry. Only the first five Army Corps contain their complement of cavalry, and one brigade belonging to the 5th Army Corps was sent from the Damascus district to Salonika some three years ago. The remaining two Army Corps districts contain an uncertain and very varying number of cavalry. The regular cavalry, which till recently was for the most part equipped with the Henri-Martini rifle or carbine, is now being re-armed with the modern Mauser carbine. As I have already mentioned, the Hamidieh Cavalry is an irregular militia recruited from the Arab and Kurdish tribes of Asia Minor. Although this force, which is made up of sixty-six regiments, each with a strength of 400 to 800 horsemen, is supposed to be embodied every year, but little training is actually carried out.

Artillery.

Each Army Corps district is supposed to provide recruits for and to contain a division of field artillery. An artillery division is made up of three brigades, each composed of two regiments. Every regiment is divided into two battalions, each of which in turn is made up of three batteries. (An Army Corps should therefore contain thirty-six batteries of field artillery.) In the past a battery has always contained six guns and nine wagons, but batteries of four guns and six wagons are now being formed.

The field artillery of the Turkish Army is located approximately as follows :

1st Army Corps district	30 batteries
2nd " "	"	"	...	48 "
3rd " "	"	"	...	48 "
4th " "	"	"	...	30 "
5th " "	"	"	...	about 20 "
6th " "	"	"	...	20 "
7th " "	"	"	...	24 "

After the Constitution, the quick-firing guns supplied under various contracts, signed between 1903 and 1905, were removed from the stores in which they had been housed since they were delivered at Constantinople, and distributed for the most part to the first four Army Corps. Enough Krupp quick-firing guns to re-arm ninety-three (six-gun) batteries have now been received by Turkey, and I believe that each gun was provided with 500 rounds of ammunition. In addition to the guns actually received by Turkey, I understand that twenty-three (four-gun) batteries have been ordered from the firm of Krupp, but have not yet been delivered at Constantinople. Owing to the result of tests which were carried out at the end of March, 1910, the Turks then decided to order nine new batteries of quick-firing

guns from the firm of Creuzot. These Schneider-Creuzot weapons will, when completed, be the first of their kind supplied to Turkey, and will resemble almost exactly those in use both in Servia and Bulgaria. The batteries of artillery in the Army not yet re-armed with quick-firing guns possess the 8.7 Krupp cannon.

The Turkish Army is supplied with but a limited complement of horse artillery. At the present time this force is only represented in the first three Army Corps districts, to each of which has been located six batteries armed with Krupp guns of the old model.

The mountain batteries are allotted to the different Army Corps approximately as follows :

1st Army Corps	6 batteries
2nd "	"	"	7 "
3rd "	"	"	15 "
4th "	"	"	6 "
5th "	"	"	3 "
6th "	"	"	1 or 2 "
7th "	"	"	1 or 2 "

Twenty-three of these (six-gun) batteries have now been re-armed with 7.5 cm. quick-firing Krupp guns. All these newly-armed batteries are quartered in the first four Army Corps districts. The older model is the 7.5 Krupp gun.

The Turkish Army possesses twelve batteries of field Howitzers, which are for the most part armed with 15 cm. Krupp guns. Three batteries of 4.3 inch position guns have been ordered and I believe delivered. The Army is also equipped with 120 machine guns (70 Hodjiss and 50 Maxims). It is now proposed to group these guns into machine-gun companies, each made up of four guns. A company will for obvious reasons be divided into two sections. Some of the new units have already been formed in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Army Corps districts.

Engineers and Details.

According to the former recognised establishment of the Turkish Army, there should be a battalion of engineers and a battalion of train in each Army Corps district. Endeavours are being made to increase this force to one of the same strength for each infantry division. Although this reform has not yet been thoroughly introduced, yet in the 2nd and 3rd Army Corps areas the new battalions of train have already been organised.

The Army possesses four Hodjkiss armoured motor-cars. Whilst two of these, which are in the Adrianople Army Corps, worked well during manœuvres, the remaining two are in the Yemen.

Medical Services.

Under the Old Régime the medical service of the Army was entirely neglected. But few arrangements were made during peace in order to ensure adequate succour to those who were either wounded or afflicted with disease during war. If one may judge the efficiency of the service from the hospitals which I visited, it is certain that no very high standard has yet been reached. At Monastir, where my visit was expected, I found the wards fairly well arranged and the operating theatre and dispensary clean. The staff of the hospital, which consisted of eleven doctors (mostly Christians), besides nursing attendants, were extremely pleased to show me their Röntjen Ray apparatus, which, although it had been but recently installed, seemed to be understood by those who were charged with the responsibility of manipulating it. A description of the hospital at Salonika is better left unwritten.

Uniforms.

After the Constitution practically the whole Army was re-dressed in new khaki serge uniforms. Whilst



OFFICERS OF THE YOUNG TURK ARMY.

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some regiments have even been supplied with "ammunition" boots, closely resembling the footgear of the British infantry, others still wear the native sandal-like shoes, which are much more serviceable, especially to those who are accustomed to them, for mountain wear. Endeavours have even been made by the Turkish authorities to do away with the fez and introduce the shako in order to provide the soldier with shade for his eyes. So far, however, these endeavours have not met with any great success.

Officers.

In the past the officers of the Army have certainly been its weakest part. The commissioned ranks are made up of two classes; firstly, the *Mektebi*, or gentlemen who have passed into the Army through the military schools, and secondly, the *Alaili*, or men who have been promoted from the ranks. The number of the *Alaili* officers, who are generally old men, entirely ignorant of all the duties of an officer, is being decreased, and in the future it is hoped that the commissioned ranks will be entirely recruited from men who have studied at the military schools. Formerly, too, there seems to have been little attempt to promote officers otherwise than by favour. During the year 1909, however, the Young Turks demonstrated their wish to correct this abuse by reducing many of the officers, who had been improperly promoted, to the grade to which their seniority entitled them. When I was in Turkey, it was no uncommon sight to see even generals performing their duties in uniforms the marks on which demonstrated where once superior badges of rank had been affixed. The fact that these men have almost without exception given up their rank and emoluments without a murmur or a complaint speaks well for the spirit of patriotism which undoubtedly pervades the Turkish Army.

During my stay in Constantinople, I paid a visit to the Pancaldi Military School. Although on paper the organisation and arrangements of the Turkish "Sandhurst" may be little short of perfect, yet I was not impressed either by the professors or by the military establishment over which they preside. A cadet enters the Military School at Constantinople between seventeen and nineteen years of age. Under ordinary circumstances about 400 boys gain admission every year to this establishment.

The course of instruction, which lasts three years, includes, in addition to the ordinary military subjects, French, and either German or Russian. The pupils at the college who, according to the information given by the Turkish authorities, number 1,200 (1,050 for the infantry and 150 for the cavalry), are divided for instructional purposes into three classes. For drill and manœuvres exercises, the cadets are organised by battalions and squadrons.

Young men desirous of obtaining commissions in the artillery or engineers pass through a separate military establishment at Constantinople.

The Military Academy at Constantinople is a sort of Staff College. Formerly the course at this college was taken by selected officers immediately after they had passed through their course of instruction at one or other of the two military schools. According to the present regulations, however, an officer must have served with his regiment for at least two years in order to become eligible for the Staff College, which accommodates 120 pupils. A certain number of officers who have successfully passed the two years' instruction at the Academy are annually sent to Germany to improve their military knowledge still further.

No satisfactory arrangements have been made for the provision of a sufficiently large supply of officers of the reserve. These men are supposed to be drawn

from gentlemen who have served in the commissioned ranks of the Army, and from non-commissioned officers who have passed certain examinations. In the event of war, and of the consequent mobilisation of a large fighting force, one of the greatest difficulties to be overcome by the military authorities will be the shortness of officers—a difficulty which the Minister of War and his advisers will do well to consider before hostilities actually occur. This shortcoming in the Turkish Army will, however, be gradually overcome as officers pass through the military schools to replace those who were retired after the revolution owing to their age or inefficiency.

Training.

Before the advent of the Constitution the troops only performed military duties on two or three days a week, and no training was regularly carried out in the Army. Almost immediately after the revolution small manœuvres, in which one or two battalions took part, were instituted in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Army Corps districts. Subsequently it was discovered that the men taking part in these manœuvres had no idea of the rudiments of drill, and it was, therefore, decided that it was necessary to carry out the more elementary phases of military instruction. During my travels I found that, in the various military centres which I visited in European Turkey, the men were undergoing a considerable amount of drill, and that manœuvre exercises were being carried out. Although practice in shooting, quite unknown during the Old Régime, has now been introduced for the infantry, I have been unable to ascertain that any firing has been carried out by the artillery. In the provinces at least, range practices for the artillery seemed to be quite unknown. An officer of high rank belonging to that branch of the service, and quartered in an important military centre,

even went so far as to inform me about eighteen months after the advent of the Constitution that the Turkish artillery had been so good for fifteen years that it was not necessary to carry out any changes ! Both at Constantinople, Salonika, Adrianople, and other military centres field days, in which the whole of the respective garrisons take part, are now of no uncommon occurrence. The troops often leave their quarters early in the morning, not to return until late in the day.

In 1909 the first manœuvres on a larger scale were carried out in the neighbourhood of Adrianople. The general idea for these manœuvres, drawn up, I believe, by General Von du Goltz Pasha, who was present throughout the operations, was that a Red force was advancing into Turkey from Bulgaria. Whilst the object of the main body of this force, which was imaginary, and which marched on the south of the Maritza, was to seize Demotica before the main body, Blue (imaginary), could be collected at that town, a second Red force, composed of about 6,000 men, advanced along the northern bank of the Maritza with orders to cut the communications between the main body (Blue) and its flanking force (composed of about 5,000 men), which was believed to be at Kirk Killissé, and to encircle Adrianople. Although some of the columns were imaginary, yet the object of manœuvres held in this locality, and with such a general idea, must be obvious to every student of Balkan geography. The importance of Adrianople is well known. The army which first occupies Demotica is not only in a position to control the railway traffic from Salonika towards Adrianople and Constantinople, and to protect Kouleli Bourgas Junction, but also to advance up the Valley of the Maritza and to attack Adrianople from the south—a direction from which the town is the least defended. Moreover, if Demotica is left unprotected, it is possible to approach the Dédé Agatch-Kouleli Bourgas Railway,

from Kirjali and Mastanli, by way of the Valley of the Kizil Déré Chai, which flows down from the Eastern Rhodope Balkans and joins the Maritza River at this point.

During these manœuvres the men marched well, and



**Sketch Map to illustrate Manœuvres
1909 -1910**

Railways open in construction Scale 1:1,500,000

the bridges across the River Tundra to the north of Adrianople were rapidly and efficiently constructed. Although the manner in which the operations themselves were carried out would hardly have been accepted as

satisfactory by European military critics, and in spite of the fact that many faults were certainly visible, yet, on the whole, the conduct of these manœuvres more than came up to the most sanguine expectations of those whose opinions concerning Turkish military matters carry most weight.

The 1910 Army manœuvres, in which about 70,000 men were engaged, again took place in the neighbourhood of Adrianople. Each force was made up of an Army Corps of regular troops augmented by a division of Redifs. As in 1909, the general idea was based on a scheme in which a force advancing from the direction of Bulgaria upon Constantinople was opposed by a force which held the railway junction at Kouleli Bourgas.

There is no doubt that both officers and men of the Turkish Army are greatly wanting in education. Before the Constitution tactical schemes for officers were entirely unknown. Some endeavours have been made to introduce these exercises since July, 1908, but it is difficult to ascertain with what success these efforts have been attended. Attempts are also being made to improve the education of the men, 80 per cent. among whom, it is calculated, are now unable to read or write. With this object in view, the more up-to-date and liberal-minded Turkish governors and military commanders are making use of every opportunity to lecture their men. During my stay in Adana I was present at two of these addresses, which were delivered by the Vali and the Military Commander of the district. These officers not only gave their men a short account of all the great deeds which had been accomplished by the Turks in the past, and referred to the fact that the eyes of the whole world were fixed upon Turkey, but exhorted the troops, by loving their officers and their comrades, to maintain that high standard of discipline which was so necessary to the Army of Turkey.



THE SULTAN MOHAMMED V. LEAVING THE BAYEZIDIVEH MOSQUE AFTER A SELAMLIK.
The two officers accompanying his Majesty are Salih Pasha (formerly Minister of War), and Mahmoud Shocket Pasha.

Discipline.

The discipline of the Turkish Army is certainly not above reproach. During the many months which intervened between the appointment of Mahmoud Shevket Pasha as "Inspector-General of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Army Corps," and the moment when his Excellency became Minister of War in January, 1910, the discipline of the Turkish Army could be but little improved. For months Mahmoud Shevket Pasha actually commanded and issued orders to generals senior to himself in rank. From personal experience I can testify that nobody could do anything in the military world without the permission of the prospective generalissimo, the then Minister of War, Salih Pasha, even referring everything to his nominal subordinate. Although Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, who is a very moderate man, undoubtedly carried out his duties as efficiently as was possible under the circumstances, and although he probably filled the difficult position entrusted to him more successfully than any other Ottoman would have done, yet it is obvious that a man nominally only occupying the position of Inspector-General of part of the Army, but in reality being a sort of secret lord and master of all he surveyed, could not enforce that state of discipline which is so necessary in any military organisation. From the moment when Mahmoud Shevket Pasha became Minister of War in the Government of Hakki Pasha, it is obvious that the difficulty of the command of the Army, both in peace and in case of war, has disappeared.

Since the advent of the Constitution, the officers of the Army, especially those of the lower grades, have mixed themselves up in the politics of the country, and have often been the most active members of the Committee of Union and Progress. On more than one occasion it has been necessary to issue orders that

officers are not to play any part in politics, and even to forbid those gentlemen to remain members of the Committee of Union and Progress. As a result of these orders, some fifty officers resigned their commissions, and about two hundred more would have adopted the same course had they not been dissuaded from doing so by the Committee itself. My readers can judge for themselves whether or not these officers, and their many friends, have in reality given up taking any interest in politics, and are now only devoting themselves to the exigencies of their much neglected military profession.

The relationship which exists between the Turkish officer and his subordinates is very difficult to describe. Undoubtedly, much more familiarity exists between the commissioned and uncommissioned ranks than in almost any European Army. It seems as if the custom which obliterates all differences of social standing in Turkey enables the officer to associate with his men and yet to ensure perfect obedience from them. The discipline of the men is, undoubtedly, considerably better than that of the commissioned ranks. The Moslem, always well disciplined, obeys and fights almost as part of his religion. In spite of the corruption which has prevailed in the past, and which, undoubtedly, still exists in Turkey, I have never heard of a soldier who has been influenced by money to disobey an order, nor who, as a result of bribery, has neglected a military duty which has been entrusted to him to perform.

The success in establishing equality between the various races of the Empire will certainly either be furthered or considerably delayed by the enlistment of Christians and Jews in the Army. This reform will have most far-reaching effects, not only upon the inhabitants of European Turkey, but also upon the population of the Empire at large. A law was passed by the Ottoman Parliament early in 1909, recognising

the right of all subjects of the Sultan to enter the Army, and abolishing the tax of forty piastres (6s. 8d.) which had previously been paid by non-Moslems in lieu of service. During the summer and autumn of 1909 the local authorities of the various Christian and Jewish communities were occupied with the preparation of lists indicating those who were liable to service, and shortly before Christmas, 1909, lots were actually drawn in many districts of the Empire.

Notwithstanding the fact that recruits did subsequently join the colours, it is difficult to obtain any reliable information as to how many non-Moslems have actually been enlisted, or what proportion of the Army is eventually to be drawn from the Christian and Jewish populations of the Empire. Scarcely any non-Moslem officers are being trained for the Army. Moreover, as the number of Christian recruits in the Army is not fixed by the Chamber, the executive is left free to decide how many Christians shall be taken for service in the Army every year. In spite of the original rumour that 25 per cent. of the Army is ultimately to be made up of non-Moslems, the Turks have clearly demonstrated their policy of making the exemptions for Christians as liberal as possible. According to a recent decree of the Minister of War the population of Christians in the Army is fixed at 20 per cent. Many recruits, who prior to their enrolment were only too anxious to serve, are now equally desirous of returning to their homes. Wholesale cases of desertion have occurred, and there is reason to suppose that at least some of the Christian recruits, many of whom happen to know a trade, are kept as "hewers of wood and drawers of water" in the commissariat, instead of being provided with and taught the use of arms.

Before Christians were actually taken for service, the heads of the various communities used all their influence in order to try to arrange that the men of

their flocks should only serve in the Army when certain privileges had been arranged for them—privileges most of which the non-Moslems were undoubtedly entitled to expect should be bestowed upon them. Owing to the fact that the Armenian Patriarch, even if he ever formulated conditions at all, almost immediately withdrew them, it is only with the petitions drawn up by the Greek Patriarch and by the Bulgarian Exarch that I propose to deal in detail here.

Although the Turks have not agreed to the conditions which these two religious chiefs desired to impose upon them, and have enlisted Christians and Jews unconditionally, yet the fact that conditions (many of them most reasonable) were drawn up is not without considerable importance. Not only is it obvious that men, enlisted without what they and their advisers consider in a constitutional country to be the rights of citizenship, might prove unreliable servants of the State, but it is certain that the influence of these religious chiefs, who have been thwarted, will be secretly, if not openly, utilised against a form of government which has paid no attention to the petitions addressed to it.

Whilst some of the same conditions were proposed both by the Greek and by the Bulgarian ecclesiastical dignitaries, the Patriarch and the Exarch each desired some modifications in the regulations for the enlistment of Christians which were not pressed for by the other Eastern Pontiff. The following proposals are classed under the first category :

1. That it should be forbidden for men to be converted to Mohammedanism during their period of military service. The object of such a stipulation is obvious. Under the conditions prevailing in the East it would be practically impossible for anybody to discover whether a man changed his religion in order to embrace Islam of his own free will or under pressure, direct or indirect, brought to bear by the Turkish

authorities. Conversion to Mohammedanism is often held out by the Turks as an alternative to massacre or ill-treatment. Even during the massacres at Adana a man who embraced the Mohammedan religion often saved his life by so doing.

2. That Christians should be allowed to observe Sundays and feast days as holidays, and to keep them according to the custom of their own particular Churches. This condition is reasonable as the military Moslems themselves observe Friday as a holy day.

3. That special companies of Christians should be formed, and that, in addition, men should sleep in barrack-rooms by companies, thereby ensuring that Christians would not be compelled to occupy the same rooms as those tenanted by Moslems. Those who are cognisant of the ways of Turkey are able to understand that, although this condition might be somewhat disadvantageous from a military standpoint, yet that the Christians are fully justified in laying stress upon it.

Besides these conditions, which both the Patriarch and the Exarch tried to impose upon the Government, the Patriarch endeavoured to arrange that—

1. Every regiment containing a sufficient number of Christians should be provided with a priest in the same manner as that in which Moslem khojas are allotted to regiments, and that a church or place of worship should be fixed, at which the Christians of each regiment might unite for prayer at the appointed times. His Holiness, who endeavoured to insist that the Greek Church must be permitted to bury their dead without any molestation, agreed that the dress of priests might conceivably be altered in order that it should be better suited to the exigencies of military life.

2. Christian boys who are properly qualified should, in future, be accepted in the military schools, in order that in due course these cadets might become officers. With reference to this condition, although I was in-

formed by the authorities at the Pancaldi War School that Christians were to be permitted to enter that establishment, I was not convinced that the examiners had looked with favour upon the attempts of many of the Christian candidates.

The Bulgarian Exarch on his part tried to insist that—

1. Military service for Christians should only be undergone in the European vilayets of the Empire.

Although this condition is certainly unreasonable when it is imposed as a condition, yet it is to be hoped that the enrolment of Christians may enable the Turks to adopt a more thoroughly territorial system, and that as a result men recruited in Asia Minor will be trained near their homes instead of being sent to European Turkey, and that, therefore, Bulgarian conscripts will, in fact, automatically serve in European Turkey, from which they will for the most part be recruited.

2. When an Exarchist soldier is pronounced to be seriously ill, a priest should be called to minister to the needs of his soul.

3. Schoolmasters and professors, besides young men who have a certificate for a higher education, should be exempted altogether from military service, and that young men who have a secondary education should only serve one year instead of three or four with the colours. In addition, that men who are studying at seminaries should be exempted from military service until they reach thirty years of age, at which time, if they have not become priests, they are to join the colours.

The question of the enrolment of non-Moslems in the Army possesses both most far-reaching advantages and dangers to the Ottoman Empire. If Christians and Jews were not permitted to serve in the Army on the same terms as Moslems, the promise of race equality would not have been realised. Discontent amongst the population would consequently increase.


Besides, many of the non-Moslems, who are often very poor, and to whom a small sum, therefore, represents a good deal, would prefer to serve in the Army rather than to be subjected to a military tax. Whether men who have served would be of a like mind or not it is difficult to say, but it is certain that were Christians not permitted to become soldiers, the military tax would be utilised as a grievance against the Government.

The admittance of non-Moslems into the Army will certainly carry with it many difficulties for the Turkish Government. Men once trained in the use of arms will be far more difficult to suppress than an unarmed, untrained, helpless mob. Not only will the superior training of the men who have been subjected to military service render their attitude towards the Ottoman Government a cause of possible internal and external complications, but should a war break out which was unpopular with any of the races from which the Army will henceforth be recruited, it seems possible that the representatives of that race, whilst actually serving, might easily cause trouble in the ranks. To the everyday man it is indeed perplexing to understand how the Moslem, always more or less fanatical, will be willing to see his Christian brother carrying arms. It will really be wonderful if a section of Moslems, or even partly made up of Moslems, ever faithfully obeys the commands of a Christian corporal.

After discussing this important reform with leading Young Turks, and with important members of the various Christian races of Turkey, I have come to the conclusion that the Young Turks have adopted the only course open to them in allowing Christians to enter the Army. When once the non-Moslem element has become a real factor in the Army, the Government must ensure that the conscripts of all races are treated with frankness, impartiality, and fairness. No attempts must be made to convert soldiers to Islam. Christians

and Jews must be granted freedom of worship. Adequate arrangement must be made for the provision of Christian officers and non-commissioned officers. If these conditions are ever really and honestly carried out, it is certain that not only the feeling of comradeship which must be established between religions and races during the period of military service will be carried back to the remotest districts of the Empire, but in case of any reactionary or Pan-Islamistic troubles in the Asiatic Provinces of the Kingdom, the Young Turks will be able to rely at least on certain divisions of the Army to support them, and thus to re-establish order amongst their Moslem brothers.

One of the greatest problems which must be solved before the Turkish Army can be prepared to repel a sudden invasion, or to despatch a powerful striking force at a moment's notice into an enemy's country, is to discover a plan by which mobilisation can be rapidly effected. At the present moment it is probable that it would be impossible to mobilise the European Army effectively in less than six weeks. In the past, owing to the small number of Moslems in European Turkey, each of the three Army Corps with headquarters in Europe has had a large part of its recruiting area in Asia Minor. As recruits for these three Army Corps are drawn from Asia Minor, it is natural that the men on completion of their service with the colours should return to their homes, however distant those homes may be. If, therefore, it were necessary to mobilise, for instance, the Salonika Army Corps, or, more correctly, the Nizam divisions of the Salonika Army Corps district, a man might conceivably be obliged to travel from the south-western corner of Asia Minor, as far as Novi Bazaar, in order to rejoin his regiment of the Nizam. Again, if it were essential to mobilise the second Army Corps, reservists might be compelled to journey from Southern Asia Minor



THE PRINCIPAL INFANTRY BARRACKS AT MONASTIR.

To face p. 80.

to Kirk Killissé, or other more inaccessible districts, to the eastward of Adrianople. When Christians once bear their share of the burden of conscription, it will be possible to reorganise the recruiting areas, so that each of the divisions and Army Corps may be largely, if not entirely, recruited from the districts in which they are quartered.

In order to get over the difficulty of being unable to mobilise the active Army rapidly, for smaller expeditions and less important internal rebellions, it is not uncommon for men belonging to the first-class Redif to be summoned to join the colours before the reservists of the Nizam have been called up. The object of this plan of obtaining a more or less powerful striking force is that, as the headquarters of Redif regiments are generally in the districts from which the men are actually recruited, these units can be quickly mobilised. Units once thus mobilised can be thrown into any part of the Empire more rapidly than could Nizam units, which would be compelled to wait the arrival of their reservists, each of whom, having travelled to rejoin the colours on his own account, would arrive much more slowly than would a battalion for which proper arrangements could be made. The disadvantages of this plan, which is the only one which can be adopted until the Army Corps districts are rearranged, and which was, in fact, followed for the expedition against the Albanians in 1910, are obvious. Not only are the Nizam and Redif battalions very different in strength, because the former are on a peace footing, whilst the latter are at a war strength, but the reservists of the Nizam, who are naturally younger and more recently trained than those of the Redif, either remain unutilised, or perhaps are even drafted into the Redif, to take their share of the burden of the campaign. However little may be the confusion which must ensue as a result of this manner of mobilisation

when the troops are only required to quiet an insurrection, it is certain that in case of a big war the efficiency of the Army would be seriously affected. Delay would necessarily ensue, even in countries provided with good means of communication, but in Turkey, where railways are few and roads inferior, it is difficult to calculate what disaster might not occur before a powerful Army could be placed in the field.

After the advent of the Constitution it was decided to reorganise the gendarmerie, not only of Macedonia, but throughout the country. The Empire has been divided into six gendarmerie districts, with headquarters at Salonika, Constantinople, Smyrna, Beyrout, Bagdad, and Trebizond. The reforms have been entrusted to European officers, many of whom have gained experience of things Turkish by a period of service in the Macedonian gendarmerie, during the reign of Abdul Hamid. Four or five foreign officers have been allotted to each of the six districts. A gendarme, who nearly always remains in the same district as that in which he is recruited, is compelled to serve for four years if he enlists direct from civil life, whilst a recruit who joins from the Army need only stay in the force for two years. As far as possible, officers and non-commissioned officers who have been trained in Macedonia as a result of the reform scheme introduced for that district have been scattered throughout the country to assist the European officers in their task—the carrying out of which is so urgently necessary to the welfare of the country.

Although in peace the Turkish Army is supposed to have a strength of 300,000 men, it is probable that the actual numbers do not exceed 260,000 of all ranks, out of which number about 150,000 are usually under arms in European Turkey. In a speech made by Mahmoud Shevket Pasha in the Turkish Chamber during June, 1910, his Excellency informed the public

that as War Minister he could not consent to a smaller actual peace strength than 274,000 men. The Turkish military force that would be available in case of war is unlikely to exceed 1,150,000. Although, at present at any rate, it is probable that these numbers will not be increased by the admission of non-Moslems, yet it is likely that the figures given on paper may be more closely adhered to than they have been in the past.

It is practically impossible to obtain any really accurate statement as to the amount of money expended on the Army by the Young Turks. Figures are given, but it seems probable that not only large portions of the indemnity paid by Austria in exchange for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also, at least, portions of the confiscated wealth of the ex-Sultan, have in fact, been allotted for military purposes. Although the Budget for 1907-8 was under £T5,000,000 without the money devoted to the gendarmerie and nearly £T6,000,000 when the expense of that force is included, yet the actual sum voted to Mahmoud Shevket Pasha for the ordinary military Budget in 1910 amounts to £T9,000,000, whilst a further provision for the Army has been made by an extraordinary Budget of £T5,258,000, to be divided between this and the two next financial years. The money voted for the extraordinary Budget is to be used to purchase a large supply of rifles and guns, and to improve the fortifications at Adrianople and other military centres.

If the writer upon, or reader about, the Turkish Army, is animated by a desire to find points worthy of adverse criticism, it would be possible to discover ample material on which to comment with damning truthfulness. If, on the other hand, the European critic desires to be fair in his observations upon the military forces of the Sultan, he cannot refrain from considering that the period which has intervened since the advent of the Constitution, even if the situation in Turkey had

been unbeset by numerous difficulties, would have been all too short to enable the Turkish military authorities to accomplish anything beyond thinking out schemes of possible reform, and accompanying these thoughts by the most superficial real changes. Provided even that unforeseen events do not occur, it must take years before the Ottoman Army can be wrested from the corrupt and stunting influences of Hamidianism. If the Young Turks can successfully train and merge the conscripts of the various races of the Empire into a great Ottoman Army, not only will they have accomplished a most difficult task from a military point of view, but they will have actually laid the foundation stone of a national building composed of materials which might indeed be known by the names of Fraternity, Equality, Justice, and Liberty.

Before concluding this chapter, in which I have endeavoured to give some account of the present condition of the Turkish Army, I will enumerate very briefly a few facts concerning the Ottoman Navy. During the Old Régime the fleet—such as it was—remained anchored in the Golden Horn from one year's end to another. Soon after the establishment of the Constitution, however, the Turkish Government obtained the services of Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble and those of about half a dozen British officers to assist in the reorganisation of the Turkish fleet, which is still in progress. On the retirement of Sir Douglas Gamble early in 1910, Admiral H. P. Williams—also of the British Navy—took his place, in which he not only acts as a general naval adviser to the Turkish Government, but also flies his flag as an Admiral in the sea-going Turkish fleet, over which he exercises a considerable amount of direct authority. Under his supervision the many much-needed reforms are making undoubted progress.

In addition to the *Haireddin Babarossa* and the

Torgut Reiss—two battleships of the *Brandenberg* class, purchased from Germany in August, 1910—the Turks have a fairly efficient old battleship, the *Messoudieh*, which has been re-armed as a cruiser, besides two small modern cruisers and about twenty serviceable torpedo craft. Of the latter, two torpedo gunboats and four destroyers are large enough to accompany the fleet to sea, whilst the remainder could effect a mobile defence of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, for which they were probably intended when they were purchased. On paper, there are a good many other ships in the Turkish Navy, but none of these are of any value for the purposes of war. At the present time a small cruiser is being built for the Ottoman Government at Genoa, and two destroyers (nearly completed) are under construction in Germany.

To estimate the true value of the re-organised and strengthened Turkish fleet as a factor in Eastern politics, it is necessary to bear in mind the work it is intended to perform. The value of a ship is always relative, and depends a good deal upon whether she be intended as a provision to meet all political emergencies, or only for a special purpose. In the existing situation, it may be said that, though the two battleships purchased in Germany are of no practical value for the first of these categories, they are of great importance for the second. That is to say, that as ships in the line of battle of a maritime Power, prepared to meet any other Power in war, they would be quite out of date; but as vessels specially obtained with a view of possible trouble with Greece, they answer their purpose very well, and, being immediately available, were, under the circumstances, quite worth the £900,000 paid to Germany for them. Before the acquisition of these two ships, the Turkish fleet could never have dared leave the Dardanelles if the Greeks had been bent upon destroying it. In other words, the Turks could have

done nothing to prevent free communication between Greece and Crete, unless by invading Greece and advancing as far as Athens. Moreover, in the event of war, the whole coast of Asia Minor, Syria, and even Turkish Arabia, with all the Turkish islands in the Levant, would have been helplessly exposed to bombardment or raid by Greek ships. As a result of these purchases in Germany all this is changed in Turkey's favour, for the aggregate Turkish armament, although rather less than the aggregate Greek, is tactically more effective. Not only are the Turkish ships better armoured than those of Greece, but, having all their armaments mounted on the centre line, they can bring all their guns into action in a line of battle simultaneously, whereas in the Greek battleships they are so mounted that one-third must always remain disengaged in any formation whatever.

III

THE ALBANIAN QUESTION

Origin and religions of the Albanians—Foreign influences in Albania—

The gathering of Albanians at Ferisovitch in July, 1908—The

Albanian insurrections of 1908 and 1909—The Congress of Dibra

—Some causes of unrest in Albania—The Albanian rebellion of

1910—School and language questions in Albania.

IT is difficult to describe accurately what is meant by the geographical term Albania. Whilst an official of the Turkish Government would refuse to recognise the existence of any district known by that name, an Albanian, a Greek, a Bulgarian, and a Servian would each define the boundaries of Albania in accordance with the national aspirations of the race (for the moment counting Bulgarians and Servians as belonging to different races) to which he belonged. Lord Fitzmaurice (then Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) in a dispatch addressed to Earl Granville in the year 1880, described the district covered by the geographical expression Albania as that territory "which falls mainly within the two vilayets of Scutari and Yanina, but extends also in an easterly direction beyond the watershed of the mountains dividing the streams which fall into the Adriatic from those which fall into the Ægean Sea and includes portions of the vilayets of Monastir and of Kossovo." Although, strictly speaking, neither a political district nor an administrative area of Albania really exists, yet for the purpose of making my few brief remarks upon the Albanian Question the more

intelligible, I propose to accept Lord Fitzmaurice's explanation of what is meant by Albania.

The Albanians are generally, and probably accurately, identified by impartial observers as the descendants of the ancient Illyrians, who were simply the inhabitants of Illyria, to whom the Albanians allege that St. Paul referred when he said: "Round about into Illyricum I have fully preached the gospel of Christ." But little is known about these Illyrians except that they were slow to accept the civilisation of the Greeks and Romans, and that subsequently they were driven westwards towards the shores of the Adriatic by the advancing hordes of Slavs. The Albanians to-day are a wild, warlike people who for many years have occupied in Europe towards the Turkish Government the same position as that held in Asia Minor by the Kurds. Both races are religiously unorthodox, both races have been utilised by the Turks to suppress the Christians, and the attitude of both races towards European interference in the Turkish Empire has been made use of by the Ottoman Government as a threat to the ambassadors of the Great Powers as each new programme for reform has been suggested at Constantinople. Fierce and lawless as the average Albanian still may be, he is a man who is faithful, even unto death. An Arnaut, once engaged, is not only the most trusty servant and loyal follower in the whole Near East, but he is the most useful protector to his employer in whatever difficulty may arrive.

The Albanian subjects of the Sultan, who reside for the most part in what I have described as Albania, are divided into two principal groups—Tosks and Ghegs. The River Skumbia, which enters the Adriatic about half-way between the towns of Durazzo and Avlona, may be said to divide the country inhabited by the former from that populated by the latter.

It is difficult to estimate the number of Albanians in



Ferid

FERID PASHA.

Ferid Pasha, who is perhaps the most important living Albanian, was Grand Vizier under the Old Regime from 1903 until July 22, 1908, when he was succeeded by Said Pasha. Subsequently his Highness was Minister of the Interior for several months under the New Regime.

Turkey. While some authorities put the Albanian population down at somewhere between 1,000,000 and 1,200,000, the Albanians themselves say that they number nearly 2,000,000. Although this is probably an exaggeration, it is possible that it is not far wrong, as in making statistics the Greeks, and usually the Turks, consider all members of the Orthodox Church as Greek, regardless of their race. If, therefore, this has been done in the case of the Albanians, many of those people who live in the south and who have become more or less "Greekised" may have been counted by the Greeks and by the Turks as Greeks, when by race they are really Albanians.

As the Tosks or Southern Albanians are more civilised and perhaps less warlike than their northern brothers, they have, at least of late years, been more subject to Ottoman control than have the Ghegs. The Tosks are not divided into regular tribes but they have a system of beys, or chiefs, to whom they turn for guidance in all matters of importance. The Ghegs are made up of a number of warlike tribes who inhabit Northern Albania. To a great extent these people still live a feudal life, and are governed by unwritten laws. The home of the Northern Albanian, patriarchal in its simplicity, is ruled by its oldest inhabitant. Such is the spirit of the people that two or three generations will often live together in one large *kuleh*, or fortified house. In the past, throughout this district, not only have the local chiefs had a military organisation of their own, but disputes and quarrels have been decided by the tribal authorities.

The Moslem Albanians are not fanatical, and therefore the question of religion in Albania is of but little importance compared with the rôle which it plays in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. The gallant Arnaut to-day is an Albanian before he is either a Mohammedan or a Christian. Owing to the attitude of the Greek

and Latin Churches, who refused to preach the gospel in the language understood by the people, when the Turks conquered Albania the people were Christians in little but name. At the present time about two-thirds of the Albanians of Turkey have embraced Islam, rather from secular than from spiritual reasons. Of the remaining one-third the Christians of the south belong to the Orthodox Church, whilst those of the north are believers in Roman Catholicism.

In the north there are districts where the people are entirely Christian, as in the territory of the Mirdites, and others where the population is exclusively Moslem, as in Mott; but the greater part of the country is inhabited by a population some members of which are Moslems and some of which profess Christianity. Although the Albanians do not usually quarrel over religion, yet the Moslems and the Christians of the south are much more united than are the "True Believers" and the Roman Catholics of the north, amongst whom the Catholic clergy, especially of late, have worked hard to stir up religious hatred for political purposes. An incident which recently occurred in the Kossovo vilayet shows clearly the attitude of the Catholic clergy. A musical entertainment was being arranged for the amusement of a mixed Moslem and Christian audience. Prior to the day on which this function was to take place the bishop intervened, with the object of making it a religious and not a secular affair. It is said that this dignitary gave money and offered the use of his church on condition that no Moslems were invited to the entertainment. Such a course must have been purely political, as from a religious point of view a bishop should surely have been only too glad to welcome Moslems as well as Christians.

Although under the Old Régime every endeavour was made to hinder the Albanian nationalist movement, yet it is certain that during the reign of the ex-Sultan Abdul

Hamid the Albanians were treated with the utmost deference, and further that his Majesty did everything in his power to make certain of their support in time of need. The Albanian Imperial Guard, recruited from the south, was always well and regularly paid, and these soldiers were allowed to return to their villages as soon as their time had expired, instead of being retained with the colours for months or years in excess of their proper period of service. During the days of the Old Régime, too, the Albanians, especially the tribes of the north, were permitted to manage their own internal affairs, practically without the interference of the Constantinople Government. It was only when the north-eastern Ghegs—always actuated by feelings of antagonism towards their Slav brothers—seemed inclined to jeopardise the policy of their spiritual and temporal master at Constantinople, that troops were dispatched to Albania to quiet the country, either by bombarding the malefactors with shell or by bribing their leaders with decorations or with money.

The Albanians, unlike the other alien races which so largely make up the population of the European Provinces of the Ottoman Empire, are neither formed into a "community" nor are they secretly backed up by the support of any neighbouring State. Not only are the gallant Arnauts unsupported by any intrigue adroitly hatched in neighbouring capitals, but they and the territory in which they live are the object of the aspirations of five distinct nationalities. Austria, Italy, Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece are each endeavouring to increase their respective interests in more or less different districts of the inaccessible country which skirts the eastern shores of the Adriatic.

The strong Catholic propaganda which has been championed by Austria during the past fifty years and more, especially for the last three decades, has not only done much to produce religious hatred, but has

undoubtedly proved an obstacle in the way of the formation of a strong Albania. The agents of Austria have worked and are working hard, nominally in support of the Roman Catholic religion. The village priesthood, which is largely composed of Franciscans, most of whom have studied first in Scutari and then in Austria, is utilised to spread ill-feeling between Moslems and Christians, and naturally works hard to prevent mixed marriages. A Roman Catholic bishop, supported by Austrian funds, has recently been promoted from the position of a village priest and appointed to the see of Pulati in the mountains.

The Austrian propaganda in Northern Albania has also been greatly furthered by the establishment of schools. In the past the education of the Christians in this part of the country has been carried out almost entirely under the auspices of Austria or Italy. Soon after the arrival of the Jesuits in Scutari, about the middle of the last century, the first Austrian-supported school was opened in that town. About the same time Austria was recognised as the protector of the Roman Catholics in Albania. At first instruction was only supposed to be given in religious subjects, but later on the education provided became more general. Besides this school, which is still in existence, the Franciscans have recently started a school for mountain boys, most of whom are sons of men of the Mirdite tribe. The same Order provides an educational establishment for orphan boys and a girls' school controlled by Franciscan sisters. In addition an infant school has also recently been founded in Scutari. The education in all these Austrian-supported schools is old-fashioned. Only bookwork is taught, and no instruction is carried out in practical subjects. Thus a boy leaves school only fitted for office work, while a girl, instead of being able to make useful garments, can only do useless embroideries of European pattern.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Italian propaganda, which was first inaugurated in Albania a few years ago, is of considerably less importance than the work which has been so systematically carried out by Austria, yet undoubtedly it cannot be ignored. In Scutari—the centre of intrigue and corruption, where everybody is more or less in the hands of either Austria or Italy, the Italians have not only inaugurated a home for the aged, but they have opened three schools which respectively provide education for boys, girls, and orphans. In addition to those at Scutari, the Italians possess schools at Avlona and at Yanina.

Although in the past the Dual Monarchy has had the upper hand in Albania, largely because the priests are Austrian trained, and for the most part Austrian paid, of late Italian influence has been on the increase. This increase of influence is at least in part due to the fact that the Italians have always gone in for secular as well as religious teaching in their schools, which are, therefore, attended by Moslem as well as by Christian pupils. Not only are all the instructors except those in religious subjects laymen, but the Italians are teaching the Albanian boys carpentering, besides other trades. The girls, too, who are educated by Italy learn the use of the sewing-machine, besides being taught how to cut out and make clothing. Moreover, the Jesuits, whom the people feel so largely voice Christian claims and represent Austrian interests in Northern Albania, have of late become unpopular amongst the inhabitants. The men of this Order, who are comparatively rich and who own large quantities of land, carry on various trades—printing, tailoring, bookbinding—at prices which hopelessly undersell the townspeople.

The Slav propaganda is championed by the Servians and the Bulgarians, each of whom separately claim certain districts said by the Arnauts to be Albanian. Although the Servian propaganda lacks the funds of that

of the Greeks, and is not carried on with the energy which is displayed by the Bulgarians, yet for some years the Albanians and the Servians in the north of the Kossovo vilayet have lived together in a continual state of feud. So strong has been the strife between the two races that many of the Servians of Old Servia have been forced to emigrate to Servia, whilst some of the Albanians formerly domiciled in the districts ceded to Servia by the Treaty of Berlin have been obliged to retreat thence to the vilayet of Kossovo. The Bulgarian propaganda—voiced and backed up by schools and churches—extends practically, if not absolutely, as far south-west as Korcha.

The Greek propaganda—perhaps resented by the Albanians more than any of the alien influences endeavouring to increase its power in what they consider to be their country—extends along the western side of Albania as far north as the town of Elbasan. The object of the Patriarchate, which, of course, has established schools and opened churches under its ancient privileges, appears to be to "Hellenise" the Albanians rather than to make them good members of the Orthodox Church. Many of the Orthodox Albanians are straining every nerve to resist this aggression, and are at the same time endeavouring to obtain concessions from the Patriarch. So strong is the feeling of these people that since the granting of the Constitution a Society known by the name of the Orthodox League has been formed at Korcha. Although this Society, which has branches at Elbasan and at Bucharest, has been inaugurated with the object of resisting the aggressions of the Greek Church, yet for the moment, at any rate, it has not, as part of its programme, the formation of an independent Church. At present the principal object of the Orthodox League is to oblige the Patriarch to allow at least part of the Liturgy of the Orthodox Church to be read in Albanian,

and to press for the use of the Albanian language in the Orthodox schools. If these concessions are not granted, and the League is able to maintain its existence, there seems reason to suppose that the 250,000 Orthodox Albanians, the majority of whom are at present much opposed to the formation of an independent Church, may insist on inviting an Albanian priest, who was ordained under Russian auspices and who is at present in America, to become the head of what would probably eventually develop into a schismatic Church in Southern Albania.

In order to discover the causes of the unrest which have existed in Albania since 1908, it is necessary to look back to some events which actually preceded the granting of the Constitution. Prior to July, 1908, confusion reigned supreme in Albania. Whilst the Austrians, Italians, Greeks, and Bulgarians were all working hard to further their own interests, an Albanian national movement had been set on foot. During the early months of 1908, too, the Young Turks were secretly preaching in favour of the Constitution in Albania—a district which had always been governed by the worst class of Turkish officials. The European Powers were at the same time agitating for the introduction of a real system of reform in Macedonia.

For the moment, at least, a common sentiment united the Albanians and the Young Turks—the horror of reforms directed by foreign agents and introduced at the instigation of the European Powers. It is now well known that it was the meeting of the Tsar of Russia with the late King Edward at Reval, on June 9th, that decided the Committee of Union and Progress—then still a secret organisation—to take immediate action. During the month of July, too, a great gathering of some five or six thousand Albanians took place at Ferisovitch. This meeting was largely held at the instigation of Shemshi Pasha—a faithful supporter of

Abdul Hamid, who was subsequently murdered at Monastir while trying to quash the "Young Turkey" revolution. These Albanians, who appear to have assembled mostly with the object of demonstrating against the introduction of reforms in Turkey under the auspices of Europe, telegraphed to Uskub to invite the members of the Committee of Union and Progress to come out and discuss some questions of local interest with them. About forty of these men went by train to Ferisovitch, and persuaded the Albanians to devote their attention to demanding a Constitution—the meaning of which they did not understand. As a result of the representations made by the Young Turks, the Albanians either telegraphed to the ex-Sultan demanding a Constitution or else they addressed a telegram to his ex-Majesty on the subject of reforms, which was altered by the Young Turks from Uskub into a demand for the Constitution. With whatever object the famous telegram was actually dispatched by the Albanians themselves, it was the arrival of this message from Ferisovitch which finally showed Abdul Hamid that the Constitution must be granted.

After the establishment of the Constitution, which was neither understood nor really accepted by the Albanians, and especially by the inhabitants of the Ipek-Gusinge-Plava district, the people awaited developments in a state of expectancy. The news of the advent of the New Régime was received with enthusiasm in Scutari, where joyful celebrations lasted for three weeks. The Moslems of the north appear to have believed that constitutional rule meant government by the Sheri law, the abrogation of all taxes and the defeat of the Reval programme. As a result, whilst the Young Turks were talking of equality, fraternity, and liberty at Salonika, Constantinople, and other important centres, Albanian gatherings were taking place at Elbasan and Tirana, besides other places in Albania,



A ROCK-LIKE HILL AT USKUB.

Uskub is a picturesque town situated on the banks of the river Yardar. Of the total population of the town, which approximately amounts to 40,000 souls, about two-thirds are Moslem Albanians.

with the dual object of proclaiming that Albanian was the official language of Albania, and of insisting that Albanian books should be distributed and that Albanian schools should be opened in the country.

In November, 1908, the Albanian leaders at Constantinople, largely at the instigation of the Young Turks, addressed an appeal to their compatriots in Albania, asking them to re-form the Albanian League of 1879. A certain number of Moslem Albanians joined the League, which was inaugurated to guard against Turkey being the loser owing to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Dual Monarchy. The Government, too, when war between Turkey and Austria or between Turkey and Bulgaria, or perhaps both, seemed possible, sent some 40,000 rifles into Albania, which were distributed amongst the people. For the moment, therefore, in face of the common danger of Austrian aggression and of Bulgarian expansion the Albanians and the Serbs lived together on friendlier relations than they had done for years.

Although at the time of the so-called counter-revolution in Constantinople in April, 1909, the Moslem khojas endeavoured to arouse the feelings of the men of Scutari—always the most fanatical people in Albania—against the Young Turks, the Albanian mountaineers remained unmoved. The men were indifferent to everything which did not affect their customs or infringe their privileges. In spite of this, the execution of certain Albanians said to have been mixed up in this counter-revolution, and the deposition of the ex-Sultan did undoubtedly create ill-feeling against the Government in Albania, and especially amongst the population of Scutari and the surrounding district. In June, Bedri Pasha, the then Vali of Scutari, announced that he was going to proceed with the census. Notwithstanding the fact that the Christians remained quiet, the Moslems at once understood that the successful introduction of

such a measure would mean the imposition of new taxes, liability to conscription, and the abolition of their privileges—almost amounting to self-government—with which they had been endowed under the Old Régime.

After the establishment of the Constitution, Djavid Pasha was made Commandant of the Military Division which has its headquarters at Mitrovitza. As this Pasha had been Governor of the district of Ipek but three years previously, and had then been forced to fly the country in order to save his life, it is natural that he was not a popular person to send to command the troops in an important district of Albania, and further it is not surprising that his presence amongst them was so largely responsible for stirring up the feelings of the people of Northern Albania against the new Government. One of the first acts of this official was to make a demonstration in force against the villages situated in the mountains to the north of Mitrovitza. The principal object of this expedition, which was carried out in November, 1908, was to capture Isa Boletin—an important Albanian chief—who had been present at the gathering at Ferisovitch, but who had then opposed the attitude of the Young Turks towards the Albanians. In spite of the assertions made at the time that Isa Boletin was then captured by the Turks, there seems reason to believe that whilst the house and farm of this chief at the village of Boletini were burnt by the Young Turks, the owner himself only took refuge in the mountains. As a matter of fact, Isa Boletin not only played a prominent part in resisting the operations which took place against the Lyuma district in 1909, but was also responsible for a large amount of the fighting in the Kossovo vilayet in 1910.

In the early spring of 1909 matters once more became unsettled. Isa Boletin had worked hard during the winter in order to collect a force of Albanians at the head of whom to march upon Mitrovitza. In March,

Djavid Pasha, by advancing against the villages where Isa Boletin was endeavouring to organise his expedition and by burning a large number of villages and houses, prevented the success of this movement. In a third campaign, which took place during the summer and autumn of 1909, Djavid Pasha, who was then endowed with full powers by the Turkish Government, attempted finally to subdue the Albanians of the Kossovo vilayet. As a protest against some of the innovations which this general tried to impose upon the people, and particularly as a demonstration against the levying of a super-tax for educational and military purposes, a large body of Albanians collected at Ferisovitch. This gathering was dispersed by the fire of Turkish artillery. Desultory skirmishes then took place between the Ottoman troops and the Albanians, until, at the beginning of September, Djavid Pasha set out at the head of a large force to subdue Lyuma—a village situated about forty miles to the west of Uskub. After the village of Lyuma had been captured, fighting took place between the Turkish troops and the Albanians in the surrounding district. Subsequently the Turkish authorities confidently stated that the Albanian revolution had been permanently suppressed. I was myself the recipient of these assurances from officials of the highest rank during my visit to Uskub. At the end of September Djavid Pasha, on the pretext of the approaching winter season, retreated at the head of his army to Mitrovitza.

During the summer of 1909 two important Albanian Congresses were held, the one at Elbasan and the other at Dibra. Whilst the meeting at Elbasan, with which I shall deal elsewhere, was assembled in order to enable the Albanians to discuss literary and educational questions, the Congress of Dibra, which took place during July, was intended by the members of the Albanian Committees to afford their countrymen the opportunity

of debating upon political matters of importance from an Albanian point of view. This Congress is not only of importance owing to some of the decisions which it adopted—decisions which undoubtedly prove that the Albanians cannot be easily crushed, but also because of the manner in which it was treated by the Young Turks. When the Young Turks heard that this Congress was proposed, they decided to utilise the meeting to their own advantage. With this object in view, all the communities of Macedonia were invited to send representatives to the Congress at Dibra. The Young Turks themselves not only secured the nomination of a certain number of representatives under the leadership of Niazi Bey—the hero of Resna—but they also prepared a list of resolutions which they intended should be adopted by the meeting without discussion.

When the delegates arrived at Dibra, as it was found that their number was far too large to discuss the programme which the Young Turks had drawn up, it was agreed that eight representatives were to be nominated as members of an inner committee, to voice the interests of each of the five Turkish vilayets which had sent deputies to the Congress. These forty delegates first adopted the report which had been prepared by the Young Turks—a report which was, of course, entirely favourable to the conduct of these patriots, and subsequently added extra clauses to the programme which clearly demonstrate the feelings of the Albanians themselves. Included amongst the resolutions thus adopted by the Congress were demands for justice in the law-courts and for the establishments of proper schools in Albania. The delegates, too, requested that more power should be given to the Councils-General of each vilayet and that the amount of annual tithe levied by the Government should be fixed upon the average amount of tithe paid during the last five years, instead of being assessed annually,

as it had been in the past. Emphasis was also laid upon the importance of building roads in Albania and of finally deciding the Turko-Montenegrin frontier. As a result of this Congress, owing to the fact that as far as possible only the clauses of the report favourable to the Young Turks were published, quite a false impression of the attitude of the Albanians towards the New Régime was made known to the world.

Before briefly describing what took place in the vilayets of Kossovo and of Scutari during the spring and summer of 1910, I will shortly enumerate the principal reasons which were responsible for the state of unrest in Northern Albania in 1909, and which necessitated the above-mentioned indecisive expedition of Djavid Pasha. To the same causes may largely be ascribed, not only the Arnaut rebellion of 1910, but also the ill-feeling against the Government which at present exists among the Gheg population of Northern Albania.

The Turks are not only attempting to insist upon the payment of taxes, but are endeavouring to collect the arrears of taxation. Notwithstanding the fact that the Ottoman authorities are certainly reasonable in enforcing the collection of revenue throughout the country, it is not unnatural that the Albanians, to many of whom the enforced payment of taxes means the loss of one of their ancient privileges, should expect some return for the money obtained from them. At present not a farthing has been devoted to the construction of Public Works in Albania. For example, in the neighbourhood of Scutari, the Young Turks have constructed a road (horse-track) to the summit of a neighbouring hill, where it was proposed to build a fortress to guard against any attack from the direction of Montenegro. Subsequently, as a result of an arrangement between the Turks and the Montenegrins concerning the frontier fortresses, the construction of the fort has been abandoned, and a road which leads nowhere is the only

thing in the nature of Public Works which Scutari has obtained from the New Régime.

The attitude of the Albanians towards the manner in which the Young Turks are spending the money which they have collected, is well expressed in some remarks made by an Albanian to a friend of mine after a review held at Scutari to commemorate the first anniversary of the accession of the new Sultan. The Albanian, referring to the soldiers, said: "Look at them, the devils! that is where the money goes. They feed and clothe themselves: what have they done for Scutari? Made an officers' club: nothing for the land whatever. We used to be robbed by one big thief, now there are a lot of little ones who are worse." I quote the above remarks, not as the expression of my own views about the Young Turks, but in order to show the regard in which the reformers of the Empire are held by the people of Scutari—probably the least disloyal town in Albania.

Another cause of discontent amongst the Albanians is that the Government has ordered a census to be made. This order is being carried out piecemeal as each new district is subdued. The Albanians, who perhaps respect their women even more than most other Moslems, strongly resent being obliged to disclose the names of their wives, daughters, and sisters. In addition, the warlike Arnauts fully realise that when a correct census has once been obtained, the Turkish Government will be enabled, not only to gauge correctly the fighting strength of the tribesmen, but also to summon the Albanian youths for conscription. The Northern Albanians, so many of whom, as I have already said, have in the past been almost entirely independent of the Sublime Porte—hold that conscription is contrary to the arrangement made between them and the old Government, and they state that they have never accepted the new administration of public affairs.

In spite, however, of the deep-rooted Albanian objection to service in the Turkish Army, this feeling could be overcome if the people understood that their military obligations were to be performed locally, and that a conscript recruited, for instance, in Scutari would not be sent to perform a large amount of his military service in the Yemen. I have on many occasions been personally informed by Albanians that they are ready to enter an army destined to fight the Greeks, Bulgarians, Servians, and Montenegrins, because this is to protect their own country, but that they are not willing to defend the Asiatic Provinces of the Sultan, which the Albanians hold are no concern of theirs.

The fact that the Turkish Government is attempting to insist on the destruction of all *kulehs*, or fortified houses, and that the Ottoman authorities are trying to enforce the surrender of arms in Albania, are matters which are causing great discontent, especially amongst the Moslems of the north. The Albanian has been accustomed to live in a defensible house, and has always possessed his rifle, which he strongly objects to giving up, especially until he is secure against the robbery or raids made across the border by the inhabitants of neighbouring States. The question of disarming certain of the Christian tribes even in principle is a difficult one, as they hold all the country bordering upon the Montenegrin frontier—a line which for years has always been so ill-defined. If these border tribes be disarmed, there will be nothing to prevent the warlike Montenegrins from raiding Turkish territory, whilst if, on the other hand, they be allowed to retain their arms, all the other tribes will naturally expect similar treatment. If, too, these tribesmen are allowed to remain armed, it will raise the question amongst the "Faithful" as to whether Moslems should be disarmed whilst Christians are allowed to keep their weapons. The difficulty of the situation has not been lessened by the

distribution of the 40,000 rifles which, as I have already said, were sent from Constantinople to Albania during the winter of 1908-9.

The above-mentioned causes, and the manner in which the expeditions of Djavid Pasha are said to have been carried out in 1909, left embers of discontent which only required a spark to rekindle the spirit of rebellion amongst the Northern Albanians. That spark was furnished early in April, 1910, by Mazhar Bey, the Vali of Uskub—himself an energetic member of the Committee of Union and Progress, who, after obtaining the consent of the Central Government, imposed an "Octroi," which, of course, affected the country people who brought goods to market. These people not unnaturally resented the burden of any extra taxes, especially as the proceeds of the "Octroi" thus enforced by Mazhar Bey were destined to be devoted to the improvement of the towns, about the condition of which the Albanians cared less than nothing.

I will not burden my readers with the details of the operations and the names of all the villages and districts which were visited by the Turkish troops during their advance upon Scutari across Northern Albania. Sufficient is it to give the briefest outline of the operations during which a large portion of Northern Albania was at least temporarily subdued by a number of mobile columns moving in all directions. The insurrectionary movement began early in April, at Prishtina, where the Albanians to the number of several thousand attacked the Turkish garrison and captured two guns, one of which was subsequently returned. In the middle of April, Shevket Tourgout Pasha arrived at Ferisovitch to take over the command of a mixed force at that time amounting to 17,000 men, but subsequently increased by various reinforcements. Half this army for the moment remained at Ferisovitch, whilst the other half occupied Prishtina, and subdued the surrounding district.



PEASANTS OF NORTHERN ALBANIA.

To face p. 104.

A small force which was sent from Ferisovitch to Prizren immediately after the arrival of Shevket Tourgout Pasha was unexpectedly attacked near the Tchernalova Pass, and had to be extricated from its difficulties by reinforcements sent from headquarters. During the time that had necessarily to elapse before a strong force could be sent to capture Prizren the Albanians occupied the Katchanik Pass, through which the railway runs from Uskub to Ferisovitch. This unexpected movement on the part of the Albanians of the Morava district compelled the Turks to lose time in order to reopen their line of communications and to make it possible for reinforcements to be sent up from Salonika into Albania.

After the Katchanik Pass had been cleared of rebels, the first objective of the Turkish Commander-in-Chief was to force his way to Prizren, which was finally occupied by Turkish troops who had advanced in three parallel columns about the middle of May. Although the towns of Djakova and Ipek were entered without resistance, the opposition that was offered to the Ottoman advance, and which met the various mobile columns which were sent from headquarters to establish order in Northern Albania, can easily be understood from the fact that under ordinary circumstances it is but four or five days' journey from Uskub to Scutari, whilst the Turkish Army, although it followed the Prizren trade route, took nearly four months to get through. Moreover, in addition to the fact that the Ottoman advance was made by way of Puka, where there was always a small Turkish outpost, the army did not operate against the Mati tribe nor enter the Malizi and Luria districts. The territory of the Mirdites—an important Christian tribe which had not revolted—was passed through without any fighting, but obstacles were placed in the way of the advance of the troops by the men of Shala (a warlike tribe), who cut down timber in order to barricade the narrow passes.

On July 24th the first detachment of the Turkish Army reached Scutari. As soon as the troops arrived the cavalry charged the populace. Although the townspeople offered no resistance, and although not a shot was fired, the troops proceeded to snatch the revolvers even from the belts of the men who carried them. Not only were ordinary people divested of their weapons, but so little did the military commanders know about the town that they forcibly disarmed the Sergherdé—a Moslem official, appointed by the Turkish Government, who is president of a mixed council which represents in Scutari the interests of the tribes which live in the district to the north-east of that town. After the arrival at Scutari, on July 25th, of three more battalions, orders were issued that all arms were to be given up at once, and a state of siege was proclaimed—a declaration which meant that nobody was henceforth allowed to go beyond his house after sunset. The Moslem inhabitants of Scutari at once surrendered arms of a kind in large quantities, and the Christians, apparently quite pleased at the discomfiture of their Mohammedan fellow-countrymen, gave up such as they possessed. The inhabitants of the villages on the plains surrounding Scutari also surrendered their arms, being rewarded for thus doing by having their pack-horses commandeered by the troops. However long these animals were kept the owner only received a sum approximately amounting to three shillings and fourpence. Cattle were bought at the Army's own price.

The manner in which the operations of Djavid Pasha were conducted, and many of the events which took place during the Ottoman advance across Albania, have stirred up ill-feeling amongst the Albanians, which it will be difficult for the Young Turks to remove. I have talked with influential Albanians, whose attitude towards the New Régime is most reasonable and moderate, who have informed me that the Turkish Government, through

the emissaries whom it has sent to subdue Northern Albania, has behaved in a barbarous manner under the pretext of endeavouring to re-establish order in the country. Houses, and whole villages, have been burned, often as a punishment to men who were not even in the villages, and whose whereabouts, although they were said to be in rebellion against the Turkish Government, were in reality uncertain. The Albanians, I think not unnaturally, hold that people who decline to pay taxes—especially taxes in exchange for the payment of which they see no return—should not be killed, but that they should be meted out punishment in accordance with the ordinary rules of justice as practised in constitutional countries.

In order to enable my readers to gain some insight into the attitude of the Ottoman Government towards the Albanians, I propose to give one instance of the manner in which the Turkish operations in Albania were carried out, and to recount another event which demonstrates the standard of justice which exists in the neighbourhood of Scutari. The details, in both cases, were not only brought to my notice by people in whom I have every reason to place confidence, but they are typical of many others in Turkey, which I have actually investigated on the spot.

The first episode occurred in Nikaj—the district of a Christian tribe. After a parley, about half the tribe consented to surrender their arms. Much against the wish of the Franciscan priest, who told the Turkish authorities that he alone could not be responsible for the safe keeping of the weapons, the surrendered rifles were stacked in the Christian church. When the troops withdrew, the mountaineers, spurred on by the members of the tribe who had not surrendered their arms, raided the church and retook the weapons. The soldiers, who had only temporarily withdrawn, returned and flogged the priest.

Not far from Scutari a man who recently died left no heir. Under the circumstances, the property of the deceased would legally pass to the Government. In due course a town crier was sent round to offer the estate in question for sale. A customer was found, who bought and paid for the land. Subsequently a near relative of the dead man made his appearance and claimed his property. The purchaser at once signified his willingness to vacate the domain, provided the purchase money was refunded to him. Finally the Government ordered the man to leave the house, and because he was reluctant put him in prison. Although the prisoner was subsequently set free, and although the claim of the relative was correct, the buyer did not receive a penny of money to make up for the confiscation of the land, which he at least was entitled to think that he had legally purchased.

The fact that the operations in Northern Albania during the summer of 1910 were at least partially successful, clearly proves the weakness of a State united in a common object, but being without a strong leader. Although both Moslem and Christian Albanians of the north are fine fighting men, and although both were certain that they did not want the Turks, yet, owing to their want of organisation, and dislike of one another, at least for the present, the Turks they have got. There seems reason to believe that the Christians did not join the Moslems against the Government, largely because they expected one of the Great Powers—probably Austria—would intervene. In some of the more out-of-the-way places, it is said that the men of the Turkish Army, with their new uniforms and caps, were actually believed by the people to be a European army advancing with the sanction of the Powers.

Not only the religious differences, but also the tribal system has been fatal to any determined resistance on the part of the Albanians. Each tribe has fought, and

probably will fight separately, to defend its own land or its own rights. If you ask in Albania why certain people have not gone out to fight, you are informed with surprise, "Oh, they have not been attacked, and they must wait to defend their own land." Notwithstanding the fact that common misfortune may weld the Moslems and the Christians together, yet the danger from the civilisation point of view is, that there is no doubt that a great Moslem propaganda will be inaugurated. The success of this propaganda will be increased by a large amount of backsliding to Islam if Austria decides that it is not worth her while to spend as much money upon the Roman Catholic Church as she has done in the past.

Although the Albanians are all one people, yet the situation in the south is very different from that in the north. In spite of the fact that the men of the south have certainly sympathised with the people of the north in resisting the abrogation of their privileges, yet with the exception of one or two local insurrections they have not attempted, by any acts of rebellion, to turn the Albanian movement in the Kossovo vilayet into a general rising, extending from end to end of Albania. The Southerners, who are not only better educated but also more united than the Ghegs of the north, seem to feel that the imposition of an "Octroi," and the confiscation of arms, are more or less questions of local interest. Whilst, therefore, the Ghegs have been openly resisting the annulment of their privileges, the Tosks have been sullenly resenting the conduct of a Government which promised to its citizens equality, liberty, and justice, but which has consistently objected to the improvement of education and to the teaching of Albanian in the schools. The imposition of the Brigandage Law, and the establishment of courts-martial—matters which I have alluded to already—have, too, not been without their effect upon the people of Southern Albania.

Whatever may have been the political or religious differences which have divided the Albanians in the past, and notwithstanding the fact that the Ghegs of the north are only just beginning to realise the advantages to be gained by the establishment of schools, it is the desire to improve their education, to make use of their own mother tongue, and to write Albanian with the national or Latin characters, which is finally destined to unite the Albanians against all antagonists.

The Albanian language, which is held by most authorities to be of Aryan origin, probably formed the original speech of the people of the whole of the Balkan Peninsula. Although the groundwork and grammar of the language spoken throughout Albania are supposed to be Indo-European, yet as a large number of words have been obtained from the Turkish, Latin, Greek, Slav, and Italian tongues, the dialects of modern Albanian as spoken in the various districts are very different. The people of each region have borrowed words from the language of the country to which they are the nearest. Thus a Gheg of the south makes use of many more Greek words than a Tosk of the north, whom he would only understand with difficulty. The fact, too, that Albanian was only reduced to writing in comparatively modern times, and that no general form of alphabet was decided upon until after the advent of the Constitution, is largely responsible for the differences of dialect which exist to-day.

Prior to the middle of the seventeenth century there is no trace of the Albanians wanting to read or write their own language. When a man desired to communicate with a friend in another part of the country, a professional Turkish letter-writer or a semi-educated priest of the Orthodox Church could always be found to indite the letter. The earliest books which contain printed examples of Albanian were published during the first half of the seventeenth century. These volumes

consisted of a religious work, published at Venice, and of a dictionary, which contained examples of the language. Later on, towards the end of the eighteenth century, Theodore of Elbasan did much to assist in the improvement of the Albanian language, by producing a dictionary. The Catholic clergy, too, furthered the language movement by providing the people with books, many of which were published in Scutari by the Jesuits, who, as I have already said, began their work in Albania about the middle of the nineteenth century.

As it is largely due to the religious work undertaken by the British and Foreign Bible Society that the people have been provided with literature printed in Albanian, I propose to give a brief description of the publications of that Society issued since 1824. Prior to the advent of the Constitution there were printed editions of the Scriptures in five different Albanian dialects—Calabrian and Sicilian (for the use of the Albanians in Calabria and Sicily), Gheg, Gheg of Scutari, and Tosk. The books published in the first four of these dialects were usually printed in Latin characters, with a few minor alterations to convey certain sounds necessary in Albanian, whilst those issued for the Tosks were published in the Greek characters, with certain modifications. In addition, whilst some publications were printed in parallel columns for the Tosks and Ghegs, in 1889 certain parts of the Bible were published at Bucharest in what were, even at that time, known as the national characters.

As early as 1824 the Gospel of St. Matthew was translated by Evangeles Mexicos, and revised by Archbishop Gregory of Eubœa. These translations were printed in modern Greek and in Tosk Albanian at Corfu, by the Ionian Bible Society—a Society promoted and subsidised by the British and Foreign Bible Society. Three years later the whole of the New Testament was published under the same auspices in the same lan-

guages, but on this occasion the modified Greek alphabet—used in printing the Tosk edition—was included in each volume in order to enable the illiterate people to read its contents. Between the years 1860 and 1870 large portions of the Bible were translated by Constantine Christophorides—an Albanian. As a result of the work of this patriot, to whom the people owe so much for the part which he played in the development of Albanian culture, in 1866 a volume containing the Four Gospels, the Book of the Acts, and an alphabet, was published for the Ghegs in the Latin characters, with certain minor alterations. This publication was followed by others, printed in Constantinople, between the years 1868 and 1879. Both the editions thus published in the Greek characters for the people of the south, and those printed in the modified Latin letters for the Albanians of the north, again contained an alphabet designed to assist readers in their study of the Albanian language.

In 1889, as a result of the request of an Albanian Committee, composed of both Moslems and Christians (principally Moslems), who met at Constantinople between the years 1877 and 1879 for the purpose of discussing the development of Albanian literature, the Book of Genesis and the Gospel of St. Matthew were published at Bucharest. These books, which were prepared under the direction of Gerasim Kyrias—a patriotic Albanian who had studied at Samakov—were printed in the new or national characters (*i.e.*, the Roman alphabet with modifications) which had been adopted by the Committee in 1879. So strong, however, was the Turkish opposition to the adoption of these characters, that various publications subsequently made were not allowed to be printed in them. After the advent of the Constitution arrangements were made for the publication at Monastir of the Four Gospels, printed in the characters adopted at the Congress of Elbasan.

Before, however, the printing of this edition had been completed at the Bashkim Club, at Monastir, all Albanian printing presses were closed by order of the Government.

Under the Old Régime Turkish Primary and Secondary schools existed in a few of the more important towns in Albania, and boys were taught to read the Koran at the mosques. The education of the people, as I have already described, was also furthered by schools established under the protection of Austria and of Italy. Before 1908, it was, however, the Orthodox Church that had been mainly responsible for improving the education of the people—specially in the south—by means of schools opened and maintained under the privileges enjoyed by the Greek Patriarchate.

Prior to the re-establishment of the Constitution every obstacle was placed in the way of the development of education in Albania by the Albanians themselves. The Turks always bitterly opposed the establishment of Albanian schools, which they foresaw were destined sooner or later to unite the followers of three great religions in a common cause—the improvement of education by secular rather than by religious instruction. So strong was the Turkish opposition to the Albanian educational movement, that at the time of the advent of the Constitution only one Albanian school remained open. This institution was founded in 1891 by Gerasim and Sevasti Kyrias at Korcha, for the purpose of educating Albanian girls. This school, to which Moslems were not allowed to send their children, only outlived the tyranny of Abdul Hamid owing to the energy of Miss Sevasti Kyrias—the devoted founder and director of the establishment. Although Miss Kyrias may not have been able to accomplish all that she desired at Korcha, yet her establishment was certainly more fortunate than the Secondary school for boys opened in the same town in 1884. After lingering on in face

of the oppression of the Turkish Government, and in spite of the persecution of the Orthodox Church, this institution was finally closed in 1902, as a result of the arrest of its two founders, who had worked for eighteen years to improve the education of the Albanian people.

The educational question in Albania may now be divided into two parts—a discussion as to the characters in which the language is to be written, and a dispute as to the manner and extent to which Albanian is to be employed or taught in the different schools which exist in the provinces in which the gallant Arnauts reside.

Although before the advent of the Constitution various attempts were made to draw up an alphabet of so-called national characters, and although, as I have already explained, a few books printed in them were published at Rome, Sofia, and Bucharest, yet for all practical purposes prior to 1908 the Albanian language was written by the Ghegs with the Latin characters and by the Tosks with the Greek alphabet.

As a result of the Young Turk revolution, an important Albanian Congress—the first that had been permitted by the Turks—was held at Monastir in November, 1908. The principal objects of the gathering were to discuss the alphabet and educational questions in Albania. After sittings which lasted for more than a week, the Committee decided to adopt the Latin alphabet as a basis for the Albanian national characters, and to adapt every letter to suit the phonetic sounds of the language. The value of each letter was carefully considered, and where the Latin symbols were found to be inadequate the remaining sounds were provided by the union of two letters of the alphabet. The amended alphabet, accompanied by the Greek letters, was appended to the report drawn up by the members of the Congress. The intention of the delegates, in including the Greek alphabet, was to grant a concession to the advocates of Tosk Albanian, which,

it was suggested, might for the present still be used in the south should the people insist on following such a course, which, however, was greatly discouraged by the members of the Congress. In addition to adopting the above report, the Congress passed a resolution that all Albanian clubs and societies should send a report to the Bashkim Club at Monastir, with the object of enabling that association to keep in touch with the work which was being carried out in Albania. In September, 1909, a second Congress, held at Elbasan—perhaps the most important town in Albania—confirmed the decisions of the Congress of Monastir, and also made arrangements for the realisation of certain sections of the programme to which I shall allude below.

The object of the Albanians in wishing to adopt the Latin, or national, characters, and in objecting to the Arabic alphabet, is twofold: in the first place they are more easily learnt by the people, and in the second they are more suitable for expressing the language. The Turks, on their part, have a deep-rooted objection to the employment of the Latin characters in Albania, not only because this system of writing and reading will eventually tend to unite the tribes and districts by a literature which is common to all, but because it will make it possible for Albanian books to be printed in Europe. If, on the other hand, the Arabic characters could be enforced, the Ottoman authorities fully realise that a much greater difficulty would be experienced in providing the means of educating and developing the mental capacities of the Albanian people.

Although Turkish opposition to the Latin, or national, characters was officially withdrawn after the establishment of the Constitution, yet there is ample reason to suppose that the Turks are trying to prevent the use of the Latin alphabet, by endeavouring to induce the Mohammedan Albanians to believe that the Arabic characters are sacred. Meetings have been held in the

mosques, in order to encourage the fanaticism of the Albanians, by stating that the schools, the language, and the national characters are dangerous to the Moslem religion. Endeavours have been made to convince the people that the Koran must be read and printed only with the sacred Arabic letters, and that those letters must be adopted by those who wish to remain loyal to the Faith. Although all Moslems were invited to attend these demonstrations, and to sign their names in favour of the adoption of the Arabic letters, yet as the Albanians are not religiously fanatical, these endeavours on the part of the Turks have, up to the present at least, proved an almost entire failure.

Not only have the meetings inaugurated by the Turks in Albania proved a fiasco, but so strong is the Albanian sentiment in favour of education that men of all classes, both Moslems and Christians, have held meetings to protest against the unjust measures which they feel have been taken by the Government against their language and against the development of their education. At Elbasan 7,000 Albanians gathered together, declaring themselves ready to protect their language with their lives. In spite, too, of the opposition of the Government, a great demonstration of Albanians, attended by numerous representatives from the surrounding districts, was held at Korcha during February, 1910. Those present at this meeting, which was opened by a prayer recited by a Moslem khoja, unanimously voted in favour of the adoption of the Latin characters for writing Albanian—letters which the delegates agreed had nothing whatever to do with religion, and which carry with them no hindrance to it whatever.

In addition to the Greek and various foreign educational establishments which exist in Albania, the schools of the country are now made up of those financed by the State (a few of which I have already explained existed before the Constitution), and of the Albanian

schools, all of which, with the exception of that at Korcha, have been established since the Constitution. At the present time the Turkish schools may be divided into three more or less distinct classes—Primary, Secondary, and Higher Secondary schools. In the Primary schools the Turks at first endeavoured to make Turkish the only language of the school. Great difficulty was found in doing this, as many of the professors did not know Turkish, and hardly any of the pupils understood it. In the Secondary and Higher Secondary schools the Ottoman authorities desire to make Turkish the language of the school, and to teach Albanian as a foreign tongue. The Albanians argue that in the Primary schools tuition should be carried out in Albanian, and urge that in all cases Albanian should be the language of the school, but at the same time signify their willingness that in all schools the children should be taught Turkish.

Where Albanian is being taught in the national schools, the Turks are endeavouring to insist on writing and reading being carried out with Arabic characters. So strong is the Albanian feeling against this innovation that in at least one school the pupils tore up the books written with the detested characters. At Korcha, which has always been and still is acknowledged as an educational centre for all Albania, thirty-eight students left one of the higher State colleges and went to the Albanian club school as a protest against the enforcement of the Arabic alphabet. The example of these students was shortly afterwards followed by a majority of the boys attending the local Turkish preparatory school.

During the first eighteen months after the advent of the New Régime the Turks offered little open resistance to the Albanian schools founded since the Constitution. These establishments, of which there were between ten and fifteen when I left Turkey, were supported by voluntary subscriptions contributed by

Albanians belonging to all stations in life. Not only is the reality of the movement proved by the fact that £T700 was collected during the Congress held at Elbasan, but while I was in Turkey I actually saw the list of subscribers—engineers, workmen, officials resident in Damascus—who forwarded a sum of £T20 through the medium of an Albanian paper published at Salonika.

In order to supply a sufficient number of well-educated young men to occupy the position of teachers in the Albanian schools, an important educational establishment was opened at Elbasan. The course at this school, which early in 1910 possessed some fifty pupils, is supposed to last six years, and is taken by young Albanians who come from all parts of the country. The fact that this Normal school possessed some fifty pupils when it had only been open for the short period of a few months—it was established subsequent to the Congress held at Elbasan in September, 1909—proves the strength of the educational movement in Albania. So strong, indeed, is this movement that its promoters anticipate that as a result of their efforts fifty per cent. of the Albanian population will, in a few years, be able to read their own language.

For months the Albanian cause was supported by at least seven newspapers which were published respectively at Salonika, Monastir, Yanina, and Korcha, besides one journal printed in America under the supervision of Faik Bey Konitza, and now forbidden entrance into Turkey. Whilst one of the papers which appeared at Salonika was a review, edited by Midhat Bey, who was president of the Congress held at Monastir in 1908, another paper, published at Korcha, was the organ of the Orthodox League. The Albanian cause, too, was greatly furthered by the Albanian clubs, the chief of which—known as the Bashkim Club—was at Monastir. In spite of the law passed by the Turkish Chamber in August, 1909, which forbids the existence of political



THE ARCH OF GALERIUS AT SALONIKA,

This ancient archway—locally known as “The Canara”—is supposed to have been built by the Emperor Galerius to commemorate one of his victories about the end of the third century.

clubs established on a nationalistic basis, the Albanians, by means of declaring that their clubs were not existing with political or nationalistic objects, managed for many months to prevent these institutions being closed by law.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Moslem Albanians (except the people of Scutari) certainly appear to want autonomy, yet the above observations will be sufficient to prove that a very limited form of local government under the authority of the Sultan, if accompanied by fair treatment, will be better for the people of Albania than a weak autonomy. The Albanians are not reactionaries, and they detested the Old Régime, but they consider that the Young Turks have no right to break the contract made with them by the Old Turks, under which at least large portions of Albania almost entirely managed its own affairs. The Turks, instead of making terms with the Albanians, who have been and are perfectly open to accept reasonable conditions, entered upon the new era with a system of bullying and deception.

Although the insurrection in Northern Albania is said to be at an end, and although the Albanians of the south have not at present risen against the Government, yet it is difficult to believe that the Young Turks are more than at the beginning of the Albanian Question. Whilst a well-governed Albania would be to Turkey a precious reserve of men, this tract of country, if badly administered, will remain an obstacle in surmounting which the Young Turks may yet be doomed to encounter disaster. By conciliating these warriors, instead of by endeavouring to denationalise them, the Young Turks will not only be assured of the support of a race who will form an invaluable bulwark against the encroachment of more than one influence diametrically opposed to the development of a strong Turkey, but they will obtain the assistance of a people whose help will be invaluable to them as each new internal or external crisis arises.

IV.

THE ARMENIAN MASSACRES OF APRIL, 1909

General remarks concerning the Armenians—Former massacres—
Description of Adana—The first massacre in Adana—The second
massacre in Adana—Relief work.

MY readers who have scanned the contents pages of this book before dipping into the following chapters, which I have devoted to a brief account of the Armenian massacres of 1909, may have expected to find enumerated a series of horrors which undoubtedly accompanied the massacre in the district of Adana. Although the particulars of the outrage are, indeed, more horrible than almost any Englishman who has not visited a massacre area can imagine, yet I do not feel that any good object can now be attained by recounting in detail the brutal manner in which thousands of Christians were murdered. In attempting, therefore, to give a clear, brief, and unbiassed general narrative of what took place in the vilayets of Adana and Aleppo, I must ask those who read these pages to understand that I am obliged to omit many facts concerning the tragedy which are quite unprintable, and at the same time to consider me as a traveller who likes the Turks, and more especially the Osmanli who inhabits the interior of the Asiatic Provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

The situation in the Ottoman Dominions is complicated by the fact that almost all the Christian races which inhabit these dominions are formed, as I have

explained elsewhere, into communities, the Patriarchs or chiefs of which have not invariably been averse to making use of their religious positions to extend a political influence amongst those whose spiritual welfare they are supposed to safeguard. The Armenian Patriarchs at Constantinople have probably attempted to keep beyond the political arena more carefully than some other dignitaries who hold almost corresponding positions at the Turkish capital. Whilst the Œcumenical Patriarch and the Bulgarian Exarch are religious chiefs of all the members of the Orthodox and Bulgarian Churches throughout the world, the Armenian (Gregorian) Patriarch possesses no authority over any Armenians who reside without the Turkish Empire. The supreme head of the Gregorian Church is the Catholicus of Echmiadzin, situated in Russian territory, about 100 miles to the south of Tiflis. This dignitary, who is elected for life by representatives of the Armenian communities throughout the world, and who now for the first time is a Russian subject, has no administrative control over the Ottoman Armenians, but has certain purely religious privileges which extend to the Gregorians of Turkey, as well as to those who live elsewhere. Two other Armenian Catholicici who reside at Akhtamar (an island in Lake Van) and at Sis in Southern Asia Minor, although nominally of the same rank as the Pontiff who lives at Echmiadzin, in reality only possess local jurisdiction over the respective Catholicates in which they have their abodes.

A Gregorian Patriarch was first appointed in Constantinople in 1461, when Mohammed II. transferred the then Bishop of Brousa from that city to the newly-conquered Turkish capital. Since this date the Patriarch of Constantinople has been administrative chief of all the Gregorian Armenians domiciled within the Ottoman Empire. His Beatitude is assisted in his position of supreme judge over all his followers, and

of intermediary between his flock and the Ottoman authorities, by a spiritual as well as a lay council. The spiritual council is responsible for all matters concerning the clergy, whilst the temporal council deals with all questions of divorce, education, hospitals, or finance. In addition to the Patriarch at Constantinople, there is a Gregorian Patriarch at Antioch and Jerusalem respectively. Both the Roman Catholic and the Protestant Armenians of Turkey have comparatively lately been formed into independent communities. Whilst it was in 1831, largely owing to the support of France, that the Papists were finally recognised as a separate community, it was not until much later that the Protestants received the same privilege.

Although those who desire to have any real idea of the beliefs and practices of the Armenian (Gregorian) Church must seek their knowledge elsewhere, yet I propose to give my readers a very brief idea of the religion of the people whom I am about to describe. The Armenians were early converted to Christianity. Notwithstanding the fact that legend gives some details concerning the prehistoric religion of the people, yet Bishop Gregory—a prince of the then reigning family of Armenia, who was consecrated bishop of his flock at Caesarea in 302 A.D., may be described as the real historical founder of the Armenian Church. The doctrines and outward forms of the Gregorian religion closely resemble those of the Orthodox Church. Confession and penance are laid down as articles of religion, Gregorians being supposed to attend confession before receiving the Holy Communion. Prayers are said for the dead, but the Church does not believe in purgatory.

In some respects the Armenians may well be compared to the Poles, whilst in others they much resemble the Jews. While the Armenians and the Poles each reside for the most part within the boundaries of three

empires,¹ both races dislike the various rulers under whom they are compelled to live. Again, whilst both the Armenians and the Jews are gifted with the same aptitude for finance, neither people, in spite of constant persecution, have changed their somewhat peculiar forms of religion. The members of both races, Armenians and Jews, notwithstanding their almost universal unpopularity with those whom they meet, are possessed of quite inexplicable methods by which they prosper under the most adverse circumstances. If an Armenian becomes destitute, either by his own or by somebody else's fault, it will be but a period of a few years before he has re-established himself in as if not more favourable circumstances than those in which he lived before the said disaster brought him to a state of poverty.

Whilst I have already shown that the Armenian possesses some features in his character which would not unnaturally make him unpopular with those who either meet or live with him, yet it is necessary when mixing with, writing about, or reading of the Armenians to remember that the conditions under which these Christians have existed for many centuries are hardly those which would produce a people possessed of those qualities which would be popular in the world. Although, speaking generally (elsewhere I shall give some stories which go to prove the contrary), the Armenians are not in the ordinary sense of the word particularly courageous, yet a people who, in spite of oppression and hardship, have never given up their language, customs, and religion must be gifted with considerable strength of mind and possess many merits,

¹ Out of a total estimated number of 4,000,000 Armenians in the world, some 2,500,000 reside within the Ottoman Empire (2,100,000 in Asiatic Turkey and 400,000 in the European Provinces of the Sultan), 1,200,000 in Russia, 150,000 in Persia, and the remainder in divers parts of the globe.

even if these qualities are not always apparent to the everyday man.

Before entering upon a long account of the terrible outbreak which occurred at Adana in 1909, I will briefly enumerate the various Armenian massacres which took place during the closing years of the ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid's reign, and which, though for the most part less terrible than those which occurred in the Cilician Plain, struck all Europe as outrages of the most terrible nature. In 1894 some 900 Armenians are computed to have been massacred by Turks and Kurds at Sasun—a mountainous district in the neighbourhood of Moush. This disaster was a result of the Armenians' refusal to pay taxes to the Turks, unless they were guaranteed against the attacks of the Kurds, who were wont to exact all the spare Armenian money. As a consequence of this massacre, and of diplomatic pressure on the part of the representatives of the Great Powers, a scheme of reform was sanctioned by the ex-Sultan. This scheme, like so many others dealing with reform, was introduced to satisfy Europe, rather than really to ameliorate the conditions under which the Christians of the Ottoman Empire existed during the final years of absolutism. So little improvement was brought about by the new project that in the late autumn of 1895 there occurred massacres in Trebizond, Erzeroum, Diabekir, Bitlis, Caiseria, and Urfa, in which according to official reports some 25,000 Christians perished, but in which it is probable that a far greater number of people actually lost their lives.

1896 was again a bloody year in the annals of Armenian history. Whilst in the spring the conflict at Zeitun, near Marash, took place, the autumn saw terrible horrors at Constantinople. On August 26th the Armenians, convinced that the attitude of the Powers would bring about no real amelioration of the condi-

tions in which they lived, attacked and captured the Ottoman Bank at Constantinople. As a result of this audacious effort to bring about the intervention of the European Powers, the Turkish Government permitted mobs of Kurds and other Moslems to parade the streets of the capital for about twenty-four hours, murdering Gregorian Armenians wherever they went. It is estimated that some 5,000 victims perished in the massacre beneath the windows of the houses occupied by the ambassadors who represented the Great Powers in Constantinople.

Between 1896 and 1909 no serious massacre of Armenians occurred in Turkey. The districts subjected to the Armenian massacres of 1909 extended from Tarsus to Kessab, situated on the landward slope of Mount Cassius, about halfway between the sea-coast towns of Alexandretta and Latakia. The Cilician Plain—a very fertile district bordering upon the Gulf of Alexandretta—was probably the scene of the greatest horrors. This fruitful area, which is practically cut off by mountains from the remainder of the Asiatic dominions of the Sultan, is watered by the rivers Cydnus, Sihun, and Pyramus. These rivers, which were once navigable as far as Tarsus, Adana, and Missis respectively, are now only muddy channels which serve to conduct a vast volume of water across the narrow plain from the mountains in which they rise to the sea coast. The rich lands of the Cilician Plain are cultivated for cotton, wheat, barley, and sesame, which are exported from Mersina—a modern seaboard town with a population of about 25,000 souls. It is to, or through, Mersina that all Armenians who possess sufficient money to leave the Cilician Plain fly in times of trouble or when massacres are feared.

The Armenians who now inhabit the Cilician Plain are the descendants of the followers of Prince Rhupen, who migrated southwards from Armenia during the

eleventh century. These people at first only dwelt in the country which surrounds the town of Sis, but later on extended the frontier of their kingdom, known as the Kingdom of Cilicia or Lesser Armenia, as far as the shores of the Mediterranean. Most Armenians speak their own language as their mother tongue, but the Christians of the Cilician Plain, as well as some other parts of the country, for the most part make use of the tongue of their Osmanli masters in everyday life. Turkish is here even written by the Armenians with their own alphabet.

Adana, where the massacres first broke out, is not only the most important town on the Cilician Plain, but also the capital of one of the richest provinces in the Ottoman Empire. While the largest part of the city, with its population of about 40,000 souls (one-third of whom are Christians), is built on the plain through which the Sihun wends its way to the Mediterranean, a portion of the Armenian quarter, including the American School for girls, the residence of Mr. W. N. Chambers (the well-known missionary, who with his nephew, Mr. Lawson Chambers, probably saved more lives during the massacre than any other two men), and the Jesuit School for girls are situated on a small isolated eminence on the right bank of the River Sihun. The town is divided into numerous distinct quarters, each inhabited or tenanted for business purposes by a different element of the community. Christians not only live in separate parts of the city from those occupied by Moslems, but the bazaars (shops) kept and frequented by Moslems and non-Moslems are, for the most part, located in quite distinct districts of the town. The main route from Mersina, after passing the Régie tobacco factory and the railway station (the present terminus of the Mersina-Adana line), enters the city and runs through the market-place to the Armenian bazaar. Beyond these Christian shops again is situated



A STREET IN THE MOSLEM QUARTER OF ADANA UNTOUCHED DURING THE MASSACRE.



A HEAP OF ARMENIAN RUINS DISTANT BUT A FEW HUNDRED YARDS FROM THE STREET SHOWN IN THE UPPER PICTURE.

the Turkish bazaar, the Moslem residential quarter, and the Konak, besides other governmental offices. In the market-place a second important street bifurcates from the main thoroughfare, and leads past the Ottoman Bank, along the open space which serves the purpose of drill and fair ground to the western end of the bridge across the River Sihun. Close to the end of the bridge, and near the Konak, this street again unites with the one from which it divided in the market-place. The bridge across the Sihun, which is some 300 yards long, is the only means by which travellers can enter or leave the city when arriving from or proceeding directly towards the east.

When I visited Adana in the month of October (six months after the massacres) the Christian business quarter of the city was practically no more than many heaps of charred remains intersected by numerous semi-destroyed walls. As I shall describe hereafter, the non-Moslem dwellings had been repaired by means of the money subscribed through the International Relief Committee, but the Government had not then attempted to rebuild, or even to allow the people to rebuild, the houses which made up the principal Armenian quarter, and included the Christian bazaar. As one looked down from the roof of Mr. Chambers's house, but little was visible besides the ruined walls of a once prosperous city, here and there the monotony of the scene being broken by the tower of an almost entirely destroyed Armenian church or the more prominent remains of a once important house. The burning and destruction were so systematically carried out that more than one Turkish mosque or Moslem house might be clearly distinguished in the very middle of the Christian ruins. Now and then a Christian house, in immediate proximity to the Turkish quarter, or situated next to a Moslem dwelling, was saved, owing to the danger that fire might spread to some "True Believer's" property were it

ignited. As one wandered through the mass of ruins the horror of the scene became more and more real. So great was the destruction that it was almost impossible to discern where streets once existed and where they did not.

Adana is the centre of the cotton trade on the Cilician Plain. Several large establishments have been started in the town for ginning, spinning, and weaving. Whilst the most important factories are owned by the Trypani Brothers—Greeks, who introduced the cotton industry into Cilicia about forty years ago—a group of German, Swiss, and Austrian financiers, known as the Deutsche Levant Cotton Company, have more recently started a business at Adana. This Continental Company, which is still almost in its infancy, annually imports a large quantity of American cotton-seed, and allows the peasants to purchase it on credit. The cotton crop is then bought back by the same firm, made up by machinery into bales, and exported for sale in the European market. Such are the Germanic methods of pushing "trade" and gaining influence in Asia Minor.

The indirect and supposed causes of the unfortunate events which occurred in Asia Minor in 1909 will be discussed elsewhere. While previous massacres at Erzeroum, Van, and elsewhere have been of short duration, and have resembled a mighty whirlwind of horror and destruction rushing through the town or district, the events which took place at Adana and in the surrounding district in 1909 were a series of most diabolical slaughters which continued for more than sufficient time to enable the perpetrators, the massacred, and the onlookers to realise fully what was actually taking place.

It was on Thursday, April 8th, that an Armenian who had previously been persecuted by some Turks in Adana, and who had, in vain, appealed to the Vali, shot at his enemies, killing one and wounding another. The

dead Turk's body was carried about the city, which caused a great deal of ill-feeling between the Moslems and the Christians. As a result of an Armenian being killed by a Moslem crowd on the following Sunday, the Christian population became very uneasy, and on Monday, Mr. W. N. Chambers, accompanied by various local dignitaries, went to the Governor-General, who faithfully assured them that the people of the city were perfectly quiet and that there was no cause for fear. In spite of these definite assurances, ominous rumours continued in the town, and one or two Armenians are believed to have been killed in the streets on Tuesday, April 13th—the day of the reactionary movement in Constantinople. During these days of anxiety any Armenians who could afford to do so and were able to leave their business went by train to Mersina, in order either to obtain greater safety in that city, owing to its situation on the sea coast, or, better, to fly to Cyprus, if time and money were available.

On Wednesday morning, April 14th, the uneasiness in Adana was so great that the Armenians, who had opened their shops on that day, began to close them, whilst small groups of Moslems, armed with clubs and provided with white *saruks* (bandages) wound round their fezzes, gathered in various quarters of the city. By an early hour the situation had become so serious that scarcely an Armenian shop remained open, and the Christian merchants were hastening rapidly homewards. Khojas, Moslems, and Turks of all classes were purchasing revolvers and other arms in all directions.

In view of the ever-increasing anxiety amongst the people, Mr. W. N. Chambers, accompanied by his nephew, Mr. Lawson Chambers (to whom I am indebted for many of my details concerning the massacre in Adana), again went to the Governor and impressed upon him that immediate steps should be taken to restore

the confidence of the people, and to ensure that public security should be adequately maintained. While these two gentlemen were with the Vali, the heads of the various Armenian communities arrived to ask that peace might be preserved in the city. His Excellency made the necessary promises, and arranged with the two British missionaries to go out into the streets in order to persuade the Armenians to open their shops. While these gentlemen were actually occupied in endeavouring to reassure the people, they met Armenians who were suffering from wounds inflicted upon them by Moslems.

Although occasional shots were heard during the early hours of Wednesday, the real battle between Moslems and Christians did not, in fact, begin until about 11 a.m. By that time the streets of the city were entirely in possession of the Turks. The Armenians, who had retired terrified to their own quarter, were only represented by a band of young men, who had gathered in the market in order to endeavour to protect their shops. It seems doubtful whether the Turks or the Armenians actually first began the general attack. Each party disown the responsibility of opening fire without provocation. The Armenians declare that at first the Christian warriors only fired into the air and did not aim at the advancing bands of Moslem fanatics until their quarter was in imminent danger. However this may be, it is obvious that if the Turkish troops actually at the Konak had been sent to stop the plundering of Armenian houses, or from the Turkish point of view "to protect the Moslems," that the whole catastrophe might have been averted.

Throughout the day the battle raged. Many of the minarets of the mosques were occupied by Turkish soldiers, who directed their fire, not upon the looters, but against the Armenians who were endeavouring to defend their lives and property against a pitiless mob of vandals and fanatics. The American School for girls

was unremittingly in danger of either being attacked or burnt. Although the building was placed in a rough state of defence by placing mattresses and boxes before the windows, yet bullets penetrated the walls and actually lodged in the partition which separated the two dormitories in which the girls were hidden. So dangerous was the situation that large crowds of Armenians left their own houses, some taking refuge in the school and in the house of Mr. Chambers, whilst others fled to the Roman Catholic schools and Papal missionary establishments. Holes were cut in the house and garden walls to enable communication to be maintained as long as possible between the different localities of refuge and to avoid the necessity of passing from place to place round the winding streets, which were, for the most part, in the hands of the Turks. It was in crossing the only public thoroughfare that separates the American School from the house of Mr. Chambers that Havagim Effendi, the Armenian pastor, was killed, while actually in the arms of Mr. Chambers.

On Wednesday evening, Major Doughty Wylie (the British Vice-Consul) arrived by train from Mersina, accompanied by Mrs. Doughty Wylie. In the morning of that day the Major had received a message from Mr. Trypani, the British Dragoman, that his presence in Adana was urgently required. As the train which conveyed Major and Mrs. Doughty Wylie from Mersina approached Adana some of the Christian travellers were threatened by the Moslem passengers, and before the British Consul and his brave wife reached the house of Mr. Trypani, situated immediately opposite the railway-station, more than one Armenian was murdered before their very eyes. Immediately after his arrival in the city Major Doughty Wylie, accompanied by four soldiers, made his way to the Konak, where he secured a military escort, part of which

he left at the American School and Mission-house. Although the approaches to the Christian quarter were defended by Armenians, who were well armed and secure in their own houses and who fired at every one who approached them, yet on this first day of the massacre no shot was aimed at the Consul or his party as soon as he announced himself. In spite of remonstrance from the inmates, the Turkish guard which was left to ensure the safety of the American School ran away, and left the foreigners and Christian girls only protected by a band of young Armenian warriors.

Shortly after daybreak on Thursday, April 15th (fires and shooting had continued all night), the Turkish troops arrived from Missis—distant some five hours from Adana. A few minutes after their arrival they opened fire on an Armenian right in front of the Konak. This poor man, who was killed afterwards, turned out to be the driver of the wagon which had brought in the officers' luggage. By this time, too, in addition to the troops which were arriving in Adana, the country people, fearing or hearing of danger, had begun to move towards the city, but were prevented crossing the river and entering the town by troops stationed on the bridge. Throughout the day the principal streets were lined with Bashi-Bazouks, armed with clubs, sticks, and pistols, who claimed to be in terror of the Armenians, who, they said, were rising against the Government.

It was on Thursday that the two American missionaries, Maurer and Rogers, were killed. These two brave fellows, who had come to Adana for the annual missionary conference, left the girls' school and went to put out a fire on a neighbouring house which, if it had been allowed to continue, would have endangered the safety of the school. It seems pretty certain that these two men were shot by Turks to whom they had



A RUINED ARMENIAN HOUSE IN ADANA.

already spoken, and who then had promised not to harm them. Even if these Turks had been aggravated by the fire of some Armenians from a neighbouring house, it was not necessary for them to shoot these men, who were only occupied in extinguishing a fire and that for the protection of their own fellow-countrymen. The bodies were carried into the school and were buried in the yard beside the remains of the Armenian pastor who, as I have already said, was murdered in Mr. Chambers's arms. As the Great Powers have insisted on no indemnity to recompense their subjects for property destroyed during the massacres, so has America not brought any decided pressure to bear upon the Ottoman Government as a result of the murder of two of her missionaries, under circumstances the disgraceful character of which can hardly be exaggerated.

On the outskirts of the town between the Ottoman Régie tobacco factory and the house of Mr. Trypani, is the Yeni Mohallé quarter. This part of Adana is principally inhabited by Armenians, who live in small detached houses surrounded by gardens. It was here that Major Doughty Wylie, whilst endeavouring to ascertain whether or not some Turkish soldiers had been killed by Armenians, himself received a wound which broke his arm just above the wrist. A message was at once sent to the Vali and the *Ferik* (military commander) that the Consul hoped that neither the house from which the shot came nor its occupants would be allowed to suffer owing to this disaster. It seems probable that Major Doughty Wylie, being dressed in uniform (he was a Military Consul), was, in fact, mistaken by the Armenians for a Turkish officer.

On Thursday evening the Armenians, who were by this time running short of ammunition, decided to try to communicate with the Government and thus to ask for protection. The formal request, addressed to the Vali, was taken to the Konak on Friday morning by a

friendly Turkish khoja, who happened to reside in the Armenian quarter. In answer to this letter, a large company of soldiers, led by this khoja and under the command of a Turkish colonel, were sent to patrol the streets and to restore order in the city. As this motley procession passed through the Armenian quarter, it was joined by some of the leading members of that community. During the time occupied by the march of these peace-makers Mr. W. N. Chambers ascended to the flat roof of his house, from which he could command the attention of both Turks and Armenians, and whilst waving a white pocket-handkerchief ordered both parties to cease fire. A truce was finally concluded at the Konak on condition that the heads of the so-called Armenian revolutionary party agreed to certain conditions, the most important of which was a kind of disarmament.

It was thus on Friday, April 16th, that the first massacre, which practically amounted to a drawn battle, was concluded in Adana. It is estimated that between five and six hundred Moslems and about seven hundred Armenians perished in the three days. During the ensuing night three or four large fires broke out in the city, whilst the inhabitants of Adana could discern others in the neighbouring villages and vineyards. The magnitude of the disaster was even then too obvious to everybody. Although it seems doubtful whether any of the Bashi-Bazouks, who took so prominent a part in the massacre, were actually provided with arms by the Turkish authorities, yet, however this may be, it is certain that on Friday afternoon a party composed of 400 armed Redifs and Bashi-Bazouks, after threatening the stationmaster (a British subject) at Adana, seized a train and insisted on its being driven to Tarsus.

After the first massacre in Adana, there was a respite of about ten days. As part of the city had been saved by the Armenian warriors, and as some

of the Christian houses had not been burnt or plundered, the people began to look after one another and to treat the wounded. A large number of villagers, who had been deprived of their homes and all they possessed, flocked into the city during this interregnum and joined these Christians, who were gathered together in refuge camps established in the churches, schools, factories, and elsewhere. The arrival of H.M.S. *Swiftsure*, and other foreign warships, at Mersina did much to re-establish some degree of confidence amongst the Christians.

Unfortunately, the reprieve was only too brief. After barely ten days' peace, it was on Sunday, April 25th, that the fresh outbreak began in Adana. In the morning everything seemed quiet. Medical supplies which had just arrived had been distributed. Suddenly, towards the close of afternoon service at the Protestant Church, the sound of a few shots were the signal for an almost universal panic. The exact origin of these shots is still uncertain. One of the first incidents in the massacre was the firing on the tents of the Salonika troops, who had just reached Adana. These men were camped on the drill-ground close to the right bank of the River Sihun. A report was immediately spread that the Armenians had opened fire on the troops from a church tower in the town. This report must have been untrue, as upon subsequent inspection it was ascertained that even if fire had been directed from the tower in question, owing to the slope of the ground, it would have been impossible for bullets to reach the camp. There is another story, that a party of local Turks, dressed up as Armenians, fired at the Rumeliot soldiers in order to incite them to think that a second Armenian insurrection had begun. Whatever may have provoked their action, it is certain that the European soldiers not only opened fire on the Armenians, but that they joined in attacking the Christian quarter of

the city, and for a time, at any rate, took part in the looting of houses and killing of innocents.

Owing to the almost complete disarmament of the Armenian population, the second massacre was far more dreadful than the first. It is estimated that at least 2,000 men, women, and children perished, either by the sword or in the flames. The Armenians suffered at least nine-tenths of the losses. Soon after the commencement of the onslaught a destructive fire was opened upon the Mouseghian School, which contained not only many of those wounded in the first massacre, but also some 2,000 refugees. The building was later set on fire. Shots were concentrated upon the school from two distinct places, and the firing became more intense as the pupils attempted to escape from the flames. The hottest fire was directed from a Turkish bey's house in the Armenian quarter, where about thirty soldiers were collected. The Turks claim that shots first came from the school, but if this were really the case, it seems unnatural that thirty soldiers should have been collected ready to return the fire from a house which had never before been occupied by more than six privates. When the Armenian church, in which some six hundred people had collected, became in imminent danger, owing to the proximity of the burning Mouseghian School, the refugees were saved by a brave Jesuit father, who rushed from the French School to the church, and with the assistance of a Turkish officer took the half-demented people to the French College, from which they were again rescued by Major Doughty Wylie when this establishment was later set on fire.

On Monday most of the people from the refuge camps were taken through the deserted, fire-bordered streets to a large, open, park-like space outside the Konak. After the women had been separated from their menfolk, all were carefully examined, ostensibly for arms, but in reality probably in order that those



PART OF THE RUINED QUARTER OF ADANA.

undertaking the search might obtain any money or valuables still in the possession of the Christians. After the people had stood in the burning sun all day without either food or water, they were allowed to depart, and were compelled again to proceed through the burning quarter from one end of the city to the other in order to reach the factory of Mr. Trypani and the Yeni Mohalle quarter, situated opposite the railway station on the outskirts of the town. In Mr. Trypani's factory 14,000 people were packed so closely that they could only sit up and had no space to lie down. 5,000 people were also accommodated in the German factory. During the day, too, the girls from the American School were taken for greater safety to the British Consulate, where they and their foreign teachers were compelled to spend twenty-four hours on famine rations (two small biscuits and a cup of chocolate each).

The conflagration, which continued uninterruptedly until Tuesday morning, destroyed, not only the whole Armenian residential quarter, but also the houses which make up the outlying districts of the city, and which were so largely inhabited by Christians. The Gregorian, Roman Catholic, and Protestant churches were burnt. Although the uninterrupted fire subsided on Tuesday, the Jesuit School for girls and many other buildings were subsequently destroyed. The girls from this school had been sent to Mersina after the massacre in order to ensure them greater safety. As soon as the brave Mother Superior had conducted her flock to the sea coast she returned to Adana to watch over her then deserted establishment. This lady, who actually spent nights utterly alone on the balcony abutting from an upper storey room, only left the building when it was finally set on fire on the night of May 1st.

Never has the burning of a town been more systematically carried out than at Adana in 1909. The fact that kerosene was freely used to ignite the houses

is only too apparent from the numerous blackened tins which for months told their tell-tale evidence wherever one turned throughout the ruins. The destruction was rendered the easier owing to the manner in which the houses had been constructed. Nearly all the dwellings and shops had wooden planks built longways into the walls, so that as the fire got hold of each successive building these layers of timber became ignited. The burning of these beam-like wooden layers caused the walls to fall in on their occupants. Moreover, where the outer shell of a house still remained standing after the fire, the walls were practically useless for reconstruction purposes, owing to the charred and rotten state of the timbers of which they were partly constructed.

There is no doubt that both Djevad Bey (Governor of the vilayet) and Mustafa Remsi Pasha (the Military Commander at Adana), if not the actual cause of the outbreak in Southern Asia Minor, were by their cowardly conduct entirely responsible for the proportions which it assumed. From the moment when Djevad Bey assured, not only the Armenian dignitaries but also the British subjects at Adana, that no disturbance would occur until the second massacre was over, neither the Vali nor Mustafa Remsi Pasha took any adequate measures to restore public order. Whether it was a Christian revolution against the Government or a Turkish massacre of Armenians, and whoever and whatever was the cause of the outbreak, it must have been the duty of the local officials who represented the Government either to re-establish tranquility or to risk losing their lives whilst attempting to perform those obligations with which they were entrusted. Mustafa Remsi Pasha, who ventured into the streets during the early hours of April 14th, turned away from wherever he heard firing and finally bolted to the Konak as soon as any real danger became apparent. This soldier, together with the Vali, did not again leave the govern-

ment buildings until the first massacre was over. During the first massacre, and while Djevad Bey and Mustafa Remsi Pasha were cowering upstairs, the yard which surrounds the government offices was crowded with soldiers, but no orders were given to the men that they should patrol the streets or take adequate measures to protect the population. Armenians were killed, not only in the very presence of the Governor and his military companion, but also, as I have already said, in the courtyard immediately beneath the windows of the rooms in which these dastards were seeking their own safety. Whether or not arms were actually distributed to civilians with the consent of the Vali is uncertain, but it is undeniable that the term "Redif" was very broadly interpreted, and it seems almost certain that anybody who claimed to be in the reserve was provided with arms and ammunition.

Between the two massacres, in spite of the fact that a systematic house to house search for all arms was nominally instituted, it seems pretty clear, in view of what subsequently occurred, that only the weapons owned by Armenians were carefully collected. After the first massacre, too, when the arrival of H.M.S. *Swiftsure* and other warships at Mersina was imminent, the Vali strongly protested against any armed sailors or marines being landed, and asked if the guard provided at the British Consulate was insufficient. His Excellency, having been informed that the foreigners wished to relieve him of as much anxiety as possible, and to set the Turkish troops free to restore order in the city, replied that there was no danger whatever, and that to land armed men, especially in a constitutional country, was a serious matter. A few British marines went to Adana to assist in the work of relief, but no armed force was landed. The second massacre occurred. I shall discuss the punishment inflicted upon Djevad Bey and Mustafa Remsi Pasha elsewhere.

Not only throughout the massacre, but during many months of distress which followed it, the Adana governmental authorities and the Moslem inhabitants demonstrated their unfair and unfriendly attitude towards the Christian section of the population. Such was the feeling of racial hatred that during the massacre Armenian shops were systematically searched in order to make certain that the account-books of their owners were destroyed, thus ensuring that it would be impossible for the Christian survivors of the outrage to collect their debts from those who were unwilling to pay them. Even when neighbours had been on most cordial terms before the massacre, little or no sympathy was extended by a Mohammedan family to a homeless and destitute Christian. Although it would obviously have been difficult for a Moslem to give a Christian family shelter in his house, yet if the massacre had been the result of the fear of an Armenian rising, as soon as the imaginary danger was past, it would have been easy for Mohammedans to do little acts of kindness, which were, in fact, conspicuous by their absence. The efforts at collecting plunder taken from the Armenian houses were farcical. Nothing efficient was done, and an insignificant portion of the booty was restored. The little plunder collected was taken to the government offices, where it was stored to await the arrival of a few people who found some of their goods. It was an indignity for Armenian women first to be obliged to go to the Konak and hunt for their possessions, in the presence of soldiers who had often taken part in the massacre, and afterwards, should they by chance find any article, to be compelled to carry it through the ruined streets and past coffee-houses filled with curious Moslem onlookers.

Immediately after the first massacre in Adana an International Relief Committee was formed, under the presidency of Major Doughty Wylie. During many

weeks of acute distress this Committee (entirely provided with funds by voluntary subscriptions from the outside world) distributed food to starving people, established hospitals for the sick, and provided rough shelters for the refugees. The Germans also fed a large number of people in their cotton factory at Adana. After the Ottoman Government began to supply refugees with food, the International Committee turned its attention to providing more lasting comforts for the inhabitants. Bedding and other necessities were served out to the people rendered absolutely destitute by the losses which they had suffered during the massacre. Six weeks after the massacre it is calculated that out of the 15,000 people actually refugees at Adana 10,000 had not even a change of underclothing—a necessity so vital, not only to comfort but to health.

After a massacre one of the greatest difficulties to be overcome by those who are trying to relieve the sufferers is how to provide the means by which the survivors can earn an honest livelihood. The International Committee at first hoped to be able to supply artisans with new implements with which to carry on their former trades, but owing to expense this was found to be impracticable, and small sums of money were therefore distributed to workmen in order to enable them to provide themselves with tools. When I was in Adana, about 1,500 workmen had received assistance, at a cost of some £T3,000. I actually saw many of these people—barbers, shoemakers, tailors, or tin-smiths, besides those of sundry other trades—sitting amongst ruined walls (where once their shops existed) carrying on their respective trades. In some cases the re-equipped tradesmen were sheltered from the sun or rain by rough roofs made out of bits of kerosene tins—the contents of which had actually been used to burn the city—whilst in others the labourers had not even a canopy above their heads. A certain

number of Armenians, thus provided with money, used the sums which they received to enable them to emigrate, generally to America, but such cases were not very common. As great difficulty was experienced in finding work for the destitute women, some widows were provided with sewing-machines. With the object of further assisting the women of the Adana district Mrs. Shepard (the wife of the well-known American missionary doctor), who some eighteen years ago so successfully founded an embroidery industry at Aintab, was invited by Djemal Bey, the new Vali, to establish a branch of her work in Adana. Owing to the initiative of his Excellency a liberal allowance was made by the Government Relief Committee in order to allow this industry to be started on a satisfactory basis.

At the time of my visit to Adana the International Committee had repaired 365 houses containing about 476 rooms. Each room accommodates a family. Where both apartments of a house which formerly consisted of two rooms were rebuilt by the Committee, the owner was obliged to sign a contract undertaking to make over his second room to the Committee for the use of another family for three years. Armenians were as far as possible employed upon the work of reconstruction, and the owners or tenants, both men and women, gave their time without wages, thereby rendering it possible to construct better houses than an outlay of only £T8 per room (the sum allowed by the Committee) would cover.

The situation was steadily improving when the torrential rains, which had been prevailing in the district for a week or ten days, culminated in a flood which swept through Adana on November 13th. The chief street of the town was like a vast flowing river. So great was the volume of water that only those mounted on horses or prepared to sink in up to their thighs could move about the lower quarters of the



SOME HOUSES IN ADANA REBUILT BY THE INTERNATIONAL RELIEF COMMITTEE.

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city. Many refugees were again compelled to take shelter in various solidly constructed buildings ; the new Mission hospital, owing to the fact that it possessed an upper story, was a favourable resort. Men and women not fortunate enough to reach any place of safety were in some cases driven to pass a whole night clinging to the trees. Loss of life was prevented by the forethought of Djemal Bey, who, as soon as the magnitude of the disaster became apparent, sent carts to bring in the inhabitants from the outlying districts of the town and to deposit them in safer localities. Not only were about half the houses actually repaired by the International Relief Committee rendered untenable by this inroad of water, but it is estimated that the total damage amounted to no less than £T100,000.

Almost directly after the massacres the Turkish Government subscribed £T30,000 towards the relief of the sufferers at Adana. Nearly half this amount was expended, or more truthfully wasted, by a committee under the presidency of Abdul Kadir Bagdadi (who was subsequently exiled from Adana owing to his conduct before and during the massacres). When it was discovered that the administration of this sum was not being satisfactorily carried out, a new committee was formed to take over the work which previously had not been properly managed. Subsequently the Turkish Government undertook to vote £T200,000 for the assistance of the sufferers in the Adana and the surrounding districts. This sum was distributed by a committee under the presidency of the Vali of Adana. As Mustafa Zihni Pasha, the Governor of the province, who succeeded Djevad Bey almost directly after the massacre, quite failed to get the goodwill of the Christians, but little was done to carry out the work of governmental relief until after the arrival of Ahmed Djemal Bey during the month of August. His Excellency at once organised a committee on a satisfactory

basis. The £T200,000 provided by the Government was divided into two equal parts. The first £T100,000 was a present from the country and was utilised to give immediate relief to the sufferers, to supply shelter for the homeless, to establish a reserve fund to be devoted to setting up, not only tradesmen but also smaller farmers in their former occupations, and to allotting special sums with which to provide work for the destitute. The second £T100,000 was a loan given by the Government, on easy terms, to larger farmers, merchants, and more important tradesmen.

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After the completion of this chapter at the end of December, 1910, the Armenian Catholicus of Echmiadzin, to whom I have referred, died of apoplexy. His successor, who will be elected by representatives sent from all parts of the world, has not yet been chosen.

V

THE ARMENIAN MASSACRES OF APRIL, 1909 (continued)

The massacre in Tarsus—The story of an escape from Kozolouk—The massacres at Hamidieh, Abdul Oglou, and Antioch—The defence of Hajin, Durtyol, and Shehr Murad—A few towns which narrowly escaped a massacre.

IT was on a hot October afternoon that I arrived at Tarsus. Thanks to the kindness of Mrs. Christie, the wife of Dr. Christie of St. Paul's College, as a stranger arriving in this "no mean city," I was met at the station and driven up to the College by one of the clever, intelligent graduates of this Mission establishment. Mrs. Christie, who was in sole charge of the refugees at the time of the massacre (Dr. Christie had gone to Adana for the Mission conference), received me with that bright, radiant smile which is always so welcome to a traveller in whatever land he may be greeted by it.

After Adana and Mersina, Tarsus is the most important town on the Cilician Plain. The birthplace of St. Paul, which is situated about half-way between the Taurus Mountains and the Mediterranean, lies scarcely a mile distant from the right bank of the River Cydnus. Picturesque gardens containing many fruit-trees almost entirely surround the town. The modern quarter of the city is made up of mud and stone built houses which border narrow winding streets. The American Mission establishment, known as St. Paul's College, which, as I shall explain hereafter, was

the means of saving the lives of so many Armenians during the massacre, is situated near the western extremity of the town. Beyond it, and at a distance of but a few hundred yards, are the barracks, standing in the midst of the military parade-ground. The railway-station on the Mersina-Adana line, by which so many murderers arrived from Adana, lies just within the northern suburbs of the city. A large number of Fellahs form part of the population. These people, who believe in a secret religion, and whose women do not veil, live for the most part in reed-like huts, situated amidst the gardens which surround the town.

It was on Wednesday, April 14th, that the danger of some disaster became apparent in Tarsus. On that day after 200 Redifs had been sent by special train to Adana, the Christians, almost in a state of panic, were assured by the Turkish Governor that no disturbances would occur. On the morrow (Thursday), in spite of the fact that the first rumours of the massacre at Adana reached Tarsus, and although there were hardly any Turkish soldiers in the town, the Armenian shops were opened as usual. It, however, soon became apparent that the state of the city was far from tranquil; for when the morning train arrived from Adana, a loud noise was heard in the direction of the station. Immediately afterwards a large mob ran to the barracks, and notwithstanding the protests of the Turkish officer in charge, insisted upon rushing the building and distributing arms and ammunition to the assembled crowd. Owing to the arming of Moslems, Christians began to crowd into the yard of the American College, both on Wednesday and on Thursday.

Not, however, until Friday morning did the real troubles in Tarsus begin. The massacre first broke out at the station when the 200 malefactors, mostly Kurdish Bashi-Bazouks, who had seized a special train in Adana, reached the city. After their arrival,



A GENERAL VIEW OF TARSUS.

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these travellers were joined by many of the Afghans, who live in the suburbs and by some of the worst of the native Turks. A few Armenians, who were trying to leave for Mersina, were killed before they could enter the train, and more would have perished had it not been for the courage of the stationmaster. The crowd of Bashi-Bazouks and others then went to the armoury attached to the barracks, where they obtained several hundred rifles and a supply of ammunition. An onlooker, whose credibility is vouched for, thus described the scene to me :

"I was standing near the barracks when I heard shouting and saw a great multitude coming towards me. When they approached the barracks, one of the leaders showed a telegram to the military commander, and to other officers who were standing at the door of the barracks, saying at the same time, 'Why do you demur? The infidels have murdered all the Turks ; be quick, distribute arms to these people. As a result of these words, the crowd, having been provided with arms, rushed to the Armenian quarter.'"

The leader of this mob was a well-known Young Turk in Tarsus, and at that time was said actually to be an important member of the local Committee of Union and Progress. My informant, although a Christian, was believed to be a Moslem Arab, as he speaks Arabic for his mother tongue.

Although, if the near-by farms and villages are taken into account, some 500 Christians perished in and around Tarsus, yet not more than about 100 people were really killed in the city itself. This comparatively small loss of life was due to the fact that the object of the Moslems was to loot and to destroy the Christian houses rather than to murder their inmates. The pillaging was most systematically carried out. After the houses had been completely devastated, they were ignited—their complete destruc-

tion being insured by means of burning kerosene. During the afternoon and evening of this "Black" Friday the illumination from the burning houses (some 800 of which were entirely destroyed) was so powerful that when darkness came, it was actually possible to read and to sign papers by its light. Very few Armenian shops were destroyed, owing to the fact that it was difficult for the pillagers to make sure of the religion of the owner of any premises situated without the Armenian residential quarter (at Tarsus the Turkish and the Christian bazaars do not, as at Adana, occupy distinct quarters of the city).

The Christians made practically no resistance, and as soon as the massacre began the people, naturally only too anxious to take refuge in some place of safety, were actually driven and hustled by representatives of the Government into the yard of the American College. No attempt was made by the mob to prevent people from obtaining shelter, and more than 3,000 were soon under the protection of Mrs. Christie. Some 400 others, less fortunate than those who were able to reach a place of safety at once, spent the first night in the swamps which border the River Cydnus, and arrived at the College next day. As the object of the Moslems in Tarsus does not seem to have been murder, the Government provided the school with a guard, and soldiers actually brought in wounded and helpless Armenians to receive succour from the Americans.

Such was his broad-mindedness that at least one Turk—a teacher of his language in the College—assisted in the work of feeding the refugees by procuring milk for the babies and food for the hungry. So great was the devotion of this man to his fellow-teachers and pupils that, dressed as a Kurd, he rode with one of the bravest of the students (also in disguise) to Mersina, a distance of eighteen miles, in order to convey dispatches describing the danger at Tarsus to the foreign

consuls residing at the coast. During the anxious days which followed the massacre four victims died at the American College, their places in the population of the yard being filled by four new-born "massacre" babies.

Although the massacre in Tarsus was less terrible than that in Adana, and, without doubt, less awful than those which took place in the smaller villages, yet the destruction of both houses and property left the survivors in great distress. Here, as elsewhere, the poorer Armenians not only lost their houses, shops, cows, or other animals, by means of which they gained a livelihood, but even were they able to re-establish themselves in business, they found themselves almost without customers. The better class Armenians had either perished or at least had lost all their worldly goods in the massacre, and were, therefore, not in a position to purchase even the barest necessities from their co-religionists.

Most of the larger Armenian houses in this part of the country are occupied by their owners, and are surrounded by yards or gardens. Within these yards are often constructed a row of rooms, each of which is tenanted by a whole family, and rented at £T3 per year. Whilst I was in Tarsus I visited some of these abodes, the condition of one or two of which I specially recall to memory. In one instance a husband, wife, and three children shared one tiny room. Some boards had been arranged in the corner for the accommodation of the children. One boy was seriously ill with dysentery, whilst another infant, although it was two years old, was hardly larger than a normal baby aged six months. This child had been pronounced by the doctor to be in a hopeless condition, and therefore the mother was taking hardly any trouble in attending to it. Another house, or more correctly speaking, a single room, was occupied by an old woman, her almost paralysed son, a widowed daughter, who was nearly

blind, and two grandchildren, besides two or three donkeys. The room, although larger than the last which I described, was nearly dark and partly dug out below the level of the ground. Over part of the floor space a sort of raised platform, forming a kind of upper story, had been rigged up. The inmates of this abode only paid rent amounting to £T2 per year, owing to their providing accommodation for two donkeys which belonged to a neighbour who had no space for them. This entire family owed its support to the granddaughter, aged fifteen years, who, when times were good, was wont to make about nine shillings a month at the local cotton mill, and to the combined wages, amounting to about 2d. per day, earned by the old people for cotton-picking.

As I have already said, the massacres which took place in certain villages near Tarsus were some of the most terrible in the entire devastated district. For example, Kozolouk was an Armenian village of about seventy-five houses, situated in the mountains about fifteen miles to the north of Tarsus. There were two churches and also at least one school. Although I dare not tell my readers the details of the massacre in which some 150 souls perished, and during which two churches, two schools, and sixty-eight houses were pillaged and burnt, yet I propose to recount the story of the escape of some of the inhabitants of Kozolouk. The woman who told me the story of her flight, and who spoke in fairly good English on behalf of herself and her sister, had resided fourteen years in England, and had only left this country at the end of 1907 in order, owing to ill-health, to be able to pass the winter in Egypt. I have made as few alterations as possible in the language of this account, because I feel that the experience is more realistically described in the words of those who passed through it. Not only is the reliability of these people vouched for by foreigners



THE BARRACKS FROM WHICH RIFLES WERE DISTRIBUTED AT TARSUS.

who know them, but it was quite clear from the conduct of the women whilst telling their story, as well as from the manner in which they replied to my sundry questions, that they were telling the truth and nothing beyond the truth.

Miss Karamanli informed me that she had only returned to Asia Minor in April, 1909, in order to see her sister and to visit Kozolouk, her native village, once more. It was her intention to spend a quiet summer on the Cilician Plain, and then to go abroad again. She said :

" I arrived at Kozolouk late in the evening of Saturday, April 10th. At dawn on Friday, April 16th, when I had been only a few days in the village and had hardly been about at all, we found ourselves faced by an attack from a multitude of wild Turks, an attack the horror of which was totally beyond our conception. Two days earlier (April 14th) some Armenian farmers, after they had been beaten and threatened by Turks, had come back to the village from a farm some three hours distant. Therefore on that evening (April 14th) two persons were sent to the city of Tarsus to give information about this affair. In the meantime the Turks, who were surrounding the village, and of whom the inhabitants were naturally much frightened, reassured the people and said they had nothing to fear. The next day (April 15th) three gendarmes arrived at the village, saying, ' We have two orders with us, one from Dr. Christie and one from the Government ; therefore, hurry up, assemble to hear the orders.' At the same time they invited the crowd outside (who had been trying to attack the village for two days, but who were afraid to enter, owing to the attitude of the villagers) to come in and listen to the proclamations. The gendarmes then addressed the assembly of people, telling them that the order which they brought was an order for their safety, that there was nothing for them to be afraid of, and that they

were to go to their own houses and take their ease. But before many minutes had passed two of the gendarmes had left us and gone away. The other, as though in a most friendly way, tried to persuade the people to give up their arms, and said if they did so he would disperse the enemy. Whatever was said we accepted with perfect confidence. We were confident believing the order was true.

"The man who in the early evening of April 15th had proclaimed safety to the village came in the morning of the 16th, saying, 'Hurry up, make haste, leave the village at once!' We in great confusion came forth and saw the village full of cannibal-like people staring at us, and ready to rush upon us. People dressed in any clothes they could get. I was obliged to seize a native costume, and went out with bare feet. Mothers with their three, four, even seven children, old men and sick people, brides and bridegrooms, maidens and young men, in the hurried escape all lost one another. The people left the village in many different parties. Here and there some who had become separated were reunited. Thus running from mountain to mountain, some of us were suddenly shot down, whilst others were wounded and left lying by the way. When now and then we tried to look at our village, we saw the rising flames, and heard the firing of guns, and the hurrying of horses carrying away all that we had left in the village. Our minds were in such a state of confusion that we had no time to think in which direction we were going. My sister and I had joined a party in which our pastor was taking flight. There were over 100 of us in all. During the day thirteen men were killed. . . . We spent the night in a small Turkish village a few hours distant from Kozolouk, where we were given some food.

"Our second day began in a very horrible way. Early in the morning the same crowd surrounded the

village. In one small room over 100 of us were packed. We were aware of their plans and knew that each moment was drawing us nigh to death. They tried to make each one a Mohammedan. . . . Suddenly they took us out to an open place where the same mob had armed themselves. The Moslems were arranged along a roof ready to shoot us all at once. My sister and I crouched behind a horse. At this very moment several men arrived on horseback and said : ' There is an order now ; don't you fear, you are now delivered.' We were then divided up into parties to be taken to different villages. . . . Our party, which consisted of about five men and twenty-five women, hurried on, following a Moslem, whom we had never seen before. As if by a miracle, after being threatened with death by several policemen, and only having escaped owing to the protection of the Moslem who accompanied us, we came at last to a village where we learned there had already been a massacre the day before. The villagers wanted us to be taken out of their village, but as we were too tired to walk any farther, the chief man of the village took us in and kept us. A room in the centre of the village was got ready for us and we were given food. In the evening the head man of the village came and spent some time with us, and at night two Moslems were left to guard and look after us. We spent three days and nights in this village. Part of the time we were guarded by Moslem guards, and occasionally the head man of the village paid us visits. We expected all the time that we should be treacherously murdered as part of our company had already been. While we were in this village some of us were employed by the Moslem women to make and mend clothes for them. At the end of three days a man came and told us that it had been decided to send us all to Tarsus. We were conducted to this city by the same man who had brought us safely to his village three days before.

On the way down we met Moslem women who wanted to stone us, but were not allowed to do so by our protector. The Government would not permit us to leave the *han* in which we were housed in Tarsus, but I escaped by pretending I must see my sister, who had been allowed to go over to the American school in charge of a sick girl."

The teller of this story was naturally a witness of the brutal acts by which so large a number of men, women, and children actually perished. For obvious reasons I have been obliged to omit many of the details described by my informant. My readers may wonder why the little party of thirty souls were allowed to escape from what for days appeared to them to be certain death. The probable answer is, that finally only five men were left in the party, and that the twenty-five women were, for the most part, above middle-age and, therefore, were not required by the Moslems for their harems.

Although the events which occurred both in Adana and in Tarsus were more horrible than anybody who has not visited the scene of devastation, and who has not heard the stories of woe, could believe, yet it was not until I drove across the Cilician Plain that I actually realised, not only the magnitude and horror of the massacre which had actually taken place, but also the intense hardships to which the Christians were subjected, as a result of the losses which they had sustained in it. More than 200 villages were attacked. Men were murdered, whilst women and children were, at any rate temporarily, carried off by the Turks. It is estimated that about 20,000 Christians perished in the villages during these terrible weeks. Not only were the most prosperous landowners and farmers Christians, but the more intelligent peasants were Armenians. In addition to the non-Moslem inhabitants of the plain, the Christian population was temporarily augmented by a



THE VILLAGE OF MISSIS.

Whilst the Christian Quarter on the left of the picture was destroyed, the Mosque and Moslem houses on the right are seen to be untouched.

large number of Armenians who had, as usual, come down from the mountain villages in order to assist in the work of gathering in the harvest, and who consequently lost their lives in the onslaught. Owing also to the season of the year, fields of wheat, cotton, barley, oats, and sesame which belonged to Christians were either entirely destroyed, or gathered in by Moslems, who sometimes, if more than usually charitable, gave a small proportion of the crop to its Christian owner.

It is impossible for me to attempt to describe what took place in anything but a few of the villages which were sacked during the massacres. My first insight into the situation was gained at Injerlik—a village through which I drove but an hour or two after leaving Adana. Every Armenian house had been burnt to the ground, and although at the time of my visit not a building had been reconstructed, and not a Christian was visible in the place, yet Moslems were complacently smoking and chatting at the local café amidst the ruins of their neighbours' houses. These people appeared to feel that nothing had occurred to disturb the peace and prosperity of the district. Again, at Missis, about five hours distant from Adana, the whole Christian quarter—containing as it did some forty modern houses—was entirely destroyed. With the exception of two village blacksmiths who consented to become converts to Islam, and whose skilled trade was necessary to the Moslems, not a man among the Missis Christians survived the onslaught. A certain number of women escaped to Adana, whilst others threw themselves into the river to avoid the possibility of being safely housed in a Turkish harem.

During my journey through the devastated district I visited Hamidieh—a small town about twenty-five miles to the eastward of Adana. The story of the massacre in this village is one of the most brutal on record. After an onslaught which continued for twenty-

two days hardly a Christian man escaped alive. Whilst more than 500 people were actually killed in the town, the number of Christians—many of whom had come down from the mountains to assist in gathering in the harvest—who perished in the fields which surround it, exceeded 1,500. In spite of the fact that the Armenians made a determined resistance in one or more houses, the death-roll at Hamidieh would have been far greater had it not been for the bravery and determination of a Frenchman and his wife (M. and Mme. Sabatier), who are the owners of a cotton-mill in the village. Notwithstanding the menaces of the Turks, who threatened to set the factory on fire if Armenians were allowed to take refuge in it, the Sabatiers fed and protected about 900 Christians within their domain until assistance arrived.

Whilst in Hamidieh—a town inhabited by the most dogged-looking Moslems I have ever met—I heard a miraculous story of the manner in which an Armenian escaped death. This story, moreover, tends to prove that the Moslems as a whole never became so uncontrolled that the massacre could not easily have been stopped had the local governmental authorities taken any adequate measures to carry out their duties. At the time of the massacre in Hamidieh about seventy-five Christians took refuge in a room at the Konak. When danger to this party seemed imminent, one of the refugees—a chemist by trade—was seized by a friendly Circassian and carried from the room where he was hiding to an upper story of the building. Whilst he was being conveyed from one part of the Konak to the other, the Armenian (who told me the story himself) received a bad sword wound in the head. The injury was not too severe to prevent the victim being subsequently taken by the Moslem attackers to the Sabatier factory. Notwithstanding the unsafe state of the streets, and in spite of the fact that the Turks did

not, in fact, allow any ordinary Armenian to leave the factory alive, this chemist, when he had recovered sufficiently to go about his business, was permitted by the Moslems to proceed every day from the factory to the Konak in order to dress the wounds of the Turks who had suffered during the attack on Hamidieh. For his first few expeditions to the Konak the chemist was escorted by one or two Turkish soldiers, but subsequently when his daily errand became known to the Moslem mob, he was allowed to cross the city unprotected !

Another miraculous escape of which I also heard during my stay in Hamidieh was that of the driver in whose carriage I had come from Adana. This story, rather different from the one which I have just told, shows that although in general the attitude of Moslems towards Christians left almost everything to be desired, yet instances happily remain on record when followers of the Prophet did behave in a "Christianly" manner towards their Armenian acquaintances. My Armenian horse and carriage proprietor, who gains his livelihood by conveying passengers desirous of travelling between Adana and Osmanieh, before the massacre was one of six brothers who lived at Hamidieh. Three of the family were killed during the month of April, 1909, and this young fellow himself lost two *yailehs* (native carriages) and four horses. On arrival in Adana before the first massacre, my friend, having been warned by a Turkish acquaintance of the coming danger, attempted, without success, to persuade the proprietor of the *han* where he was wont to stable horses that all Christians ought to fly to the Armenian quarter. The driver himself left his horses to their fate, and went to a friend's house. The hotel proprietor and others remained in the *han* and were killed. Between the two massacres my jobmaster, having returned to the stable in order to try and find his lost carriage and

horses, was again warned—this time by a Kurd, who said that horses and carriages were, at present, of no importance to Armenians, who had better disappear for a few days. The boy driver again availed himself of this advice, and departed with three or four others. A second time all Christians who remained in the *han* perished either by fire or by the sword.

At Hamidieh a clear example of the spirit and perseverance of the Armenian people came to my notice. The proprietor of the *han*, who is an Armenian, has always been wont to sublet his restaurant. Prior to the massacre this eating establishment was rented by an Armenian, who also possessed property at Erzeroum. In spite of this man's promise to give the Turks all he possessed he was murdered during the events at Hamidieh. After the massacre the restaurant was again sublet by the proprietor to the two sons of the Armenian who had been murdered. These boys—for neither of them is more than twenty-one—borrowed £T100 from the hotel proprietor, and, notwithstanding the awful tragedy of which they themselves were witnesses, are now doing a roaring trade by supplying excellent food to passing travellers. Few, except Armenians or Jews, could successfully restart business under such adverse circumstances.

A terrible story of the massacre in Abdul Oglou was told to me by one of the survivors. This village, which was originally made up of twenty-five Moslem houses (thirty men capable of bearing arms) and fifty-three houses and huts inhabited by Christians, is situated within sight of the historic Pyramus River, and distant but a few hours' journey from Adana. At the time of the massacre there were nearly five hundred Christians in the village as, like at Hamidieh, a large number of men had come down from the mountains to assist in gathering in the harvest. When the reports of the massacre in Adana first reached Abdul Oglou, the two

most important Moslems in the village swore by all that was to them most holy that no harm should befall the Christians of the place. Police were sent round to reassure the people. Kebar Oglou, one of these two magnates, himself went to Missis, distant but a few hours from Abdul Oglou, and brought back a message from the military commander that no disturbances would be allowed to occur. By this deceitful means the Christians, who, as I have shown, were originally more numerous than the Moslems of the village, were kept quiet until Kebar Oglou had had time to summon a number of his followers from the neighbourhood. Subsequently the Christians were collected in three or four houses of the village and brutally murdered with arms which, it is supposed, were provided from Missis for that purpose. To the credit of the Government be it said that Kebar Oglou and his brother were hanged early in December, 1909, for their acts of treachery at Abdul Oglou.

At Antioch the massacre was very systematically carried out. The Armenian quarter, which is made up of houses built in little courts leading off narrow winding streets, is only approachable from the town through the Turkish quarter. About Thursday, April 15th, the rumour of a massacre in the Adana district became known at Antioch and the Christian population consequently became uneasy. On the morrow (the Moslems' Sabbath) the Christians became still more alarmed by noticing that all the Mohammedan shops were closed and that the attendance at the mosques was much larger than usual. Great meetings of the principal Mohammedans of the town were held in the houses of the chief men, and the "True Believers" were busily occupied in buying up arms and ammunition. On Monday, April 19th, when the men belonging to the Redif battalions were assembled before the barracks and were, in fact, being supplied with arms

and ammunition by the local authorities, the Governor, as a result of an agreement with the Mohammedan chiefs, assured the Armenians that there was nothing to fear. These assurances had hardly been delivered when fire was opened upon the Christians. Whilst only six women perished, 135 men and boys (out of a male population of 157 Armenians) were killed. The houses were systematically robbed, not so much as a pin being left.

Although in many cases a few Christians, having taken refuge in some more solidly constructed building than those which surrounded it, defended themselves against attack for a brief period, yet with but few exceptions the Armenians of the villages did not make that determined resistance which was offered by the Christians during the first massacre in the town of Adana. Notwithstanding the general tendency of the Armenians to submit quietly to the Moslem onslaught, in several places the Christians systematically and successfully protected themselves against their Mohammedan fellow-countrymen until assistance arrived, or until a cessation in hostilities occurred during which it was possible for them to travel to Adana.

Hajin—a mountainous village almost entirely inhabited by Christians and situated about sixty-five miles to the north-east of Adana—was defended for many days by Armenian warriors. When danger became imminent, the Christians not only formed a line of outposts round the village and prevented any Moslems who arrived from the country districts from entering it, but they also compelled the few Turks actually in Hajin either to remain in their houses or to move to some Armenian house in which they could be watched by the Christians. This precaution was taken in order to keep the Moslems in the city, and thus to prevent them joining the enemy who were besieging it. So hot did the fire in Hajin finally become that it was im-


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possible for the Americans, who had already lost one messenger, killed whilst proceeding to the post, to send any more telegrams by hand to the office. Messages were consequently tied to stones and thrown from and to the telegraph office. During the siege, too, a desperate attempt was made by the Moslem attackers to burn Hajin, but fortunately the wind was favourable, and blew the flames away from the village. As a result of several telegrams dispatched from the American Mission, and after a siege lasting nearly ten days, in which only about sixty Armenians had been killed and wounded, assistance at last came from Missis to the people of Hajin.

Another determined resistance was made by the Armenians of Durtyol—a village made up of about 1,000 houses and situated on the Plain of Issus, three or four miles distant from the sea coast. When the news of the outbreak in Cilicia arrived, the population of Durtyol was joined by three or four thousand people who fled to that village for protection. For twelve days about 10,000 people were besieged by 7,000 Moslems, 400 among whom were armed with military rifles and provided with government ammunition. On the third day of the siege, the water supply of the town having been cut off, a strong body of the besiegers was posted at the source in order to prevent the Christians getting it turned on again. On April 21st, after four or five days' siege, the first attempt at relief, which proved unsuccessful, was made. On that day fifty Turkish soldiers having been conveyed on H.M.S. *Triumph* across the bay from Alexandretta, a parley was arranged with the besiegers, who promised to make a truce for two days, and to turn on the water to the village. No sooner, however, had the expedition returned to Alexandretta than news was received that the Moslems had not only completely disregarded their oath, but that they had renewed their attack on Durtyol

with greater violence than before. On Sunday, April 25th, as a result of pressure brought to bear by Mr. Catoni, the acting British Vice-Consul, and by Mr. Kennedy, the American missionary, a governmental commission and 550 Turkish Redifs were disembarked near Durtyol. While the troops were being disembarked, the commission, the military commander, and Mr. Kennedy, who then represented the British Vice-Consul at Alexandretta, proceeded to a point about a mile and a half to the north of Durtyol, where they found the Moutessarif of Erzin, in whose district Durtyol is situated. After considerable delay it was arranged that Mr. Kennedy should advance to Durtyol in order to inform the inhabitants of the arrival of the troops who had come for their protection, and to arrange for taking over the barracks, which had been occupied by the Christians during the siege. The Christians at once signified their willingness to surrender as soon as the Turkish troops came up and took over the town from the garrison. In spite of the fact that a message to this effect was at once sent to the commander of the troops, a most determined attack was made upon the village from four directions during the night. After some six or seven hours' negotiation it was on April 26th, at the end of a ten days' siege, that the town was finally relieved, and the population, from whose number only about ten had perished, was again provided with water.

Although the Christian garrison was much smaller than that of either Hajin or Durtyol, the village of Shehr Murad, situated about twelve miles to the south-east of Adana, was ably defended by its Armenian inhabitants. Before the massacre this hamlet had a population of some 300 or 400 Christians, and only one Moslem family—that of a rich gipsy farmer who owned a large quantity of land in the district. In order to endeavour to effect a slaughter this gipsy arranged for



THE WALLED-IN FARM AT SHEHR MURAD.

A few of the loopholes were still visible at the time of my visit.

the importation of other Moslems who usually dwelt in the hillside villages. Although all the Christian houses were burnt and the property of their inmates stolen, yet only forty or fifty Armenians were actually killed.

When the outbreak at Shehr Murad first occurred, the local priest called all the Christians into a walled-in farm, which occupies a central position in the village. In this improvised fort, which is about fifty yards square, and which is surrounded by walls about six feet high, 250 people were besieged for five days. Not only the outer walls and sheds but the buildings of the interior were loopholed, and traverses were constructed to protect the defenders from reverse fire directed against them from certain houses from which shots could be poured into the fort. The beleaguered garrison possessed but twenty-five rifles, some of which were of most antiquated patterns. During the several nights of the siege the force of the attack somewhat abated, and small quantities of food could then be collected by the garrison. Such was the energy of the Armenians that when the ammunition ran short the besieged went out under cover of darkness and dug out their enemies' Martini bullets which had lodged in the walls, and used the lead thus obtained to make ammunition for their own defence. When the garrison possessed no more caps, heads of matches were successfully used to ignite the rifle charges. At the end of five days, when succour seemed as far off as ever, and when a temporary cessation in the attack occurred, it was thought advisable for the Christians to go into Adana, where they actually arrived between the two massacres in that city.

One of the most difficult problems to be encountered by the Turkish authorities after the massacre was how to induce the people then collected in Adana to return to their homes. Although the expense of sending back

those who were willing to return to their villages was paid out of funds provided by the Turkish Government, yet it was not unnatural that the inhabitants of whole districts who flocked to Adana after the massacres, and who had seen their menfolk actually murdered before their very eyes, did not wish to return to their homes, made up of but dust and rubble. In some cases the only survivors of a village were a large number of women under the protection of one or two men. It was not unnatural, too, that the Relief Committee (itself so short of money) should refuse to rebuild houses until the people, by their presence and superintendence, gave a practical guarantee if shelter were provided for them that they would endeavour to gain a livelihood in their former homes. When I drove across the plain in October I found villages to which the people had not yet returned, whilst in the vicinity of others I came upon the inhabitants living in tents provided by the Government, until their houses could be rebuilt.

In Marash, Aintab, Urfa, and Mersina no massacres took place, largely because the local Governors were strong and took adequate measures to ensure the maintenance of peace. At Marash, although no serious outbreak occurred, yet the town suffered greatly from the massacres in Cilicia. About 500 young men—the most active breadwinners of the town—who had gone down to the plain for the harvest, lost their lives in the fields. This not only left many families without any male representative to support them, but it also had a most demoralising effect upon the industrial classes in general. Again, although the districts subjected to the massacre lay for the most part in the plains which border upon the sea coast between Mersina and Alexandretta and did not actually extend farther northward than the neighbourhood of Hajin, yet the fear of a massacre existed throughout almost all the districts

of Asia Minor inhabited by Armenians. At Kharput it is known that plans for a massacre were deeply laid, and that the disaster was only averted by the firmness of the Vali, who, although he stood alone among the officials of this province, aided by providential circumstances, postponed the massacre until all was quiet. At Van, where a general massacre had been planned and would probably have taken place, the Moslems were disappointed by a snowstorm which prevented the people from going to the market on the day arranged for their destruction.

The inhabitants of Caiserea narrowly escaped the horrors of an outbreak. As in so many other places, somebody spread the news that the Turks were about to be massacred by Christians, and that the slaughter was to be accomplished by 500 armed men who were on their way from Marash and Aleppo to kill the Mohammedans of the town. The Moslems, knowing that some of the local Armenians did possess arms, grew frightened, and were on the verge of instituting a massacre, probably really under the impression that it was necessary to do something in order to ensure their own safety. At the last moment the outbreak was averted by the energy of the Moutessarif of the district, who, as soon as he realised the danger, at once summoned the Mohammedan khojas and ordered them to prevent the massacre by discouraging or even forbidding it in discourses delivered in the mosques.

VI

THE CAUSES AND RESULTS OF THE MASSACRE

The outbreak in Cilicia shown to be a massacre of Christians and not an Armenian rebellion—Some reasons for supposing that the ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid was not himself personally responsible for the massacres—Effects of the massacres—An account of the manner in which the causes of the massacre were investigated by the Government and of the methods by which the courts-martial carried on the trials of supposed malefactors—The cases of some officials who did not receive that punishment which their conduct merited.

THE real causes of the outbreak which occurred in Southern Asia Minor and in Northern Syria in 1909 are incompletely known. The object of the following pages is not, therefore, to assert or to rely upon any particular facts in order to prove that any special persons or series of events were or were not the causes of the massacre, but rather to collect, if possible in an intelligible form, the evidence which comes before the traveller who is honest in his desire to ascertain the truth, and also to reproduce extracts from certain documents which must undoubtedly prove the official attitude of the Turkish Government concerning the causes of the massacres. By this means, which is the only course open to me, I trust that I may be able, not only to assist my readers to form some opinion as to the possible causes of the outbreak, but also to enable them to understand some of the results produced by this great calamity.

The first question which must be decided before endeavouring to ascertain who was responsible for the disaster in Asia Minor is whether this outbreak was an Armenian rebellion against the Turkish Government, or whether it was a Moslem massacre of Christians. If this slaughter was the result of a rebellion, then the Armenians would naturally have been liable to suffer for their actions ; but if it was a massacre, then the Christians were certainly guilty of no crime in defending their homes and their women against hordes of blood-thirsty men who mercilessly assailed them. No official, either Turkish or European, has been able to bring to my notice any proof that the Armenians did not surrender and give up their arms as soon as they were promised safety by the Ottoman Government. Unfortunately, the Christians often delivered their arms on the receipt of promises which were broken as soon as the object for which they were made had been accomplished. Although certain sections of the Armenian community were certainly foolish in some of their actions between the advent of the Constitution and the spring of 1909, yet after full consideration of all the evidence brought to my notice during a prolonged stay in various districts of the Turkish Empire, I consider that these events took the form of a brutal massacre of Christians, who were, at any rate for the most part, innocent of any idea of rebellion against the Government. If the Armenians had desired to rebel against the Government, it is clear that they would have retired to some such place as Zeitoun, instead of revolting whilst so many of their co-religionists were not only helplessly on the plain without arms, but whilst they were separated from their womenfolk, who had for the most part been left behind in the mountain villages.

The following is a translation of an official circular drawn up in August, 1909, at Constantinople by a Commission composed of the Ministers of Finance,

Public Works, and Justice, and addressed to the government authorities in the provinces. I reproduce this translation because it is supposed to have been based upon the report of the Parliamentary Commission which went to Adana to ascertain the causes of the massacre.

"It is evident that, at the time when oppression and corruption were practised by the Government, several parties belonging to the Armenian people engaged in certain undertakings. Whatever the form and manner of these undertakings, it cannot be denied that their sole purpose was to secure freedom from the evils and oppressions of a tyrannical Government, and in this effort there is nothing to censure ; on the contrary, assisting and co-operating with the nation in her attempt to re-establish the Constitution, they gave a practical proof of their genuine devotion to the Ottoman Fatherland. Particularly after the proclamation of the Constitution, when it was fully understood that the discussion of all political ambitions would be chimerical, they united to devote all their energies to the public welfare, accepting the fact that the deliverance and happiness for which they longed could be enjoyed only by faithful adherence to the Ottoman Constitutional Government. Therefore, beyond all question, there is no ground for the suspicion, which has originated among those who are ignorant and uninformed as to the facts, that the Armenians are cherishing a dangerous political ambition.

"In regard to the circumstances which gave rise to the awful calamity in Adana, the general conclusions of a special investigating Commission and the situation following the natural course of the disaster show that after liberty and the Constitution had been declared, when the Armenian people saw that, by methods peculiar to the tyrannical régime, efforts were being made to destroy patriotic and fraternal sentiments and



A GROUP OF ARMENIAN SURVIVORS OF THE MASSACRE.

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complained of this, certain simple-minded people put an evil construction on these complaints. The ignorant people, not acquainted either with the name or the activities of the Tashnagist and Hunchagist societies,¹ when they saw the members of those societies suddenly becoming unusually active, entertained unfounded suspicions and made inferences, and this gave rise to many rumours. These suppositions on the part of the ignorant, reacting on the Armenians, gave origin to fear and suspicion. In this way originated mutual distrust and misunderstanding.

"It was the fundamental duty of the local authorities to discover at once the source of these misunderstandings, and by bringing the various races together to remove mutual distrust and to establish and ensure amity and fraternal patriotism among the races. But, on the contrary, the highest officials of the Government, through their painful stupidity and inefficiency, kept silence, which, on the one hand, added to the misunderstandings and distrust, and, on the other, gave the mob occasion to increase its lack of respect for the power of the Government. The origin of the disaster was in the neglect of patriotic duty and through the officials failing to meet their obligations in a devoted and proper manner. In other ways it has been plainly demonstrated that the Armenians have not deviated from their consecrated fidelity towards the mighty Ottoman Government. Judged by the facts of this situation, the actual instigators of this painful disaster and those derelict in their duty will be punished according to law. Only it is a matter for regret that in some quarters there have come into existence such unfounded

¹ The Tashnagist and Hunchagist societies were revolutionary organisations, which, under the Old Régime, always intrigued against the Government. The members of these two organisations flocked back to Turkey after the granting of the Constitution and were welcomed by the Young Turks as supporters of the New Régime.

and fictitious suppositions as are opposed to permanent co-operation and sincere fraternal feeling, the establishment of which is essential among the various races which are bound together by common interests. With the object of doing away with these suppositions and suspicions you must put into practice all the measures necessary for the welfare and amity of the various races, and you must try to establish and strengthen patriotic integrity, which is one of the essentials in a constitutional government."

In spite of the emphatic phraseology of this circular, which was, doubtless, issued for political motives, it is clear that the more advanced members of the Tashnagist and Hunchagist societies did exceed the bounds of reason. However this may be, and even if these Armenians by their somewhat foolish actions did give cause for suspicion on the part of the more ignorant Turks, this document, which as I have already said is believed to be based upon the report of the Parliamentary Commission which was sent to the Adana district early in May, clearly proves that the Government held its own officials to be responsible for not having ensured friendship between the various races of the Empire.

Notwithstanding the language of the document which I have just quoted, both at the time of as well as for a considerable period after the massacre, the Turkish governmental authorities asserted that the outbreak was the result, not only of the endeavours of the Armenians to regain their freedom and to re-establish an independent Kingdom of Armenia, but also of a fear on the part of the Turkish population that they, the Moslems, were about to be massacred by their Christian fellow-countrymen. I have talked to Mohammedan country travellers as we climbed together up mountain roads, or sat side by side in railway carriages, and have always been informed that the massacre was a great

"pity," but that if the Moslems had not assumed the offensive while there was yet time, they would have been attacked and overpowered by the Christians. There is no doubt that some of the more ignorant Moslems, especially those domiciled in the villages, did and do believe, not only that the Armenians were about to rebel, but that they had even made definite plans to regain their freedom.

Although the fear of an Armenian rebellion was certainly without cause, yet there is no doubt that the Christians, who ought to have understood that equality between Moslems and non-Moslems could not be immediately realised even if it were ever possible, were certainly guilty of acts of foolishness, which the Moslems—only too ready to seize the opportunity—were able to interpret as the outcome of a general revolutionary spirit. More than one secular and religious teacher urged that the Armenians must arm themselves in order to be prepared for any eventuality which might occur. There is no doubt, too, that Mousheg, the hot-headed Bishop of Adana, who went about his province pressing his flock to spend money upon arms, did much to stir up a feeling of unrest.

Subsequent to the massacres the Turks bitterly complained of certain theatrical entertainments arranged by the Armenians during the winter of 1908-9 at Adana, Mersina, and elsewhere. The plots of these performances were said by the Turks, not only to have been an incitement to the Armenians to rise against the Government, but also to have been a proof that projects were on foot for the establishment of an independent Armenian Kingdom. One particular act, which at a later date was held by the Turks to have been a sign of an impending revolution, was the exposing at Mersina of pictures of former kings of Armenia. The innocence of the meaning of these actions is clearly proved by the fact that the local Turkish officials were

invited to, and, in fact, did attend, the so-called inciting theatrical performances, and that no attempt was made to hide the "revolutionary" pictures from the governmental authorities. Moreover, in a constitutional country nominally possessed of a Government, if the Armenians were (as the Turks at first tried to urge) really guilty of any actions likely to disturb the peace, then they should have been punished for these actions instead of being allowed, if not actually encouraged, to continue their foolish or wrong behaviour until disaster finally occurred.

Almost immediately after the massacre a report was spread, and forthwith accepted by Europe, that the ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid was himself responsible for the massacre. I have often been informed that the slaughter was ordered from Yildiz. I have even seen in print the translation of a telegram describing the zeal with which Christians were to be killed. This telegram is supposed to have been addressed by his ex-Majesty to the then Governor of Adana. Far be it from me, who have travelled in the Ottoman Dominions during the Old Régime, and who have seen the effect of its brutality, to try either to exonerate the ex-Sultan from blame or to free him from any responsibility for any act of brutality. The history of a reign of nearly thirty-three years proves what manner of horrors were carried out under the very eyes of a despot who was never so happy as when oppressing his subjects. Before, however, assuming that any order was sent from Yildiz to Adana, it will be well for those who are not only interested in discovering the cause of these massacres, but also who are anxious about the future welfare of the Christian races in the Ottoman Dominions to realise that there is no proof that such a telegram was ever sent to Adana from the capital, and if it were transmitted, no evidence has been produced that its despatch was authorised by Abdul Hamid.

As I have already stated, the first massacre in Adana occurred on April 14th, and, in fact, actually broke out but a few hours after the so-called reactionary party had gained the upper hand in Constantinople on April 13th. Therefore, even if Abdul Hamid or his malefactors had at once secured control of the telegraph offices at the capital, which I believe that they did not, then no order could have reached Adana until the situation in that town had already become most acute. Besides, when the massacre broke out, nothing was known by the ordinary man in Adana of the events in Constantinople on April 13th. If even, therefore, a telegram despatched from Constantinople on April 13th had reached the Governor of Adana during the night of April 13th-14th, it is difficult to see how it would have been possible for him, as a result of this order, to have arranged for an onslaught to begin early in the morning.

Again, although it may be argued that the order was actually despatched from Constantinople prior to April 13th, it is difficult to agree with this theory because, notwithstanding the fact that the power of Abdul Hamid was not entirely swept away by the revolution of July, 1908, yet it is impossible for those intimately acquainted with the condition of affairs in Turkey between July, 1908, and April, 1909, to believe that during the closing months of his reign the ex-Sultan was actually in a position to send any direct or secret orders to the governmental authorities in the provinces.

A further reason against the conclusion that Abdul Hamid, either directly or indirectly, actually ordered the massacre, is that if any proof of such an order either exists or ever did exist, then it seems manifest that this evidence would have been produced at the instigation of the Young Turks, who subsequently had access to all the documents at Yildiz and elsewhere.

The production of any such documents would have enabled the Parliamentary Commission of inquiry sent from Constantinople to Adana to discover the real causes of the outbreak. In addition it is clear if the blame of the outbreak could be thrown upon the former despot, not only would his removal from the throne have been justifiable beyond all doubt, but such blame would have entirely cleared the Young Turks from all responsibility for the outbreak.

Notwithstanding the Armenian assertions to the contrary, it is inconceivable that the Young Turks as a body were any party to the massacre. There is no evidence, except possibly the manner in which the principal offenders were, or, more correctly speaking, were not, punished, which justifies the assumption that the central body or the principal members of the Committee of Union and Progress were really in any way implicated in the massacre. In spite of the undeniable bad behaviour of the Salonika troops in Adana during the second massacre in that town, and of the mystery which surrounds the removal of the Moutessarif of Mersina to Mush¹—two of the reasons given by the Armenians to show that the Young Turks were favourably disposed towards the massacre—it is obvious that a massacre, at any rate in the long run, must have been so detrimental to the cause of successful reform, that, leaving

¹ A massacre at Mersina was prevented largely by the energy of the Moutessarif of the district. Although to be Governor of Mush—the district to which this official was removed during the autumn of 1909—is nominally a promotion, yet it is difficult to believe that the Turkish authorities decided to make such a change and to remove a good official from the attractive surroundings of Mersina to a lonely town in Eastern Asia Minor purely for the advancement of the employee in question. Whether or not the somewhat too pro-Armenian sympathies of this gentleman, and the fact that he had accompanied the members of the Parliamentary Commission during their journeys in Cilicia, accounted for his removal from Mersina must ever remain a mystery.



THE QUAY AT MERSINA.

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all arguments of good intent out of consideration, it is incomprehensible that the leaders of the New Régime, who had so cleverly brought about an almost bloodless revolution, could possibly have connived at such a horrible crime.

By means of the foregoing remarks I have endeavoured to prove that the events at Adana were not an Armenian revolution but a Christian massacre, and that they were considered as such by the Turkish Government. Moreover, I have given some reasons which have led me to believe that there is no proof that the ex-Sultan issued any direct order for the massacre, and in addition I have attempted to explain that the Young Turks cannot as a body be held responsible for the outbreak. I will now very briefly summarise what I believe to have been the real causes of the massacre.

In July, 1908, the new Constitution was received throughout the Empire with demonstrations of joy. All classes and sects took part in these proceedings, and cheers were given by the entire population for liberty, fraternity, equality, and justice. As time went on it was evident, however, that the religious leaders of the Moslems, besides many of their chief men, in addition to the ignorant people of the villages, were not with the new movement. The Moslems, who had been accustomed for centuries to despise and oppress the Christians, could not all at once give up the privileges accruing to their position of superiority. It was impossible for the Young Turks immediately to substitute new officials in all parts of the Empire for those trained under the Old Régime and thus to ensure tranquillity throughout the Ottoman Dominions. It seems more than likely that secret agents of the reactionary party, probably assisted with money either provided from Yildiz or by those who had formerly depended on Yildiz, not only for their positions of importance but for their wealth, moved about the interior of the whole Empire

and especially of its Asiatic Provinces, stirring up trouble where best they could. There is ample proof that the massacres were encouraged, if not directly caused, by reactionary feelings. As Christians were actually being killed they were told to "take that for their liberty." Moreover, not only was the arch which had been erected to commemorate the Constitution outside the Adana Konak pulled down, but cheers were given by the crowd for Abdul Hamid.

Whilst considering the causes of the Adana massacre it must be remembered that the greater part of the district subjected to this awful outbreak had hardly been touched in the years 1895 and 1896. The influence of the foreign consuls, as well as that of the international warships which patrolled the coast, secured this comparative immunity. Therefore, during all the years which intervened between 1896 and 1909 the Christians who inhabited the very fertile Plain of Cilicia increased both in numbers and in wealth. It only, therefore, required a spark left behind by any fanatical or reactionary agent to kindle the smouldering embers of Mohammedan jealousy against the Armenian population of this district.

I have already said enough to convince my readers that the massacres were probably remotely caused by the talk of equality which roused the Moslems to a state of fury, by the extreme orators of both religions, by the somewhat foolish actions of a very small section of the Armenian community, and by the feebleness and negligence of the governmental officials in the localities in which massacres actually occurred. Most of these officials, under the plea of having their powers restricted by the newly-granted liberty, undoubtedly permitted the followers of both religions—always opposed to one another—to arm themselves until a conflict became inevitable. It seems as if the spark which finally ignited the fire was the publication of a series of inflammatory

articles against the Christians in the Adana Press, followed by a small local conflict which I have already described. The outburst of Mohammedan fury may, perhaps, have been hastened on by the arrival of news of the events in Constantinople on April 13th. There is no doubt that the local Government could both have foreseen and prevented the outbreak,¹ and that had its officials attempted to carry out their duties, it would have been possible for them, whatever was the feeling of the population, not only to have taken measures to stop the massacre in the town of Adana, but also to have made certain that adequate precautions were taken to prevent the disaster spreading to the village districts, and thus to have saved the lives of over 20,000 Christians.

It is difficult to give any idea as to the general and permanent effect of the Adana massacres upon the future of the Turkish Empire. There is no doubt that the Ottoman Christians throughout the Empire who were, and are, united in their desire for a regenerated Turkish Kingdom, and who for the most part have been sincere in their endeavours to assist the reformers of Turkey, have been discouraged, not only by the massacre itself, but by the manner in which the Young Turks have dealt with those who, according to their own account, are so largely responsible for the outbreak of April, 1909. The following brief extract from a declaration signed by the heads of the various Christian communities in Adana, and presented to different departments of the Government, will give an idea of the attitude of the Armenians towards the Government in June, 1909. This document was drawn up during the period when Mustafa Zihni Pasha, who succeeded Djevad Bey and who preceded Ahmed Djemal Bey, was Governor-General of the vilayet of Adana. The translation is as follows :

¹ The Governors of certain places did prevent a massacre in the districts over which they ruled.

"We again declare our loyalty to the Constitution. We are ready and eager to make any sacrifice for the true welfare of our beloved land, and we declare also that we cherish no spirit of revenge, notwithstanding the sufferings which we have endured. Our earnest plea to our Moslem fellow-countrymen is that they should work in harmony with the various other communities which compose the Ottoman Empire. May the goodwill and fellowship which appeared at the time of the proclamation of the Constitution appear again. With malice toward none, and charity and justice toward all, and with the hope of healing the grievous wounds in the vitals of our country, let us unite in securing the present and future prosperity of our land. In one word let unity, fraternity, equality, and justice prevail."

At a time when the Armenians of Asia Minor were undoubtedly becoming somewhat reassured, and when the sufferings of the survivors were as far as possible being alleviated, not only by the energetic measures taken by the International Relief Committee, but also by the assistance of the money subscribed by the Turkish Government, the feeling of uneasiness was increased and greatly prolonged by the method in which the preliminary investigations as to the causes of the massacre were carried out, and by the unjust manner in which the courts-martial fulfilled the duty entrusted to them.

Although the massacre took place in April, 1909, yet such was the continued state of unrest that on the day of my arrival in Mersina (October 14th) I found Christians crowding down from Adana by train either in order to avoid passing the Bairam festivities in the interior of Asia Minor, or, if sufficient money was available, to take refuge in Cyprus for the time being. Again, during the Moslem festival of Kourban Bairam, which fell in 1909 near the end of the month of December, the Christians of the Adana district were a



AN ANCIENT GATEWAY AT TARSUS.

good deal frightened. At that period, too, there were threats towards the Armenians on the part of some of the Turks. Although, as it turned out, these precautions and fears were quite unnecessary, yet it is impossible for those who have not seen the state of devastation that then existed throughout the district to realise the horrors to which these people might be subjected if any recurrence of these events had or did occur. It is necessary for people who glibly criticise the Armenians, either for their supposed stupidity during a massacre or for their timidity after the slaughter is over, to realise what they would feel had they seen some of the events which I have not thought fit to describe in the foregoing pages. Foreigners who have been present at other Armenian massacres declare that this onslaught at Adana was the worst they have ever known. In order to explain some of the reasons connected with the Adana massacres which have largely increased the Christian feeling of distrust for their Turkish masters, I am about to deal briefly with the manner in which the Ottoman Government investigated the causes of the massacre, and the system by which it punished some of the supposed wrongdoers.

With the object of making my explanation the more clear, I propose to divide my account of the effect of the Adana courts-martial into two parts: (1) a description of the various courts of inquiry, parliamentary commissions, and courts-martial which have either investigated the reasons of the massacre or have professed to try accused persons for acts which they did or did not commit; (2) a short account of a few of the persons who I consider have not received the punishment which their acts of commission or omission must undoubtedly have merited.

As a consequence of the first massacre in Adana, a court of inquiry, largely composed of local officials,

was assembled. Among the members of this court was the well-known Abdul Kadir Bagdadi—a Moslem notable of Adana, of whom I shall say more later on. This commission, bearing in mind what was then the Turkish attitude, namely, that the massacre was caused by the supposed menacing conduct of the Armenians, at once instigated a house-to-house search for arms. The weapons of all Armenians were carefully seized. It is argued that the arms of the Moslems were confiscated in a like manner ; but in view of the subsequent slaughter and of the efficient manner in which the Moslems were then armed, it is impossible to believe that this search was fairly and impartially carried out. Immediately after the second massacre Armenians, thousands of whom, as I have explained, had taken refuge in the factory of Mr. Trypani, and in other institutions at Adana, were arrested by order of this preliminary commission. These arrests caused an absolute panic amongst the already terrified people, huddled together so closely that they had not even sufficient space all to lie down at the same time.

The unfair influence which the decision come to by this court of inquiry was likely to have upon the members of the courts-martial was fully realised by the Armenian Patriarch at Constantinople, who requested the Turkish authorities that the preliminary examinations made by the governmental officials at Adana, by the influential persons there, and by the body formed from the persons responsible for the events should be considered as null and void. In spite of these protests, although this preliminary court of inquiry made no public decision, yet the report which was drawn up by it did undoubtedly prejudice the members of the court-martial when they arrived at Adana. There is no doubt that the courts-martial did, in fact, take over the prisoners with a tremendous dossier made out by the sub-committee of inquiry formed by Djevad Bey, Vali of

Adana, during the massacre. When the Armenian Patriarch subsequently understood that the opinion of the preliminary court of inquiry had been accepted, and that some of the decisions arrived at by the courts-martial had not only most probably been influenced by the opinion of the preliminary inquiry, but were unjust, his Holiness tendered his resignation to the Grand Vizier. Negotiations were in course of progress between the Patriarch and the Turkish Government for many months, and the Patriarch did not finally withdraw his resignation until he had been promised a satisfactory solution to some of his complaints by Hakki Pasha, the then newly-appointed Grand Vizier, at the beginning of February, 1910.

After the dispersal of the first court of inquiry, two courts-martial, composed of officers drawn from the European Army Corps, were sent from Constantinople to Adana. The appointment of the first of these courts was announced in the capital early in May, probably largely as the result of a violent attack which was made upon Djevad Bey, ex-Vali of Adana, and upon the then assistant Minister of the Interior, who, many people considered, was negligent in the order which he, acting as Minister of the Interior, gave for the prevention of the massacre. The most important of these courts-martial accepted petitions, divided up the work which they had been entrusted to carry out, and began trying some of the prisoners. As a consequence of the repeated endeavours of the Armenian Patriarchate, about the time that it became apparent that Djevad Bey and Mustafa Remsi Pasha and other notables must be subjected to trial, Ismail Fazil Pasha, the then Military Commander of Smyrna, was sent to assume supreme control of the legal investigations. This dignitary (who was subsequently made Governor-General of the vilayet of Damascus) took over the presidency of the second court-martial, which eventu-

ally went through the form of trying Djevad Bey and Mustafa Remsi Pasha. In addition to these two courts-martial which were assembled at Adana, tribunals were summoned both at Marash and at Erzin.

Besides the above-mentioned courts of inquiry and courts-martial, it was announced early in May that a Parliamentary Commission composed of Babigian Effendi, the Armenian deputy for Rodosto, and of Yussuf Kemal, a Turkish Member of Parliament, assisted by the Moutessarif of Mersina, would be sent to Adana to investigate the causes of the massacre. This committee, which undoubtedly attempted to carry out its work in an unbiassed manner, is believed to have reported in no veiled terms. Babigian Effendi having died at Constantinople before his report was submitted to the Chamber, no official statement as to the opinion of this investigating committee has ever been published, but I have reason to believe that the circular addressed by the Sublime Porte to provincial governors, of which I have already given a translation, was largely based upon the report of this Parliamentary Commission.

Up to the time that this Commission completed its report, the manner in which the courts-martial carried out their investigations was extremely unsatisfactory. It seems too clear that the courts-martial at first assumed that the massacres were actually either an Armenian rebellion, or at least that the conduct of the Turks was caused by their well-founded fear of a Christian insurrection. The Government did nothing to encourage the Armenians to make complaints against Turks of importance. The Armenians consequently feared to volunteer any evidence, because they knew if they did so, and the Government failed to act upon it, that the person accused would take good care to have his revenge against the person complaining. Subsequent to the completion of the report of the

Parliamentary Commission, some improvement became noticeable in the manner in which the courts-martial carried out their duties.

The methods adopted at the trial of prisoners by these courts-martial have had so great an effect in Turkey, largely owing to the feelings of apprehension which they have stirred up amongst the Christian elements of the population throughout the Empire, that I am about to give a brief description of the procedure as a result of which important final decisions were arrived at. Nine Moslems and six Armenians were subjected to capital punishment in the autumn of 1909, besides twenty-five Moslems who were hanged during the month of December of that year.

The members of the courts-martial themselves examined and cross-examined the accused, after which witnesses for the prosecution were called. If the accused desired to summon any witnesses in his defence, these men were then examined. The interrogation of the witnesses, whether for the prosecution or defence, was not, however, carried out in the presence of the accused. It is obvious that this method of conducting the trial of ignorant men, and of examining inexperienced witnesses would certainly not conduce towards obtaining the truth.

Far more unsatisfactory are the circumstances under which certain of the prisoners were condemned to death. It seems almost certain that at least three of the Armenians actually hanged were, in fact, entirely innocent. The friends of one of these poor fellows were ready to give evidence that the man in question took refuge in the courtyard of Mr. Chambers's house at the very commencement of the massacre and stayed there until it was over. Mr. Chambers himself actually saw this man in his house during the afternoon of the massacre (but a few hours after the onslaught began) and believes that he remained there until all was quiet.

It is certainly natural to assume that a man who had once gained access to a place of safety would not again voluntarily venture into the streets filled with people anxious to take his life. Neither Mr. Chambers nor the friends of the executed man, who actually signed a petition which was handed to the proper authority, were ever called upon to give evidence at the trial of this Armenian.

In the case of the second Armenian who was unjustly condemned, a well-known European at Adana was prepared to swear that the man in question was in his (the European's) house throughout the massacre. According to statements made by Babigian Effendi (one of the members of the Parliamentary Commission of inquiry) in an interview with a Constantinople journalist, a third Armenian who was subsequently hanged went to the Adana branch of the Ottoman Bank on business before the massacre began, and owing to the commencement of the outbreak, and to the consequent danger of being in the streets, remained hidden in the bank for four days until the town was again quiet. According to the further testimony of Babigian Effendi, in spite of the evidence given by the director of the bank and all the officials of that establishment as to the innocence of this Armenian, the court, "relying upon the revengeful statements of other men," condemned him to death. In addition to the wrongful execution of the Christians whose cases I have commented upon in detail, I understand that several of the first nine Moslems subjected to capital punishment were probably unjustly sentenced. I have reason to believe that even Mohammedans were arrested and sentenced to death because the Turkish authorities wanted to get hold of them for committing some real or supposed offence prior to and quite apart from the massacres. Out of the nine Moslems hanged, two and I believe more belonged to one family of



A HOUSE RECONSTRUCTED BY THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT.

butchers who carried on an honest business in Adana.

Sufficient is known concerning, not only the negligence of Djevad Bey but also of his cowardly conduct during the events in Adana, to prove, unless some evidence in his favour was suppressed, that the punishment inflicted upon him by the military tribunal was quite inadequate. His Excellency was simply sentenced to be debarred from service in any official position for a period of six or seven years. The Turkish Parliamentary Commission itself had condemned him. Whether the lenient treatment which was meted out to this official was due (as it was rumoured to have been) to the threat of Djevad Bey, that if he were punished by the Central Government he would produce documents which would compromise officials holding positions in the employment of the State, must long remain a mystery. Whatever information concerning the unrest in the Adana vilayet may or may not have been forwarded to the Central Government by the Vali during the time which intervened between the advent of the Constitution and the massacres, it is certain that when his Excellency did apply for a stronger garrison for the Adana district at the time of the Bairam Feast of 1908 (towards the end of October) he was merely sent a battalion from the 5th Army Corps—hardly one of the most loyal sections of the Turkish Army.

Mustafa Remsi Pasha, the Military Commander, who, as I have already shown, took no measures to suppress the disturbance in Adana, and solely safeguarded his own life during those dangerous April days, was only sentenced to three months' detention in Mersina. So much consideration did this gentleman receive that, during his sojourn in Adana, before he was sent to Mersina, his Excellency was continually visited by Turks of all classes. On the day of Mustafa Remsi Pasha's departure for the sea coast he was

escorted to the station at Adana by Mehmed Ali Bey, the then commander of the troops in the city. The departure of this criminal from his former command, in the special first-class carriage always used on this line for distinguished visitors, seems to have been more like a hearty send-off for a general embarking upon a campaign than the retreat of a malefactor undergoing a sentence for his crime.

Ihsan Fikri, the editor and proprietor of the *Iktidal* newspaper published in Adana, who made use of his columns to promulgate inflammatory articles both before and during the massacre, was sentenced to two years' exile—I believe in Bagdad. Owing to the fact that this gentleman, who embarked at Mersina nominally for Bagdad, travelled without any escort, perhaps even on a foreign ship, he not unnaturally disembarked in Egypt, where he remained for some months. During his sojourn in Egypt this journalist stated in an interview with a newspaper representative at Cairo that "the members of the court-martial did not even ask him a single word on the subject of the publications made against the Armenians in the *Iktidal*, because they (the court-martial) knew very well that all the publications which had appeared in his paper were drawn up by the secretary of the Government at Adana and sent to him to be published under his own signature, and that he was compelled to act in consequence." Ihsan Fikri stated at the same time that he considered that "the local Governor knew very well that the massacre would take place, and that if the case arose he would prove the truth of what he said from documents which he possessed." As to whether or not Ihsan Fikri spoke the truth when he was thus interviewed in Cairo, I am unable to give any opinion. During my stay in Constantinople at the end of November, 1909, Ihsan Fikri suddenly arrived in the capital from Egypt. After being allowed to spend

several days in Stamboul, this gentleman was hustled off to Konia—a town possessing the advantage of being off the beat of European journalists. If the Ottoman authorities had been anxious to convince the world of their sincerity in wishing to punish those who were responsible for the massacres, and if, as they contend, Ihsan Fikri was one of these persons, it would have been easy for the Turkish Government to arrest him in Constantinople, either on a charge of escaping from his exile or for spreading what they must consider to be "lying" reports about government officials during his stay in Egypt. On more than one occasion I have discussed the treatment of Ihsan Fikri with Young Turks, but I have never succeeded in obtaining any satisfactory answers to my inquiries on the subject.

Abdul Kadir Bagdadi, the notable of Adana, who had always been guilty of inciting Moslems against Christians, and who is even said to have arranged how and which bazaars should be attacked, was only condemned to be exiled for two years. The Governor of Jebel Bereket, who was tried and condemned twice for his conduct during the massacres, was subsequently allowed to go about as if nothing had happened.

I am unable to discover any satisfactory reasons why these notable men were so leniently dealt with. The explanations given by the Turkish authorities are quite insufficient. It is only possible to draw two conclusions from the attitude which the Young Turks took up towards those who are felt by the civilised world to be largely responsible for the massacres. The Central Government at Constantinople feared to punish these men in an adequate manner either because it was itself implicated in the massacre or because it was afraid of what the general or local effect of this sufficient punishment might be. Assuming, as I have already asked the readers of these pages to assume, that the Young Turks are not themselves directly responsible

for the outbreak, then we must conclude that the second cause of the lenient treatment of these officials is the true one. However this may be, and although there is no doubt that innocent men have suffered as a result of the Adana courts-martial and that important Turks have been unfairly exonerated, yet it must not be forgotten that a large number of Moslems have actually been hanged as a punishment for murdering Christians. Whilst some of these executed people were wealthy, others were religious leaders, or men who held high political positions in their respective communities.

As far as I know, this is the first time in the history of Islam that Mohammedans have been hanged for murdering Christians. As a result of the revolution of April, 1909, in Constantinople, Moslems of the Old Régime were hanged by Moslems of the New Régime, not for killing Christians but for plotting against other Moslems. The manner in which the Young Turkey Government has dealt with the Adana massacres, although undoubtedly unsatisfactory, certainly indicates that some attempt has been made, not only to deal justly but to preserve law and order and to make the lives of all men more secure. The New Régime, even if it has been unable to punish adequately the most important members of the population, has at least possessed sufficient power to carry out a policy radically opposed to the earliest traditions of the Mohammedans of Turkey.

VII

ASIA MINOR UNDER THE NEW RÉGIME

Reasons for my visit to Asia Minor—The Law Courts—Reforms in the vilayet of Adana—Djemal Bey and some of his projects—The Governor of Missis—A journey across the Taurus Mountains—The Bagdad Railway—Reforms in the vilayet of Konia—The irrigation of the Plain of Konia—Reforms in the vilayet of Angora.

WHATEVER may be the number and the magnitude of the complicated problems which beset the Young Turks in European Turkey, and however great may be the dangers which have to be encountered from external foes, it is by the support or the opposition of the population of the Asiatic Provinces of the Empire that the destiny of the reformers of Turkey will be decided. Whether or not the Christians of Macedonia rise against one another or against the Government, or whether or not some foreign Power should endeavour to establish herself at Salonika, in any case, as long as the seventeen or eighteen million Ottomans who reside in the Asiatic Provinces of the Sultan remain loyal to the Caliph, it is certain that the Turkish Empire must continue to be an important factor in the world's politics.

When I returned to Constantinople after a considerable sojourn in the European Provinces of the Turkish Empire, I was faced by the difficult problem of deciding whither I should travel in order to gain some idea of the effect of the Constitution in Anatolia. After due

consideration and careful consultation with those best informed concerning the state of Asia Minor, I decided to sail from Constantinople to Mersina and thence, after investigating the causes and effects of the Adana massacres and actually seeing the destruction which had taken place, to return across the Taurus Mountains by way of Konia and Angora to the shores of the Bosphorus. By adopting this course I was enabled, not only to follow the route of a large portion of the most difficult section of the Bagdad Railway, and to gain information concerning an important work of irrigation which is being carried out, but also to visit the headquarters of three vilayets, each of which is in many ways different to any other in the Turkish Empire.

During my journey across Asia Minor and in course of my visits to various towns I endeavoured both by personal intercourse, not only with the governmental officials but also with the more important Christian magnates, to ascertain what changes and reforms actually had been or were about to be carried out in the Asiatic dominions of the Empire. In order to make what I saw and heard more intelligible, I propose to take some of the worst abuses practised under the Old Régime and to discuss them very briefly, and then to describe what I found had been done to reform them, and what proposals had been made for the future administration of the interior of Asia Minor.

It is a well-known fact that under the Old Régime the manner in which justice was administered left almost everything to be desired. Although the necessary reforms had not been carried out at the time of my expedition across Asia Minor, yet some steps in the direction of reform had actually been taken and others were in progress. Notwithstanding the fact that during the summer of 1909 Count Leon Ostrorog, the able Foreign Councillor at the Ottoman Ministry of Justice, drew up a series of recommendations which were sub-

sequently submitted to the Minister of Justice, I have not attempted either to give any idea of all the reforms thus proposed or even to take my details from it, because I feel that although the proposals made are excellent in principle, owing to the ignorance of the officials upon whom their execution must depend, so elaborate and ably thought out a programme can hardly be realised, at least in the near future.

At the capital of each vilayet the law-courts are composed of (1) a Court of Appeal, which is divided into a civil and a criminal branch; (2) a lower or sort of County Court, consisting of civil and criminal departments. This County Court is not what may be called part of the vilayet organisation, as it is also supposed to exist at the headquarters of each sanjak (smaller administrative division than a vilayet). It therefore really exists at the capital of each province, because that town is also the centre of a sanjak. I believe that for many years the presidents of these two kinds of court have been nominated and sent from Constantinople, but that the members have usually been drawn from the more important local inhabitants, who carry on their ordinary businesses as well as administering justice in the country.

In the more important and civilised vilayets of Asia Minor, including Angora, Konia, Adana, Smyrna, Aleppo, Brousa, and Kastamouni, it has now been decided to nominate, not only the presidents but the members of the above-described Court of Appeal and of the County Court from Constantinople. This reform when it has been effectively carried out will subject the Turkish Government to considerable extra expense, as it is obvious that officials who are unable to carry on their private businesses as well as holding a government appointment must receive higher salaries than those formerly paid to local magnates. Not only will an increase in salary enable the Government to

obtain men who have some idea of the laws of the land, but it will be reasonable for the country to expect these properly-salaried officials to devote all their time to legal business, whereas previously the courts often only sat for about two hours in the day, thereby causing enormous delay before cases could be brought forward. At Smyrna, Beyruth, and Aleppo, besides important towns of European Turkey, the Commercial Courts which have existed in the past are to be maintained. It is intended also to form these tribunals to deal with commercial cases in other towns, the trading importance of which merit their creation. Each of these courts is made up of a president and three members who are supposed to possess a knowledge of mercantile matters.

The happiness and prosperity of the inhabitants in the interior of an immense country like Turkey depend as much upon the justice and fairness with which the gendarmerie and police carry out their duties as upon anything else. As I have dealt elsewhere in general with the regulations which have been introduced for the reform of the gendarmerie, I propose here only to comment upon the changes which actually have been or are about to be effected in the gendarmerie and police of the districts of Asia Minor, in which I have travelled. From personal experience and from careful inspection I can testify to the fact that the men of both the gendarmerie and the police have greatly improved.

Although, owing to the abnormal conditions which had prevailed for some months at the time of my visit to the vilayet of Adana, this may scarcely be a suitable district from which to draw any concise conclusions as to the ordinary reforms which have been or which are about to be carried out in Asia Minor, yet for special reasons I am going to describe the changes which I found had been made or were proposed at Adana more fully than I would otherwise attempt to



AHMED DJEMAL BEY, VALI OF ADANA.

do. Not only is the district of Adana, with its rich lands and its mixed population, probably one of the most difficult to govern throughout the country, but the fertile Plain of Cilicia, which forms so important a part of the vilayet, will, if properly administered, be vastly more productive than it has ever been in the past. Moreover, Djemal Bey, who was specially selected to take over the government of this province in August, 1909, and who, I believe, only undertook the responsibility of re-establishing order on condition that he was allowed to remain at Adana for at least three years, was so closely mixed up in all the stirring events which preceded the granting of the Constitution by the ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid, and appeared to me to be so busily engaged in carrying out the programme of the Committee of Union and Progress, that his methods of government and his proposals for reform are, it is to be hoped, typical of those which the Committee of Union and Progress (if it is able to maintain its position of power) finally intends to introduce throughout the Empire.

Djemal Bey, who is a smart, simple-hearted, energetic Turkish officer of about forty-three years of age, besides being actively connected with the Young Turkey revolt of 1908, played a considerable part in the recapture of Constantinople, after the counter-revolution of April, 1909. Although during the Old Régime, probably owing to being a mere regimental officer, his Excellency was never exiled or compelled to fly for safety from the Ottoman dominions, as were so many Young Turk patriots, yet Djemal Bey has obtained some knowledge of European cities and Western civilisation from visits which he has made to Paris, Buda Pesth, and other foreign capitals. Although the Governor of Adana is essentially a regimental officer (he was a colonel in the Army), inexperienced in the affairs of State, yet it must not be supposed

that drill and elegant uniforms were the only things which occupied his mind before he came to Adana. Prior to the revolution Djemal Bey was the author of at least one book, and I believe that another work by him was in the Press of one of the Young Turkey papers, the office of which was burnt during the counter-revolution in April, 1909. Subsequent to the revolution of April, 1909 Djemal Bey was made Moutessarif of Scutari, where he remained until, after two months' persuasion on the part of the Government, he finally consented to undertake the responsibility of becoming Vali of Adana.

Owing to the difficulty to which I have already alluded of obtaining a sufficient supply of men who are real supporters of the New Régime, it is more than usually interesting, not only to study the character of an official who is, undoubtedly, endeavouring to further the cause of liberty, fraternity, equality, and justice, but also, especially in a country where militarism is the spirit of the nation, to investigate what manner of rule has been set up by this young soldier-Governor. Although Djemal Bey is a Mohammedan and, perhaps, in his heart of hearts may think that the Christian is inferior to the "True Believer," yet he does not allow these prejudices, even if they exist, to interfere with the impartial manner in which he endeavours to perform his duty towards Turk and Christian without favour or affection. Not only, as I shall attempt to show later on, has Djemal Bey endeavoured to introduce reforms throughout his province, but by the personal interest which he has taken in all that was going on around him, as well as by the unceasing energy with which he has occupied himself with the affairs of State, his Excellency has done much to re-establish confidence amongst the inhabitants of his province—a confidence which was so conspicuous by its absence when Djemal Bey took over the reigns of government from Mustafa Zihni

Pasha in August, 1909. If the majority of local Governors in the Ottoman dominions were as fair and as liberal-minded as Djemal Bey, the reforms promised by the Young Turks would now at least be on the way to realisation.

One of the most liberal and up-to-date ideas possessed by Djemal Bey is his desire to found a permanent Ottoman orphanage at Adana for fatherless boys and girls left destitute by the massacre. The instruction in the school, which it is hoped may eventually contain 500 children, is to be purely secular. Notwithstanding the fact that the Christian and Moslem children are to be allowed to go to their places of worship on Sundays and Fridays respectively, no priest, Christian or Mohammedan, is to be allowed to enter the establishment. Children in order to be eligible for the orphanage must be between the ages of six and eleven and have neither father nor mother. The language of the institution is to be Turkish. Although it is estimated that £T8,000 would build, and £T30,000 would endow this establishment (an excellent site has already been given by a Moslem magnate at Adana), it seems as if this sum might take some time to collect. Moreover, in Turkey each child educated in a school of this kind costs at least £T12½ a year to cover the outlay for food, clothing, and instruction. Unless, therefore, a very high rate of interest can be obtained, £T30,000 would hardly endow an establishment accommodating 500 orphans. Contracts for the construction of the building have been signed, but no work had actually been begun in October, 1910.

In addition to the possible difficulty of collecting sufficient funds to start the Adana orphanage, it is apparent that the religious prejudices of the various elements of the population may form a considerable obstacle in the way of its foundation. When I was in Adana the Armenians were already (in my opinion

quite unreasonably) objecting to the orphanage on religious grounds. Further, it is difficult to believe that devout Turks will sympathise with an institution of this kind owing to the obligations of prayer imposed by the Mohammedan religion. Unless these prayers are to be purely personal worship, or unless the rules proposed for the institution are to be broken, it would be almost necessary to have a Turkish imam, or an instructor to take the place of an imam, who might lead the pupils in their religious devotions. Although no Moslem "clergy" really exist, the entrance of a *khoja* or imam into the institution would certainly give those professing Mohammedanism an unfair advantage over the Christian pupils of the school, whose priests would, in all probability, not be permitted to enter the establishment.

In spite of the fact that the immediate object of this orphanage is to take in fatherless boys and girls left destitute as a result of the Adana massacres, yet if such an institution could once be successfully started, it would be a precedent for establishing more homes with somewhat the same objects in other parts of the Ottoman dominions. Whatever, therefore, may be the personal views of my readers upon religious education in schools, it is impossible for them, if they are well-wishers of Turkey, not to sympathise with any object which will further good feeling between the Moslems and the various Christian races of the Turkish Empire. I have described this orphanage so fully, not on account of its own actual importance, but in order to demonstrate the really broad-minded ideas of the most liberal-minded Turk I have ever met, and to prove that if the orphanage is ever completed, and if the present programme of absolute religious equality for the believers in all creeds is ever maintained, then at least some Young Turks are genuinely anxious for the establishment of equality between all Ottomans.

In the vilayet of Adana which forms part of the larger gendarmerie district of Beyrouth I found that considerable reforms had already been effected or were about to be introduced in the gendarmerie. In an interesting conversation which I had with Djemal Bey, I ascertained that his Excellency intended, when his scheme was fully realised, to have 1,200 gendarmes in the vilayet. These 1,200 men, who will be organised in battalions, are to be divided up so that each group of four or five villages will possess a gendarmerie post—under the conditions of existence in Asia Minor, an advantage to the population which can hardly be overrated.

The ranks of the gendarmerie are to be filled by Christians (from whom about 15 per cent. of the force is said at present to be drawn), by khojas who have failed to pass their examination entitling them to exemption from military service, and by recruits who leave the Army after six months or a year with the colours. The would-be khojas will prove a valuable addition to the force, as although they have failed to pass what is only a simple examination, yet they will at least be able to read and write. In order to ensure the efficiency of his new gendarmerie, the Vali of Adana obtained special permission authorising the formation of a school of instruction for 300 pupils at Tarsus. His Excellency had also been promised officers, non-commissioned officers, and gendarmes, from Salonika and from Constantinople to assist him in his task of reforming the gendarmerie. At the end of 1911, therefore, it is probable that there will be in the Adana vilayet 600 trained gendarmes, nearly all of whom have passed through a period of three months' instruction at a semi-military establishment. Both the battalion and the company commanders have been changed since the advent of the Constitution. The old *Alaili* officers have been replaced by younger men

appointed to their commands regardless of their rank. Not only have the gendarmes who were in any way responsible for the massacres been removed from the force, but many of the more undesirable members of the rank and file, when they found that more work was required of them, took the matter into their own hands and voluntarily retired into civil life.

The police of Adana have been subject to considerable reforms. Not only has the strength of the force been doubled, but the men are to be adequately and regularly paid. As in the gendarmerie, Christians have been, and are to be, admitted. While I was in Adana a friend of mine actually saw a police patrol making its way through the streets under the command of a Christian corporal.

Although in Adana, as in many other vilayets of Turkey, it was not immediately possible to substitute new and enlightened Governors in all the smaller cities and towns for those well acquainted with the ways of the Old Régime, yet many of the reactionaries appointed during the reign of Abdul Hamid have already been removed from their appointments. As I had the opportunity of meeting and talking with several of these officials I shall describe one gentleman with whom I had an interesting conversation. I do this because he seemed to me to be a good example of the type of man the Young Turks ought to send throughout the country.

Missis is a small town of about 2,000 inhabitants, situated on the Cilician Plain some twenty miles to the east of Adana. The Governor, a bright, intelligent Circassian, about twenty-five years of age, received me in a small, ill-kept, one-storied building which served the purpose of a Konak. This official, who was surrounded by the various village dignitaries when I called upon him, knew a considerable amount of history and discussed the horrors of the Old Régime with much

feeling. His Excellency informed me, like so many other Turks have done, that everything would be different under the New Régime. This gentleman not only talked in a well-informed manner as to the possibility of obtaining foreign capital at a reasonable rate of interest in order to develop the country, but also thoroughly understood how that capital might be advantageously employed in order to utilise the rivers for making electricity besides other useful purposes. This young Liberal also explained to me a scheme by which, if it were sanctioned, he desired to build a new village somewhere in the Tigris Valley, and then, by transporting 100 families thither from Cilicia, to found a well-arranged colony, the example of which might induce the nomad population of that district to settle down, and thus to improve their prospects for the future. In another city I found a very clever, liberal-minded Christian Governor, who had begun his public career in the Diplomatic Service, and was actually married to a foreign wife well known in society at a European capital.

Among other reforms proposed by Djemal Bey is the construction during the next five years of about 800 miles of road in the vilayet. Although this seems rather an extensive programme under the present state of the Turkish finances (it is estimated that the total cost would be about £T600,000), yet as the Ottoman Government possesses a valuable farm of about 600,000 acres in the neighbourhood of Adana, it is probable that a very considerable loan could be arranged, the interest upon the capital borrowed being guaranteed by the rent of this farm. Even if it is not possible at the present moment to let this farm for a total rent of £T69,000 (the figure mentioned to me by Djemal Bey as the possible rental), it is obvious, when the new sections of the Bagdad Railway have been completed and when, as a consequence, this line has been joined

on to the Hedjaz Railway, that the value of land on the Cilician Plain will rise by leaps and bounds.

In the Adana district most energetic attempts have been made to suppress brigandage. Whilst, a few days before my arrival in the city, a well-known brigand, whose last act of lawlessness had been to attack and rob Dr. Shepard (the well-known American missionary doctor), had been captured, during my stay another Mohammedan outlaw was actually marched in chains through the streets, bearing his sentence inscribed in Turkish upon a card hung round his neck. This latter act may appear to the everyday reader to be of small importance, but the fact that Djemal Bey dared to take so strong a step as to expose a "True Believer" to such an indignity in a city where the Moslem and Christian elements are so greatly opposed to one another displays considerable force of character upon his part. Both in Adana and in Tarsus I found that many of the new members of the law-courts and other legal officials had actually arrived, and that the remainder were expected shortly. In addition practically the whole staff employed in the various government offices of the city had been changed since the arrival of Djemal Bey.

At the conclusion of my visit to the Cilician Plain I drove across the Taurus Mountains from Tarsus to Boulgourlou—the actual terminus of the Bagdad Railway. The journey can be accomplished in two or three days. After leaving the Cilician Plain and crossing the lower spurs of the Taurus Mountains, the road enters the pass by which the Cilician Gates are approached. Thence for hours my carriage wended its way up the wooded valley which leads to the Pylæ Ciliciæ. As the highway actually passes through the Cilician Gates at an altitude of some 3,600 feet above the sea level, the gorge is so narrow that the road has been constructed on a revetted embankment immediately



THE GORGE OF THE BOZANTI SU, UP WHICH THE BAGDAD RAILWAY WILL RUN.

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above the bed of the stream. Disconnected, craggy rocks lend grandeur to the scene. Although the Cilician Gates are not actually the summit of the pass over the southern portion of the Taurus Range, yet the valley almost immediately widens out, and the road soon reaches the Tekke Plateau (height about 4,500 feet). Thence, after winding for some hours down a steep descent, the traveller finally enters the Valley of Bozanti.

The Vale of Bozanti—about four miles long and one wide—is a fertile district situated in the midst of the Taurus Mountains. It is in this valley that the Bagdad Railway, on its way from Adana to Boulgourlou, is destined to meet the present highway from Tarsus. Instead of climbing northward from the existing Mersina-Adana Railway near Tarsus, the Bagdad line will quit the Cilician Plain near Adana, and penetrate the southern portion of the Taurus Range by way of the Valley of the Charcut Su, which flows eastward of the Cilician Gates. This river runs from the Vale of Bozanti into the heart of the mountains, and finally dives down into a dark cave-like opening in the mountains, to emerge on the southern slopes of the range, after a subterranean course of some 300 yards. The approaches to the localities where this curious river enters and emerges from its subterranean course are, I believe, entirely unexplored by any European except one or two railway engineers, who were compelled to cut down trees and make special paths in order to arrive at what will in future be the northern and southern extremities of a tunnel (some 850 yards long) by which the railway will pierce the most difficult portion of the range.

After leaving the Valley of Bozanti, the existing road and the line planned for the future railway run for miles almost side by side. The gorge of the Bozanti Su, which is followed by this great trade route,

is so narrow that railway construction will be rendered most costly owing to the embankments, bridges, and rock-hewing which will have to be undertaken. Ulu Kishlar (the largest village on the whole route) is situated almost at the highest point (about 5,000 feet above the sea) on the pass. Thence the line surveyed for the railway again leaves the road in order the more easily to descend to the plain, and thus to reach Boulgourlou Station, situated in a deserted spot about four miles from the village of that name, and distant no more than six miles from the town of Eregli.

There is no space here to discuss the complicated political and economical problems connected with the Bagdad Railway, or to examine the reasons which have caused the delay in prolonging the line from Boulgourlou. Whole books have been devoted to these subjects. I have only described my journey across the Taurus Mountains in order to give my readers some idea of the country through which the second section of the Bagdad Railway is destined to pass. After considerable indecision, the Turkish Government has finally decided, for strategical reasons, that the line to the eastward of Adana (namely, the third section) shall follow the northern route via Bagché, as arranged under the original concession, instead of going from Adana to Aleppo via Alexandretta. During the autumn of 1909, too, arrangements were made between the Turkish Government and the Company for the construction of some 500 miles of line which, when and if completed, will bring the terminus to El Helif—a point between the towns of Mardin and Mosul. The construction of the second section was begun early in 1910, but subsequently, owing to financial and other causes, work was brought almost to a standstill.

This journey across the Taurus Mountains provides an opportunity for studying and conversing with the prehistoric, old-time-looking travellers who frequent the



A BEGGAR WOMAN NEAR THE CILICIAN GATES.


road. Although it is difficult to believe that even a small minority of these people have any idea of the meaning of the Constitution, yet everybody seems pleased to welcome the European stranger, who is at once believed to be occupied with the business of railway construction. Travellers, pilgrims, or merchants moving between Mersina and Caiserea, or the more distant districts of Asia Minor, follow the great highway which leads across the Taurus Range as far as the Valley of Bozanti. An almost unbroken line of caravans, composed of either lordly camels or pack animals of lesser degree, winds its way to and from the sea-board plain. Practically all these caravans are accompanied by terrible wild-looking dogs, varying in size and appearance from a kind of sheep-dog to a St. Bernard. Children, rendered by their tender age unable to accompany their parents on foot, are usually firmly lashed, stomach downwards, on the top of the rear portion of the camel's pack-saddle. The position is such that only the head can be moved, the arms being bound inside the covering, which is usually laid over the child beneath the lashing. Few of the Mohammedan women travellers veil their faces or even cover their hair. Much of the population is nomad, and it is no uncommon thing to find a temporary village composed of rough tents, made out of blankets just plumped down near the edge of any favourable stream.

The traveller crossing the Taurus Mountains quits the province of Adana and enters that of Konia in the Vale of Bozanti. The vilayet of Konia, about one-third part of which is a great desert, has an area of nearly 39,500 square miles, and is the largest province in Asia Minor. The Anatolian and Bagdad Railways, when the latter has been continued into the Taurus Mountains, running as they do practically from its north-western to the south-eastern corner, will divide the province into two almost equal parts. Not only

is Konia the largest vilayet in Asia Minor, but the importance of this province is increased because it is one of the only districts of the Ottoman Empire in which the majority of the inhabitants are Turks. The ancient Iconium is not only the seat of the Tchelebi or chief of the Mevlevi Dervishes, but it is also the centre at which many Moslem theological students undergo, or are supposed to carry out their religious training. Thus Konia is no unimportant centre in which to study the New Régime in Asia Minor.

It is probable that the ignorance of the Mohammedan khojas and theological students constitutes one of the greatest obstacles to reform in the Turkish dominions. As far as I could ascertain in Konia, where there are said usually to be some 3,000 students, the khojas may practically be divided into two distinct classes. There are men who have studied at the theological schools at Konia or elsewhere and who have obtained some nominal diploma for proficiency in religious subjects. There are also students who have only come to a religious centre and registered themselves as theological students, and perhaps received a month's instruction in the outward forms of the religion of Islam. Although these men are not really khojas, in the past they have been possessed of considerable influence among the more ignorant members of the population.

A law was, I believe, always in force obliging the khojas and theological students to pass an examination in order to avoid military service, but it was not until the advent of the New Régime that this law was actually put into force. At the time of my expedition across Asia Minor the Mohammedan theological students were undergoing this examination, which was the first of its kind that had actually been enforced. Approaching Konia the trains were crowded with candidates for examination. The official who came from Constantinople to examine the students in this city met



A RUINED MOSQUE AT KONIA.

with considerable opposition, as the khojas learned in the law, who were not amongst the candidates, objected to the students being asked simple geography and arithmetic questions instead of their being questioned in purely religious subjects. This examination, which I found had either taken place or was in progress at Adana, Konia, and Angora, will not only decrease the number of a very conservative set of men, but if it is properly and strictly carried out and enforced every year, it will ensure that those who become khojas have some education, however slight that education may be.

Although when I was in Konia the new members of the law-courts had not arrived, I understood that they were expected shortly, and that in the meantime legal business was not only proceeding rather more rapidly than it had done under the Old Régime, but that bribery and corruption were less rife than formerly. Tewfik Bey, the then Vali, was reported by the Moslem as well as the Christian inhabitants to be a fairly honest though a weak Governor of the province. His Excellency had not unnaturally failed to gain the confidence of the Christian population, partly on account of his domestic affairs. In Konia, depending as it does upon the district of Smyrna, I could not find that any reforms had been made in the gendarmerie. The police force was said to be slightly improved, but the reforms which had already been effected were not nearly equal to those which had been introduced at Adana or Angora.

Although the arrangements for the irrigation of the Plain of Konia were entered into before the advent of the Constitution, yet as considerable advantages may accrue to the Turkish Government when this enterprise has been completed I propose to give some details concerning the scheme under which about 132,000 acres of now almost desert country are to be converted into fertile land. Even if it is difficult to see how the money which has been and will be expended


by the Turkish Government in the neighbourhood of Tchumla can be recoverable from the increased value of the land, it is obvious that the improvement of this district will possess to the Government some political as well as financial advantages. Amongst other things, new villages, destined to be inhabited by Moslem emigrants from Bosnia, besides others from the Caucasus and the Crimea, can be built. It is certainly preferable both for the future of the Ottoman Empire, as well as for humanity at large, that these people, if they are to be imported into the country at all, should be settled amongst their co-religionists in Asia Minor, rather than that they should be dumped down in Macedonia, where they must render an already complicated problem even more difficult of solution.

A Company for the purpose of draining and watering the Plain of Konia has been formed as what might be called an offshoot of the Anatolian and Bagdad Railway Companies. The supreme direction of the work is in the hands of the firm of Holzmann (of Frankfort-on-Main), who, with the Anatolian Railway Company, make up the syndicate charged with the irrigation of the plain. The immediate supervision of the work is in the hands of two brothers (Messrs. H. and A. Waldorp), Dutch engineers, who were originally charged by the Deutsche Bank with the construction of the harbour at Haidar Pasha.

Although the work of surveying this vast government territory was begun as long ago as 1904, the final agreement was not actually signed between the Turkish Government and the Company until 1907. The general task of the Company, a task which I shall endeavour to explain in detail below, is to bring water from a lake situated some miles to the west of the Bagdad Railway, in order to irrigate a large district which surrounds Tchumla Station, and which is divided into two parts by the Bagdad Railway. Tchumla Station,

situated on the line about twenty-five miles to the south-east of Konia, has been made a sort of local headquarters for those occupied with the work, and the employees of the two companies actually carrying out the work are housed in a modern village which but a year or two ago was non-existent.


The Lake of Beyschekir is situated about fifty-six



miles to the west of the town of Konia. It is from this lake, which receives its contents from several mountain cataracts, and which has a superficial area of some 135,000 acres, that water will be obtained for the irrigation of the plain. From the south-eastern corner of this lake flows a river known as the Beyschekir River. About fifty miles (measured along the winding

banks of this stream) to the south-east of Lake Beyschekir is another lake known as Lake Karaviran. When the water is at its mean level this lake measures about ten miles long by seven and a half miles wide. The Lake of Karaviran, again, in its turn is, practically speaking, connected with the Plain of Konia by a gorge-like defile, later on widening out into a valley. The lake is actually separated from the western end of this defile by a sort of ridge. About fifteen miles from the Lake of Karaviran this gorge meets the Valley of the Tcharchamba, down which flows the mountain river of the same name. Hence, the Tcharchamba River proceeds in a north-easterly direction, and finally empties itself into the salt desert. When the Lake of Karaviran becomes exceptionally full of water owing to an unusually rainy season, then water floods over the above-described ridge and enters the defile which finally takes it into the Tcharchamba River.

In order to utilise effectively the water provided by the Beyschekir Lake, the Irrigation Company is constructing a large barrage at the point where the River Beyschekir leaves the lake. This barrage, which will have fifteen sluices, will be capable of allowing twenty-five cubic metres of water to leave the lake per second. If necessary the river will be deepened to permit the free passage of the requisite volume of water. From Karabaluk (on the Beyschekir River), where another barrage will have to be constructed, a large canal about thirty-four miles in length will conduct the water to the River Tcharchamba, avoiding the Lake of Karaviran altogether. This canal is at present in course of construction. By means of the barrage at Karabaluk it will be possible to turn surplus water from the River Beyschekir into part of the Lake of Karaviran. Moreover, it is at present intended to drain and irrigate about 17,500 acres of land which will be reclaimed from the Lake of Karaviran owing to the small



THE BARRAGE HALF A MILE TO THE SOUTH OF TCHUMLA STATION.

quantity of water which will in future reach it from the Beyschekir River.

The water conducted by the above-mentioned canal to the Valley of the Tcharchamba will all flow down the deepened course of that river as far as Jaila. At Jaila another most important barrage will have to be built. By means of this mighty hatchway water will either be diverted into a canal which will leave the river on its southern bank, or it will be allowed to continue its course down the river itself. The water let into the canal will flow parallel to the Tcharchamba for a few miles, and then cross over that river by an aqueduct about thirty metres in length. Hence, the canal conducts a vast volume of water to irrigate the 42,500 acres of land which surround the village of Tchumla, and which are situated on the western side of the Bagdad Railway. From the primary canal will lead secondary and tertiary watercourses, which will in their turn deliver water on to the fields. Arrangements will be made for the water not absorbed by the ground to be received by tertiary, secondary, and primary canals, and thus to be conducted back to the Tcharchamba River, after it has flowed beneath the Bagdad Railway.

The water destined for the irrigation of about 72,500 acres of land situated on both banks of the river to the eastward of the railway will continue its course down the river from Jaila. About half a mile to the south of Tchumla Station, and at a distance of but 250 yards to the eastward of the point where the railway crosses the Tcharchamba, a large barrage is already completed. By means of this barrage (provided as it is on three sides with sluices) water can be allowed to continue its course down the river, or it can be turned into two canals which will conduct it to irrigate the 12,500 acres of land to be improved to the north of this barrage, or to water the 60,000 acres which

lie to the eastward. Much of the two primary and considerable lengths of the secondary canals are already completed. A system of tertiary, secondary, and primary canals, like those on the west of the line, will be laid out to bring back the unabsorbed water to the river bed.

From the foregoing remarks it is clear when the irrigation has been completed that some 132,500 acres of now arid plain will be effectively watered. To accomplish this object more than 200,000,000 cubic yards of water will be required every year. Although after careful investigation it has been ascertained that even in dry seasons some 230,000,000 cubic yards of water can be obtained from the Beyschekir Lake, yet it is obvious that the expense of making the necessary canals and of constructing the all-important barrages must prove a considerable drain upon the already impoverished Turkish exchequer.

It is extremely difficult to ascertain exactly how much has already been or will be spent upon this important irrigation scheme. Haladjian Effendi (Minister of Public Works) assured me that when the work is complete the Turkish Government will have devoted some £800,000 to this enterprise. I have also been informed on good authority that the Company responsible for the irrigation receives its payment calculated on the basis of a certain sum per cubic yard of earth moved and a regular price per cubic yard of masonry constructed. This Company in its turn is not executing the work itself but simply provides skilled engineers and surveyors to supervise the work of constructing canals and barrages, which it has arranged shall be carried on in part by a French and in part by a German company.

The Turkish Government hopes to be able to recover the cost of the irrigation, the money for which is at present being gradually advanced by the Anatolian


Railway Company at 5 per cent., by the following methods: (1) By selling portions of the land irrigated. (2) From the higher tithes or rents to which the tenants will be subjected. A considerable indirect advantage should, too, accrue to the Government from the improvement of traffic upon the Anatolian and the Bagdad Railways. When the crops begin to improve, and consequently more produce is sent away by train, traffic will certainly be increased. This augmentation in the annual receipts of these railways should reduce the enormous sum which the Turkish Government is now compelled to supply annually to cover the kilometric guarantee of the line which connects Haidar Pasha with Boulgourlou, and which, as I have already said, will later provide railway connection between the Bosphorus and the Eastern Mediterranean.

The journey from Konia to Angora can be accomplished by train in two long, wearisome days. Owing to the terms of the agreement which exists between the Government and the railway company, it does not pay the latter to run trains by night, and therefore the traveller is compelled to sleep at Eski Shehr, the junction at which the line to Angora separates from that which connects Konia with Haidar Pasha.

As I have already said, Angora differs in many respects from almost any other city or district in Asia Minor. Out of a total population of some 30,000 souls, about 13,000 are Armenians, many of whom belong to the Roman Catholic and not to the Gregorian Church. Moreover, the population of Angora and the surrounding district is known to be less ignorant than the people who live in many other parts of Asia Minor. Partly owing to better education and partly because the Moslems do not and never have disliked Roman Catholic Armenians as much as Gregorians, no serious outbreak against the Christians has ever occurred in the vilayet of Angora.

The reforms which have been instituted in Asia Minor have certainly reached a more advanced stage in Angora than in Konia. Some of the new members of the courts had already arrived when I was in Angora, whilst the remainder were expected immediately. The fact that a Greek is president of one of the courts of law and that another member of the Orthodox Church is assistant public prosecutor proves that some changes have been effected. In the vilayet of Angora the former local gendarmerie commandants at the important centres have nearly all been replaced by new officers, who, according to the information of reliable foreigners who have seen them, are thoroughly efficient. At the time of my visit about 150 gendarmes were daily expected from the school of gendarmerie to assist in the work of reorganisation. Many newly-enlisted policemen had been substituted for those well versed in the methods of the Old Régime. The men of this force, who were being enrolled after some form of examination, and who could consequently nearly all read and write, were receiving instruction (from a Commission made up of legal men) as to what constitutes a crime deserving arrest and what does not.

During my stay in Angora I had an interesting conversation with Mahmoud Ferid Pasha, the Vali of the province, who was most anxious to explain to me what reforms had already been, and what changes were about to be, introduced into his province. Although his Excellency, who is a pleasant man of about fifty-eight years of age, cannot speak a foreign tongue, and is unable, therefore, to mix much with Europeans, yet he seemed not only to be possessed of liberal ideas but to be anxious to make reforms. Prior to the advent of the Constitution, Mahmoud Ferid Pasha was so well known for his honesty that he remained as a Moutessarif without promotion for twenty-seven years. His



PART OF THE TURKISH QUARTER OF ANGORA.

Excellency informed me that nearly all the Governors of the smaller districts of the vilayet had been changed since the Constitution, and that the personnel of the local government officers was now being reorganised.

The position occupied and the influence exerted by the Central Committee of Union and Progress, and by its local branches, is one of extreme importance, especially in Asia Minor. As I was informed that the Angora branch of this Committee took an active interest in the affairs of the State, and used its power for the good of the nation, I paid a visit to the headquarters of this association. I found there six members of the organisation. One of these was the principal *khoja* of the town, whilst the other five were made up of two Turks, one Greek, a Catholic Armenian, and a member of the Gregorian Church. Although my visit was expected (otherwise I should have found nobody at home) I took special trouble to discuss various questions with all the different members, who I believe were united in desiring the welfare of the State. The Mohammedan element, voiced by the *khoja*, assured me that equality of all races and liberty of thought was in accordance with the Mohammedan religion, and had only been retarded by the Old Régime, under which it has been impossible to teach the true meaning of the Koran. Whether the Moslem spokesman really believed the doctrines which he expounded, and whether the readers of the Koran are willing to adopt them, I will leave it to the public to decide for themselves.

During my travels across Asia Minor I also had the opportunity of meeting and conversing with a large number of Christian Ottomans. While truthfully stating that equality between Moslems and Christians had not been, and could not be established at least for many years, practically everybody agreed that the position and existence of the Christian in Asia Minor is considerably better under the Young Turks than it ever

was in the days of Abdul Hamid. Amongst many other things permission is now granted to travel, instruction in all subjects is freely permitted in schools, and papers, letters, and books are safely delivered to their addresses. Although I have received letters from Armenians stating that they were afraid to call upon me at my hotel, yet I can hardly believe that these fears were founded upon any reasonable grounds.

After studying the various questions at the different centres which I have visited, it appears to me on the whole that, relatively speaking, more reforms have been effected by the Young Turks in the parts of Asia Minor which I have visited than in European Turkey. That these reforms are more apparent in Asia Minor than in European Turkey is at least in part due to the fact that the state of Asia Minor under the Old Régime was even worse than that of European Turkey. Besides, it will be obvious to my readers that the changes which I have described in this chapter have been for the most part effected for the benefit of Moslems in districts which are at least to a great extent populated by Mohammedans. Although the difficulties to be overcome by the Young Turks, especially in Asia Minor, are enormous, yet these reformers must remember it is only by abandoning the nationalistic attitude, which I learn, especially of late, has become more noticeable, and by trying to gain the confidence of the subject races of the Empire, that Turkish rule can be established on a basis that will tend to develop the vast resources of the Empire.

VIII

THE CRETAN QUESTION

The population of Crete—Cretan reasons for desiring union with Greece—An account of some events which occurred prior to the appointment of Prince George as High Commissioner of Crete—Crete from December, 1898, to October, 1908—Changes introduced in the administration of the Island as a result of the Cretan declaration of union with Greece in October, 1908—The Turkish aspect of the Cretan Question—The manner in which the power of Bulgaria affects the Cretan Question—The Cretan flag hoisted upon the fort at Canea in August, 1909—Moslem deputies excluded from the Cretan Chamber in May, 1910.

ALTHOUGH the object of these few pages is neither to write a history of Crete nor to reproduce statistics about the Island, yet before attempting to enumerate some of the events which have led up to the present situation in Crete, I propose to give my readers a few facts about the inhabitants of the "Island of Liars." Out of a total population of about 303,000 souls, some 273,000 belong to the Orthodox Church, whilst the remaining 33,000 are Mohammedans. This small minority of the population, a minority which is always on the decrease, may roughly be divided into three groups. The better class Mohammedans of the Island are almost entirely composed of Cretans who were converted during the Turkish occupation of Crete. These families for the most part possess Greek names, and often only speak a few words of the Turkish tongue.

A second class of Mohammedans is made up of the

Bengazis, who have very dark complexions, and were imported into Crete from Africa by the Turks. A third and distinct class is composed of the Moslems, who are black. These people, known as the "Aripides," were originally slaves, but were eventually freed by desire of the foreign consuls. These blacks are the lowest caste of the Cretan population. They gain their daily bread by the most menial forms of labour, generally carried out in Mohammedan families. The women of this caste are not veiled. One occasionally meets a regular Turkish Mohammedan, who has probably only recently emigrated to the Island in order to obtain some remunerative occupation. The Mohammedans of Crete, who scarcely ever have more than one wife, are fanatical from a national point of view, but they are not devout in religious things. Mosques, of course, exist, but one does not see the population flocking in to prayer as in Mohammedan countries.

Since the international occupation of the Island the government of Crete has been entrusted to a High Commissioner of the Powers advised by four councillors. The Chamber is composed of sixty-five deputies (eight Moslems and fifty-seven Christians), each elected by about 1,100 voters. Parliament meets every year for a session varying in length from three to six months. Each deputy receives a sum equal to about £32 for every ordinary session. The Chamber is divided into two principal parties, the Conservative and the Liberal. The Conservative party would always have been pleased to vote for the return of Prince George as High Commissioner, while the Liberal party is in favour of freedom of the Press, liberty in elections, and objects to sundry abuses which were allowed by Prince George. Except on purely religious questions, and in matters concerning the union with Greece, the Moslem deputies do not form a separate party.

It is unnecessary, as I have already said, to discuss



A MOSQUE IN CRETE.

the history of Crete here. Sufficient is it to say that the hardships to which the Islanders have been subjected by their many rulers and the numerous rebellions which have taken place do much to demonstrate the indomitable courage of the inhabitants. Subsequent to the Turkish conquest the Sublime Porte has always purported to regard every disorder as a rising of Christians. Even at the present day, if a Moslem Islander is killed by accident, the Turkish Government at once assumes that a massacre of "True Believers" has either already begun or that the danger of such a disaster is imminent.

With the object of attempting to explain the Cretan Question—a question which has occupied the attention of Europe for years, a problem which is yet unsolved—I propose to treat the subject very briefly: (1) from a Cretan point of view, (2) from a Turkish point of view, and (3) from a Greek point of view.

Whether or not union with Greece would prove advantageous to the Cretans is a matter of opinion. In spite of the fact that these patriots fully realise the condition of Greece to-day, those among the gallant, obstinate inhabitants of the Island who profess Christianity are willing to submit to increased taxation, and to undergo more arduous conditions of military service, in order that their national aspiration may be realised. During my stay in Crete M. Venezelos graphically explained to me that the people of the Island desire to be united with Greece for sentimental as well as for material reasons. The Cretans, for the most part purely Greek by race, and members of the Orthodox Church by religion, are united to the inhabitants of the Hellenic Kingdom by bonds of history, language, and religion. No Cretan Government which adopts any measure contrary to the national aspiration of the people can, therefore, ever hope to withstand the displeasure of the inhabitants.

The Cretans urge as their principal material reasons in favour of union with Greece that :

(1) From a financial point of view the Island is too small to exist alone. Even if it is not required for defensive purposes, an efficient, although a small, military force must be maintained in order to ensure public order and security. It is also believed by the Cretans that, were the Island simply endowed with an autonomous régime, they would be obliged to defray extra expense in order to cover the salaries of officials charged with representing their interests abroad.

(2) As Crete is an island largely dependent upon its agricultural products, the import duties which are imposed upon these products by the neighbouring countries render it impossible for the produce of the Island to compete with the products of the countries to which it is exported. Greece cannot, of course, admit Cretan goods on favoured terms, otherwise she would be accused of countenancing the idea that the Island is a part of the Hellenic Kingdom.

(3) As long as Crete is not united with Greece all arrangements as to the status of the Island must be temporary, and therefore it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain foreign capital with which to develop the national resources, and with which to build railways and roads in order to improve the communications which exist, or more correctly do not now exist, between different parts of the Island.

The events which have slowly but surely led, not only the Cretans but the whole of Europe to believe that Crete was ere long to be united to Greece, might almost be said to begin from the year 1896. Subsequent to this the Powers composing the European Concert, both by the proposals which they themselves have made, as well as by the innovations which they have countenanced, have demonstrated that their policy was one which would sooner or later allow the Cretans

to be united with Greece. In March, 1897, when it was obvious that the reforms which had been promised by the ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid in 1896 would never really be introduced, the Great Powers presented a collective note to both Turkey and Greece, stating that although "under the present circumstances" Crete could not be united with Greece, nevertheless the Island would be endowed with an autonomous régime. Whilst the same document contained a summons to the Hellenic Government to withdraw the Greek vessels and troops then in Crete, a note delivered but a few days later informed the Ottoman Government that the autonomy granted to Crete implied the progressive reduction of the Ottoman forces, and that it would be expedient as soon as the Island was evacuated by the Hellenic troops to take the necessary measures for the concentration of the Imperial troops in the fortified places which were then occupied by European detachments. Again, during the month of March, 1897, the admirals of the Great Powers then in Cretan waters, "acting on the instructions of their respective Governments, solemnly proclaimed and made known to the population of the Island that the Great Powers have irrevocably decided to maintain complete autonomy in Crete under the suzerainty of the Sultan." The proclamation continued by saying that "the Cretans will be completely free of all control of the Porte in so far as their internal affairs are concerned."

After a year and a half of unsatisfactory government, it was on September 6th, 1898, that a massacre of Christians took place in Candia. As a result of this outbreak, in which some hundreds of Christians perished, and in which about fifty British officers, soldiers, and sailors were killed and wounded, an Ultimatum was presented to the Sultan by the Ambassadors of France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia (Austria and Germany had by this time withdrawn from the

Concert of Powers) demanding the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the Island "within a period of one month." This note also clearly stated that if the Turkish evacuation was not completed by the date fixed, the four Powers, freed from every moral obligation respecting Ottoman sovereignty in Crete, "would take steps to establish in the Island a régime in accordance with the wishes of the majority of its inhabitants." The phraseology of this dispatch clearly proves that had not the Sultan immediately complied with this formal request, union with "Mother" Greece would at that time have been countenanced by the Protecting Powers. In November, Russia, who had previously suggested that Prince George of Greece should be Governor of the Island, proposed his Royal Highness as High Commissioner of the Powers. In spite of the objections of the Turkish Government and of the diplomatic outcry which was raised in Europe, his Royal Highness was actually invited to assume the duties of High Commissioner of Crete on November 26th and did, in fact, arrive at Canea on December 21st, 1898. Although his Royal Highness was to recognise "the high suzerainty of the Sultan, and to take measures to safeguard the Turkish flag, which according to the promise given to the Sultan by the four Powers, was to float upon one of the fortified points of the Island," yet the appointment of a Greek as Governor of Crete, contrary to the express wish of the Sultan, must have meant the practical severance of the Island from Turkey.

By the foregoing remarks I have endeavoured to recount very briefly the events which immediately preceded the appointment of Prince George to the post of High Commissioner of Crete. The ten years which intervened between the arrival of his Royal Highness in the Island and the Cretan declaration of union with Greece in 1908 can be divided into two parts. Prior

to 1905, although the Great Powers took no steps actually to encourage the Cretans to believe that their national aspiration would soon be realised, yet the European Concert certainly allowed the Islanders, by many overt acts which infringed the sovereign rights of the Sultan, to establish the autonomy granted to them upon the broadest possible basis. In 1905 no outward or visible sign of Ottoman suzerainty remained on the Island, except the one flag which floated upon the rock-like island which lies at the entrance of Suda Bay. From 1909 until after the final evacuation of the Island by the international troops, which was completed during the summer of 1909, the Great Powers encouraged the Cretans to expect the almost immediate realisation of their great national aspiration.

On January 6th, 1899, the new High Commissioner, who was charged with the responsibility of establishing an autonomous government, and of creating a national militia, nominated a committee of fifteen members, who were entrusted with the mandate of elaborating the Constitution. This Constitution, which was assented to by the Great Powers, clearly demonstrates the nature of the autonomy which it was intended the Cretans should enjoy. Amongst other remarkable statements which were made in this document, the "Island of Crete, with the adjacent islets" is described as a *State* enjoying complete autonomy. Greek was, moreover, laid down as the official language of the *State*. In addition, the Prince in whose name justice was administered was granted the right of concluding conventions, coining money, and conferring decorations. As a result of the power conferred upon his Royal Highness, the rulers of Crete, authorised by the French Government, arranged with the Mint in Paris to coin Cretan money. In addition, having not only joined the Postal Union, but the International Telegraph Convention, the Cretans arranged to be represented

at all the international conferences held to discuss postal and telegraphic affairs.

Again, not long after the promulgation of the Constitution, and in spite of repeated protests, formulated by the Turkish Government, Lord Salisbury informed Anthopoulos Pasha (then Turkish Ambassador in London), after consultation with the Governments of France, Italy, and Russia, that her Majesty's Government considered that the autonomy granted to Crete included the right of imposing a duty of 8 per cent. upon goods imported into the Island from the Ottoman Empire. The imposition of this duty clearly demonstrated that the rulers of Crete intended to establish the same fiscal relations with the Suzerain Power as those already existing with foreign nations. Moreover, in 1899, the Cretan Government was allowed to show its partiality towards Greece, by entering into an arrangement with the National Bank of Greece for the establishment of a bank at Canea under a Charter which was to last for thirty years. This bank was to have the exclusive right of issuing bank-notes in the Island.

In spite of the cold manner in which the resolution in favour of union with Greece voted by the Cretan Assembly in June, 1901, was received by the Protecting Powers, it was in this year that one more bond of union which existed between the Island and its nominal suzerain lord was severed. It was natural that Crete—now for all practical purposes no longer an integral part of Turkey—should have been obliged to take over its share of the Ottoman debt. The fact that the Island originally did take over a proportion of the annual sum due from Turkey to the Ottoman Debt, instead of paying a tribute to the Sultan, undoubtedly proves that Crete was even at that time considered all but independent. As a result of the liability which the Islanders had assumed, in August, 1901, a convention was signed

between the Cretan Government and the Ottoman Public Debt by which it was arranged that the Public Debt should renounce all its rights in Crete in return for a payment of £60,000 in addition to a concession of a salt monopoly in the Island. Although this contract did not directly affect the prestige of the Turkish Government, yet by doing away with yet another link which still united the Government of Prince George with that of Constantinople, the agreement tended to satisfy the national aspirations of the people. A decision of the Ambassadors at Constantinople, who, during the negotiations, had been invited to arrange a compromise between the Cretan Government and the Ottoman Public Debt on an outstanding question, clearly demonstrates that the Protecting Powers assented to Crete being permitted to arrange her own affairs concerning her international liabilities. At the end of the same year (1901), the Great Powers themselves attempted to oblige the Ottoman Government to recognise Cretan passports, and to acknowledge the Cretan flag which had been granted to the Island by the Concert of Europe.

With the exception of the resolutions in favour of union with Greece which were passed by the Cretan Assembly, practically no further important developments occurred which favoured the realisation of the Cretan aspiration until 1905. Between 1905 and 1908 a number of diplomatic notes were addressed to the Cretans by the representatives of the Great Powers at Canea. Not only was each successive document couched in more encouraging language than the last, but every note gave some fresh concession to the people of the Island—concessions which were for the most part absolutely derogatory to the prestige of the Ottoman Government. Thus, early in April, 1905, in reply to the report drawn up by Prince George and presented to the Powers on the occasion of his tour in

Europe, the Consuls-General informed the Cretan Government that "under the present circumstances" it was not possible to modify the political status of the Island. The Protecting Powers not only undertook by the terms of the same document "not to annex the Island themselves or to allow the annexation by any other Power against the consent (*gré*) of the inhabitants," but they also agreed, as soon as tranquillity was restored, each to reduce by one half their contingent of troops then garrisoning the Island. The document closes with the encouraging promise that the Powers "will bring to the notice of the Sublime Porte some demands presented by the High Commissioner in July, 1901, which have not yet received satisfaction." In addition, the Powers state that they intend to insist on obtaining from the Sublime Porte the recognition of the Cretan flag, besides other less important concessions.

During the year 1906 the Protecting Powers demonstrated their goodwill towards the Cretans by addressing at least two important dispatches to the Government of the Island. The first of these documents, dated July 23rd (of course before the departure of Prince George), states that the Powers had examined the conclusions arrived at by their delegates who had held an investigation as a result of the disturbance of 1905, and that "at the moment when the National Assembly, recently elected, is about to begin its work, they [the Powers] are bound to show the Cretan people the interest which they take in them, and at the same time to take into account, as far as possible, their legitimate aspirations." The note goes on to say that, "inspired by the proposals of their delegates, the Powers think it possible to enlarge in a more national sense the autonomy of the Island, and to make a series of dispositions tending to ameliorate the moral and material situation of Crete. With this object in view, the Powers



THE HARBOUR AT CANEA.

have agreed (1) to reorganise the gendarmerie and to create a militia in which the Cretan and Greek elements can be progressively developed, with the reservation that the Greek officers whose assistance is accepted shall be struck off the active list of the Greek Army ; (2) to withdraw the international troops as soon as the gendarmerie and the militia are formed, and having been placed under the orders of the High Commissioner, shall have restored tranquillity and ensured the protection of the Mussulman population." After dealing with some financial reforms which were to be introduced, this note closes with the somewhat inciting sentence : "The Powers, in imparting these decisions to the Cretan people, feel confident that they will understand that every step towards the realisation of their national aspiration is subordinated to the establishment of order and of a stable régime." The encouragement vouchsafed to the Cretans by the arrangement concerning the Greek officers to be sent to Crete is obvious. Moreover, in spite of the condition imposed by the Great Powers, that these officers were to be struck off the active list of the Greek Army, these gentlemen, eight of whom actually arrived in Crete in December, 1906, although nominally removed from the active list of the Greek Army, were in reality allowed to reckon the time spent in Crete towards their promotion, as if this period had been passed on leave. When I was in Crete I ascertained that most of these officers expected to return to their own regiments when their task was completed, and that their actual position might be compared with that of a British officer who is "seconded" from his regiment.

Prince George of Greece, who, as I said before, was nominated to his appointment by the Powers, actually left Crete in September, 1906. In the same month the Island Government was informed, through the medium of a note, that "the Protecting Powers, in

order to manifest their desire to take into account, as far as possible, the aspirations of the Cretan people, and in order to recognise, in a practical manner, the interest which his Majesty the King of the Greeks ought always to take in the prosperity of Crete, have agreed to propose to his Majesty that "henceforth every time that the post of High Commissioner of Crete becomes vacant, his Majesty, after confidential consultation with the representatives of the Great Powers at Athens, shall nominate a candidate capable of carrying out the mandate of the Powers in the Island, and that he [the King of Greece] shall officially inform the Powers of his choice." The note goes on to say that the Protecting Powers as soon as they have approved of this decision, will make the necessary arrangements to inform the Sultan of the nomination. This "concession" as it is called in the note, would clearly not only enable the King of Greece to extend still further his authority in Crete, but would be yet another sign that the Great Powers were gradually allowing Crete to be united with Greece by "instalments." It is obvious that a High Commissioner appointed by the Greek Court, however honest he might have been in his desire to carry out the mandate of the Powers (I believe M. Zaïmis to have been thoroughly honest) would be far more susceptible and liable to Greek influence than he would ever be to that of a Turkish suzerain, with whom he was not connected by bonds of nationality or sympathy. Although when Prince George was appointed High Commissioner of Crete by the Powers in 1898, the appointment was felt by some to have extended Græcian control in Crete to a greater extent than was advisable, yet in reality the influence vouchsafed to the King of Greece by the action of the Powers in September, 1906, was of much more far-reaching importance than any measures which were taken by the European Concert in 1897 or 1898.

On May 11th, 1908, the Powers informed the Cretan Government that they intended to withdraw the international troops from Crete, in fulfilment of their promise made on July 23rd, 1906. The evacuation was to be completed within the period of one year from the date when the first contingent actually left the Island.¹ Although, owing to the quite unforeseen events which occurred in the Near East in 1908, it may be unreasonable to criticise the policy of promising to withdraw the international troops from Crete, yet it is of course the withdrawal of these garrisons which has brought about the latest phase of the Cretan question. When it became apparent in July, 1908, that the situation in the Near East had changed, and was changing, it would undoubtedly have been better had the Powers reconsidered their former decision and decided to maintain at least small military contingents in Crete, at any rate until the New Régime in Turkey had had sufficient time to prove to Europe whether reforms were really to be effected or not. The evacuation was carried out in spite of the protests addressed to the Powers both by the Turkish Government and by the Cretan Moslems. The Island followers of the Prophet supported their protests by alluding to the terms of the proclamation of the admirals issued on November 4th, 1898—a proclamation which clearly stated that the Moslems of the Island were placed under the protection of the international troops.

The foregoing remarks must have clearly proved to my readers that in 1908 the autonomy originally granted to the Cretans had not only been established on the broadest basis, but that the Great Powers had themselves encouraged the Islanders to believe that ere long their union with Greece would actually be an accomplished fact. Crete was far less subject to the

¹ The last international troops actually sailed from Crete before the end of July, 1909.

authority of the Sultan when this monarch granted a Constitution to his people than was Eastern Roumelia. Not only did the Sultan receive an annual tribute for Eastern Roumelia, but besides possessing rights over most of the railways of this province, the Ottoman Government was endowed with the right (it was never put into force) of occupying and defending the passes of the Balkans between Northern and Southern Bulgaria. Prior to 1908 the Cretans were always told if annexation with Greece were permitted, that the whole Near Eastern Question would be reopened, and that each of the Balkan States would demand some counter-balancing compensation. The Hellenic race has not at present received any recompense for the independence of Bulgaria.

It was early in October, 1908, that Bulgaria declared her independence, and that Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Such was the excitement in Canea when the news of the declaration of Bulgarian independence was published, that a crowd of some 10,000 people at once assembled and declared the union of the Island with Greece. By this declaration, in reality the Cretans only assumed of right a situation which was already existent in fact. On October 12th the Cretan Chamber legalised this declaration, and on the next day a committee of six members were elected to rule Crete in the name of King George until the Greek Government had time to take over the administration of the Island. Although, as I have already shown, this was not the first declaration of union with Greece which had been made by the Cretans, yet no previous proclamation had carried with it any real changes in the administration of the Island. In October, 1908, however, several important modifications were introduced. Amongst other things, (1) the Greek Constitution was applied in the Island instead of the one previously in force in Crete. (2) The Greek

flag was hoisted on practically all the Government buildings where the Cretan colours had previously floated. Although the emblem of Cretan nationality still flew on the fort at Canea and at Suda Bay in company with those of the Great Powers, yet I believe that at this time about 1,000 Greek flags were hoisted in the Island. (3) The Cretan stamps bearing the head of M. Zaïmis (then High Commissioner of Crete) were surcharged "Hellas" or "Royaume de Grèce."

(4) The public servants, the militia, the gendarmerie, and Cretan functionaries took the constitutional oath of fidelity to King George of Greece, in whose name justice was henceforth, and still is, administered in the Island.

(5) In order to be in accordance with the Greek code, not only was the jury system introduced in criminal trials, but appeals were referred to the High Court at Athens. So careful, however, were the Greek statesmen not to disobey the instructions of the Powers, that the cases thus forwarded to the Greek capital were never adjudicated upon in the Athenian courts.

What was the attitude of the Great Powers when they heard of the declaration of union with Greece and actually saw the changes which were subsequently introduced by the Cretan Government? Was it an attitude of absolute condemnation? Did the Great Powers censure these acts of overt insubordination, either by reproving the Cretan ministers who had sanctioned them, or by refusing to have any diplomatic dealings with what must, to them, have been an illegal Government? Not at all. On October 28th the agents of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia, acting under the orders of their respective Governments, informed the Cretan people that "the Protecting Powers considered the union of Crete with Greece as dependent upon the assent of the Powers who have contracted obligations with Turkey." The note goes on to say that the Powers "would nevertheless not be averse to considering with

favour (*bienveillance*) the discussion of this question with Turkey, provided that order is maintained in the Island, and that the security of the Mussulman population is assured." In reply to this note, the Cretan Government informed the representatives of the Great Powers at Canea that "the Cretan people, at present attached more than ever to their national aspiration, and confident as to the justice of their claim, feel profoundly grateful to the Protecting Powers for taking their cause in hand. The Cretans, feeling sure that the Powers in their esteemed benevolence will deign to put the finishing touch upon the work which they have undertaken, place themselves with entire confidence in their [the Powers'] hands, feeling certain that the union with Greece, bought back with the price of innumerable sacrifices, will definitely be accorded to them." The Powers took no exception to the clear phraseology of this note.

Again on July 13th, 1909, when the New Régime in Crete had been in force about nine months, and when the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the independence of Bulgaria had already been officially recognised by the Powers, the Consuls-General not only declared that the Protecting Powers were confident of the loyalty of the Cretan people, but also clearly affirmed that they relied "upon the energy and loyalty of the established (*constitués*) authorities for the maintenance of public order, and for the safety of the Mussulman population, and that they [the Powers] would continue to concern themselves favourably (*avec bienveillance*) with the Cretan Question."

I have only recalled to memory a few of the events which have occurred in recent Cretan history, and enumerated some of the actions of the European Concert, in order to prove, if certain conditions were fulfilled, that the Cretan people have undoubtedly been encouraged to expect the realisation of their national

desire. By October, 1908, the most important stipulations set forth by the Powers in their note of July 23rd, 1906, namely, that order and tranquillity should be restored, and that the gendarmerie and militia should be organised, had unquestionably been carried out. In February, 1907, a new Constitution had been substituted for that drawn up under the supervision of Prince George in 1899. No serious disturbances had recently occurred in the Island. Tranquillity had been completely restored. There had been no threatening of any attack upon the Mussulman population.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Cretans are justified in anxiously awaiting the recognition of their union with Greece, the Turkish side of the Cretan question deserves careful consideration. As the status of Crete was arranged by the Treaty of Berlin, it should only be changed by consent of all the signatory Powers of that international compact. It is natural, therefore, before any definite change in the status of the Island is decided upon, that the Ottoman Government considers that such a change should receive the assent of Germany, Austria, and Turkey, besides that of the four Protecting Powers. Moreover, undoubtedly, the Sublime Porte has been led to believe on more than one occasion since the occupation of the Island by the Powers that the annexation of Crete to Greece would not be allowed, at least under present circumstances. In addition, if the present Ottoman Government were allowed to discuss the recent history of Crete with the Concert of Europe, it might reasonably urge that it never invited or authorised the Powers either to occupy the Island or to encourage the Cretans to expect separation from Turkey. In spite, however, of the advent of a New Régime in Turkey, for a Government to try and undo arrangements allowed by its predecessors would be to reopen questions which were settled in 1898. This can, therefore, hardly be countenanced by the Great Powers.

The Turkish Government, even if it were willing to accept an indemnity in exchange for the loss of Crete, would probably now be powerless to do so, as such a settlement would certainly be opposed by a large number of the Turkish inhabitants of the Empire. Many of the Young Turks are prepared to make great sacrifices, and even to risk losing their lives, in order that Crete may nominally remain an Ottoman island. During my travels in the Turkish Empire, since the advent of the New Régime, I have had the opportunity of discussing the future status of Crete with different classes of men domiciled in various districts of the interior of both the European and Asiatic Provinces of the Empire. Whatever may be the origin of their feelings, there is no doubt that to the Moslem inhabitants of the Empire the Cretan Question has now undoubtedly become a matter of vital interest. Whether or not these men personally care about the future of Crete, they have certainly been educated up to the idea, and thus convinced that Crete must not on any account be handed over to King George. Certain sections of the Turkish Press, by describing the supposed injustices and dangers to which the Moslem inhabitants of the Island are subjected, have undoubtedly created a kind of Pan-Islamistic feeling on the subject of Crete amongst the "True Believers" of Turkey.

During a visit to Salonika, I had the opportunity of discussing the Cretan Question with Dr. Nazim Bey (the then Secretary-General of the Committee of Union and Progress). The Doctor, whose opinions carry great weight in Turkey, appears to have expressed the view of the average Young Turk when he said that the principal reasons why the Turkish sovereignty over Crete must be maintained are that—

1. Crete is only one of many Greek islands forming part of the Ottoman Empire, and therefore if the politicians of one island were successful in obtaining



THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE CRETAN GOVERNMENT AT CANEA.



THE CRETAN HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT AT CANEA.

The Greek flag is shown flying above the building.

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union with Greece, then the inhabitants of the others would begin agitations in order to bring about the same change.

2. The Greek Army would be greatly strengthened by the recruits with which it would be furnished from Crete. At the present time, about 6,000 Cretans annually attain the age of nineteen, so that if the new recruiting regulations, which do away with the system of drawing lots, are ever introduced, the Greek Army, in which every able-bodied man will then be obliged to serve, will certainly gain considerable strength by the addition of a Cretan contingent. It is certain, too, that a sprinkling of Cretan blood in the Army would do much to improve the "morale" of the Greek troops.

3. The Moslem Cretans who have emigrated, and are now domiciled in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, would immediately rise against the Government if their native Island were peacefully sacrificed to the Greeks. A large amount of the excitement which undoubtedly exists in Turkey concerning the Cretan Question has certainly been fostered by the Moslem Islanders who have emigrated to the Ottoman Empire since the occupation of the Great Powers. Throughout the many months during which the latest phases of the Cretan Question have occupied the attention of Europe, the cause of the Moslem Islanders has not only been ably championed by a well-written paper in Constantinople, but it is at least in part to the same organ that the unrest on this subject throughout Turkey may directly or indirectly be attributed.

In addition to the above described opposition which would be offered to the Government if Crete were ceded to Greece, there is a large body of reactionaries in the country who would be only too pleased to have the opportunity of making use of the loss of Crete in order to gain influence by which they could weaken the New

Régime. These malefactors, whose power cannot be ignored, already urge that the Government has bartered Bosnia and Herzegovina while it has accepted an indemnity in lieu of the Turkish suzerainty over Bulgaria, and in exchange for the annual tribute actually paid for Eastern Roumelia.

During the summer of 1909, when the crisis between Turkey and Greece was probably passing through its most acute stages, the Ottoman Government attempted to link the Cretan and the Macedonian Questions together. If this can successfully be accomplished, it, of course, enables the Turkish authorities to enter into direct communication with Greece; while, on the other hand, if the Cretan Question is alone under consideration, it is apparent that all negotiations must be carried out between Turkey and the Great Powers. Not only has every endeavour been used to confuse the Cretan with the Macedonian Question, but the Greeks of Turkey who under the Old Régime were, of course, always supported by the ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid against their Slav fellow-countrymen, have been and are now being made to feel the effect of the Cretan Question. Although, at the time of writing these few pages, the Committee of Union and Progress party is sufficiently strong to carry on the government of Turkey, yet it is clear that a policy of entirely alienating the sympathy of the Greeks who so largely make up the trading and commercial classes in Turkey may not only bring on a war the termination of which it is difficult to prophesy, but such a system may also be productive of other far-reaching results which would be most disastrous to the Empire.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Turks state that they are willing to grant the fullest measure of autonomy to Crete, yet they wish to insist that at all costs the "sovereign rights" of the Sultan must be maintained in the Island. It appears that the maintenance

of the *status quo* at present existing in Crete would be unsatisfactory to the Ottoman authorities, who wish to establish a Government somewhat on the same basis as that which exists in Samos.¹ Whatever may be the rights and wrongs of the case, it is natural that the Turkish Government, undoubtedly well aware of the difficult position in which the Protecting Powers are placed by their inconsistent actions of the last few years, is now trying to insist that a final solution of the Cretan Question shall be found, and in particular, amongst other things, that :

(1) Crete shall be created an Autonomous Principality under the suzerainty of the Sultan ; (2) the High Commissioner of the Island, who is either to be nominated by the Powers and sanctioned by the Sultan, or else to be appointed by the Sultan and sanctioned by the Powers, shall under no circumstances be a Greek ; (3) the Cretan stamps shall bear no semblance of connection with Greece. The fact that the Turkish Government wishes to limit the autonomy already existing in Crete by the imposition of these conditions proves that the Sublime Porte is not merely anxious to maintain the nominal authority which it possessed in the past, but is desirous of obtaining a firmer grip of the Island than it previously held.

Throughout the stages of the crisis which began in the summer of 1909, the uncertain attitude of Bulgaria has doubtless influenced Ottoman statesmen to be more moderate in their demands than their somewhat over-patriotic Turkish supporters would otherwise have sanctioned. It was, of course, in 1897, largely as a

¹ Although since 1832 Samos has been freed from the tyranny of the Sublime Porte, yet the autonomy which the island enjoys is considerably less liberal than that granted by the Powers to Crete in 1898. The Governor, who is known as the Prince of Samos and who is always a Christian, is appointed by the Sultan. The island is subject to a tribute to Turkey amounting to about £2,700 per year.

result of Bulgarian neutrality during the Græco-Turkish War, that the Exarchate gained three extra dioceses in Macedonia. When we consider the feelings of the great majority of the people of Bulgaria, it seems hardly likely that King Ferdinand would again be willing to remain a peaceful spectator of a war between Turkey and Greece unless he was assured of some real and important compensation for so doing. Under the circumstances which have existed since 1909, therefore, it is more than probable, had a favourable occasion arisen, that King Ferdinand and his advisers would not have been slow to try to increase the sphere of Bulgarian influence, even if they had failed finally to settle the Macedonian Question to their own advantage. Henceforth, in case of hostilities between Turkey and Greece the part which Bulgaria will be able to play must largely depend upon the nature of the reported agreement between Turkey and Roumania. How far this convention, if it really exists at all, will paralyse the future actions of Bulgaria must depend largely upon how effectively King Ferdinand can carry out this policy of balancing the Dual Monarchy against Russia, and also to what extent Russia can and will protect her "adopted child" in the Balkans.

During the period which has intervened since Crete was occupied by the Powers in 1898 it appears to have been part of the Hellenic programme to exploit the Island for the benefit of a small section of the Greek community. Had the Government of Prince George been more successful, it is safe to assume that Crete would now form an intrinsic part of the Hellenic Kingdom. At the time of the arrival of Prince George in Crete the people might almost be said to have idolised a Greek prince. The Cretans, who at first believed that in the person of his Royal Highness they already saw the outward sign of the realisation of their great national aspiration, soon found that they had been

deceived. In spite of the provisions laid down in the Constitution that public posts should be reserved for natives of the Island, Prince George not only surrounded himself with Greek officials and loitering courtiers, but also took a personal part in the political struggles of the Islanders. Not content even with the autocratic powers with which he was endowed by law, such was the spirit in which Prince George carried out the mandate of the Powers, that although he drew a salary of £8,000 a year, his Royal Highness compared his life to the exile of Napoleon in St. Helena. Although the Prince was undoubtedly surrounded by many difficulties, and although he certainly did something to bring about the efficient organisation of the militia, yet the administration of the Island during his tenure of office need not have been carried out in such an unsatisfactory manner that an ever-increasing discontent arose among the inhabitants, and an almost ceaseless rebellion continued in the Island.

Since the evacuation of Crete by the international troops two important crises have arisen in the Island. In both cases the Cretans have certainly been foolish in incurring the displeasure of the Protecting Powers on whom their future status must so largely depend. Immediately after the departure of the last foreign contingent from Canea, the Cretans hoisted the Greek flag on the ancient fort which flanks the entrance to the harbour of that town. Although, owing to the fact that about 1,000 Greek flags had then already been hoisted and are still flying in the Island, this act of Cretan "insubordination" could have had little real importance for Turkey, yet as a result of the protests and threats of the Ottoman Government each of the Protecting Powers sent two warships to Canea to remove the offending emblem. The flagstaff was actually hewn down on August 18th, 1909, by contingents landed from the international fleet to represent each of the four Pro-

tecting Powers. Although there is no doubt that from their own point of view it was bad policy on the part of the Cretans to refuse to remove the flag themselves, yet such was the feeling in Canea, that in spite of the better counsel of M. Venezelos and of others among the more moderate local politicians, it was impossible for the Island Government to issue instructions for the flag to be removed.

A second instance of what was certainly Cretan folly occurred when the Chamber reassembled early in May, 1910. The Assembly having been opened in the name of the King of Greece, as on several former occasions the Christian deputies (about fifty-seven in number) took the oath of allegiance to King George. The Moslem deputies (who number about eight) immediately handed in a written protest, which was certainly most immoderate in its text and which there is reason to suppose was not framed at Canea, but drawn up by certain Chauvinistic Turkish politicians at Salonika. Subsequently a Moslem deputy was about to lay a second protest before the Chamber when the document was seized and torn up by one Christian member whilst another struck the Moslem politician in the face. As a result of this scene the two Christian offenders were suspended. Although there can be no excuse to merit the subsequent exclusion of the Moslem deputies from the Cretan Chamber, yet it seems probable that M. Venezelos, faced with the alternative of either risking a breach of the peace in the Island or of preventing the Mohammedan deputies from taking part in the debates in the Chamber unless they agreed to take the oath of allegiance to the King of Greece, decided to adopt the lesser of the two evils. Notwithstanding the fact that the result of such a measure was obvious from the first, yet the President of the Chamber, by at least attempting to pander to what was undoubtedly Cretan hot-headedness, probably gained support in the

Island which otherwise he would hardly have secured. As soon as it became clear to the Protecting Powers that the Cretans would not admit the Moslem deputies to the Chamber unless they were compelled to do so, ships were despatched to Canea. In face of a European demonstration and in order to prevent the Custom House at Canea from being occupied by representative detachments of the Great Powers, on July 9th the Cretan Assembly voted in favour of the unconditional admission of the Moslems to the debates of the Cretan Assembly. Whatever the Powers have or have not done since they first occupied the Island in 1898, they have always promised to protect the rights and property of the Moslem minority, and therefore for the Islanders to take it upon themselves to interfere with the carrying out of these promises could only have as a result what has, in fact, occurred.

It is natural that the Young Turks, by pressing for an early settlement of the Cretan Question, should attempt to avail themselves of the opportunities granted to them, not only by the undecided attitude of the Concert of Europe, but also by the former inertness of the Athenian rulers and the inefficiency of the Greek Army. At the present moment some of the simplest details of the Régime, now said to be in force in Crete, remain undefined. It would be difficult to meet any European statesman who could explain exactly the meaning of the *status quo* in the Island. Does the *status quo*, which the Powers have promised to maintain mean the *status quo* which existed before or after October, 1908? Moreover, is the *status quo* conditional upon the number of Greek flags floating in Crete? Does the Island now possess, too, a High Commissioner of the Powers? M. Zaïmis proceeded on leave of absence to Athens on October 3rd, 1908, before the Cretan declaration of union with Greece, and has neither returned nor been replaced.

IX

THE MILITARY REVOLUTION IN GREECE

Causes of the revolution—The Military League—The Government of M. Mavromichalis—Programme of the League—Attitude of M. Theotokis and of M. Rallis towards the League—Want of moderation on the part of the members of the League—Formation of a Cabinet d'Affaires under M. Dragoumis—Proposed changes in the Constitution—The First Grand National Assembly of 1910.

WHEN we consider the governmental system of all Balkan countries in comparison with those of Great Britain, the United States of America, or, in fact, almost any great Western Power, they are but vaguely constitutional. Recent events and revelations will have proved to my readers that although the Greek Government may have been somewhat more constitutional than those of some of the neighbouring countries, yet the internal state of the country undoubtedly left much to be desired. The causes of the so-called military revolution, which, as we know, actually took place during the closing days of August, 1909, may conveniently be grouped under two headings :

1. Things which appertain to the interior affairs of the State.
2. Things which relate to the external politics of the country, and which are sometimes a consequence of those classified under the first division.

For many years in Greece politics have been made use of by those taking part in them, either to advance their own interests or to further the advantages of their

friends. The Hellenic deputies who are elected to represent the interests of the people, in many cases for purely personal reasons, have hindered their respective parties when these parties should have endeavoured to carry out far-reaching reforms. Party leaders have constantly played for their own advancement instead of for the welfare of the nation. Government officials have been for the most part changed as each new party entered upon its term of office. The Army and the Navy have been pitifully neglected, and the money which has been voted to increase the efficiency of these services has either been devoted to other purposes or else wasted. The projects for new laws dealing with Army reorganisation have been pigeon-holed, and often not heard of again for years.

The people of Greece felt that the unpreparedness of the Army, undoubtedly the most important of the two defensive forces of the country, was to some extent due to the privileged position held by the princes of the blood royal. In August, 1909, the Crown Prince still held the appointment of Commander-in-Chief, whilst Princes Nicholas, Andrew, and Christopher occupied peculiarly advantageous appointments in the Greek Army. During the critical period through which the Greek people passed between the revolution in Turkey in July, 1908, and the military upheaval in Athens in August, 1909, it was felt that the Crown Prince should have occupied himself more wholly with his military duties, instead of continuing to move in a narrow clique of society and to live for amusement rather than for work, at a time when every Greek, from the lowest to the highest, ought to have been employed in things which would further the welfare of the State. Although no accusations of extravagance or riotous living are brought against them, the fact that the royal princes spent much of their time in going about, not always amongst the leading members of Athenian

society, but rather in associating with the richest inhabitants of the country, was much resented by the population in general and more especially by the Army, who naturally considered that they suffered in consequence. Even their Majesties the King and Queen did not escape criticism from the Young Greeks.

In spite of the feelings of resentment which existed amongst the majority of the population against the conduct of the royal princes, it seems more than probable that, had the King cast in his lot with the party leaders and with the people, and placed himself at the head of what was a popular movement, the League, as voiced by its more violent supporters, would have been overthrown, and the period of uncertainty and anxiety which existed for so many months as a result of the outburst of popular indignation which occurred in August, 1909, might have been considerably shortened.

Notwithstanding the many assertions to the contrary, the strong position really occupied by his Majesty, a position which might from the first have been utilised with great effect, is demonstrated by at least two events which took place during the régime of the Military League. At the end of December, 1909, when Colonel Zorbas proposed to his Majesty that a Cabinet d'Affaires should be summoned, King George resolutely and positively refused even to see the list of names from which the League considered the Ministry might be formed. His Majesty informed Colonel Zorbas at the same time that the then Prime Minister had not even tendered his resignation, and that until he did, he, the King, could not contemplate his successor. Again, early in 1910, when the Military League took upon itself prematurely to announce the fall of M. Mavromichalis' Government in the Press, his Excellency refused to quit office as long as his Majesty required him to remain in power. As a fact, in spite of the protests of the



INFANTRY OF THE GREEK ARMY.

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League, the new Government of M. Dragoumis was not formed for six or seven days.

At a time when an undoubted feeling of discontent was increasing in the country, the fire was suddenly kindled by the renewed complications which arose concerning the Cretan Question. As a direct result of the declaration of Bulgarian independence in October, 1908, the Cretans unanimously proclaimed their union with Greece. Although the condition of the Greek Army was at this time pitiable, yet it seems probable that, had King George and his people been as bold as the Bulgarians were in 1885, and had M. Theotokis (then Prime Minister) determined to disobey the orders of the Great Powers and to accept openly the declaration of the people of Canea, a permanent solution for the Cretan Question would at that time have been arrived at. Another favourable opportunity was allowed to pass unheeded in April, 1909, when at the time of the counter-revolution in Constantinople, and the consequent difficulties in which the Young Turks were placed, it might have been possible for the Greek Government to accept the declaration of union with Greece made by the Cretans. Had this been done, the Greeks, with the excuse of assisting the Young Turks to defray the expense of their march to Constantinople, could have paid a sum of money to Turkey which, although it would really have been a compensation to the Turks for the loss of Crete, need not either have been received as an indemnity by the Turkish Government or have been thought of as such by the more ignorant sections of the Mohammedan population, who now so bitterly oppose any Ministry which shows weakness concerning the Cretan Question. In spite of these two favourable opportunities which occurred, King George and M. Theotokis preferred to have confidence in the benevolence of Europe, and to rely upon the remarks which are said to have been made to his

Majesty by the representative of one of the four Protecting Powers.

Throughout the months which intervened between the Cretan declaration of union with Greece in October, 1908, and the final evacuation of the Island by the military forces of the Great Powers, the Young Turks had wisely contented themselves by placid, formal protests against the actions of the people of Canea. In the meantime, however, the Ottoman Government had settled her outstanding questions with the Austro-Hungarian Government, and with the Tzar of Bulgaria. In addition to the fact of her improved military position, events took place which gave Rifaat Pasha, in the name of the Turkish Cabinet, an opportunity of impressing upon the Greek Government, at that time led by M. Rallis, the powerless state in which Greece then found herself.

Whatever might, or might not, have been the possibilities of success which would have awaited any forward policy on the part of the Athenian statesmen in October, 1908, or in April, 1909, it is certain that in August, 1909, the only possible attitude to be adopted by the advisers of King George throughout the critical days during which the international fleet lay off Canea was that of tranquil acquiescence with anything that might be decided or advised by the Great Powers of Europe. The Young Turks, fully realising that for them other external complications were for the moment non-existent, and that their own Army had been somewhat improved during a year passed under the New Régime, not unnaturally wished to increase their prestige in the interior of Turkey and consequently made their position of authority unpleasantly felt at Athens. Not only were endeavours made to hold the Greek Government responsible for the events which were then occurring in Crete, but most audacious endeavours were made by the Turks to mix up the Cretan and the

Macedonian Questions in order that, concerning the latter at least, direct negotiations might be entered into between the Sublime Porte and the advisers of King George. This systematic attempt to inflict humiliation upon the Greeks was all but successful, and hostilities would probably have broken out in August, 1909, had it not been for the diplomatic intervention of the European Concert.

These are the factors of foreign policy which naturally led to an outburst of popular indignation against the Government in August, 1909. Although the outbreak actually occurred during M. Rallis' tenure of office, the movement was not in reality directed against any particular Cabinet or any special party leader; it was aimed against the party politicians in general. This attitude of the people is clearly shown by the fact that M. Theotokis and M. Rallis were both, for somewhat different reasons, forced to retire at the will of the people, in the latter case openly supported by the newly-formed Military League.

The greatest difficulty which Greek statesmen have been compelled to encounter and to attempt to overcome throughout the many crises which have taken place in Greece since April, 1909, has been that, owing to the attitude of the Cretan people, it has been impracticable to resort to a General Election. In case of a General Election, if the Cretans decided to send deputies to Athens, then the Greek rulers would be almost powerless to refuse these deputies admittance to the Chamber. Not only would the Cretans domiciled in Greece resent such an insult to their fellow-Islanders, but no Government which adopted this course could hope to withstand the displeasure of a people already so greatly perturbed by the state of political corruption which has already made Greece almost a negligible quantity in Balkan politics. As a result of this difficulty, in April, 1909, when M. Theotokis tendered his

resignation to the King, M. Rallis, after several days' deliberation, considered it impossible for him to form a Ministry without first understanding the views of the people, and therefore refused office rather than risk the external dangers which would undoubtedly have been caused if he had forced on an election. In July, when M. Theotokis actually resigned, knowing that he could not rely upon the Army to support him against a great demonstration which had been arranged to prove the feelings of the people towards the Cretan policy of the Government, M. Rallis only undertook the responsibilities of office on condition that Parliament was to be dissolved.

At this time, although the coming military revolt had not actually made itself apparent to the world, yet the affairs of the State were in a critical condition. Although, therefore, King George had arranged with M. Rallis that a dissolution should take place, it was subsequently found necessary to abandon all idea of elections, owing to the attitude of the Cretan people. It was natural, therefore, as it was impossible for M. Rallis to formulate a programme to be laid before the electorate, that the Cabinet should be greatly weakened, and finally that it should be obliged to resign by the action of the majority of the people, who were compelled to demonstrate their feelings by throwing in their lot with the Military League, instead of taking part in a General Election, and thus openly showing to which party they belonged.

The date of the commencement of the military movement in Greece seems difficult to fix precisely. During May those who were really cognisant of the internal state of the country became aware that something was going on beneath the surface. The exact nature of the movement was, of course, then unknown to any but those actually and intimately connected with it. Up to the last moment the governmental authorities

hastened to affirm that the agitation was of no importance, and that it only represented the ideas of a few unimportant and at the same time junior officers. The actual formation of the Military League, perhaps, dates from just before the fall of M. Theotokis' Government, on July 19th, 1909. The governmental authorities, who had received information concerning a gathering which was about to take place in a certain house in Athens, sent an official to make inquiries as to who was present at this meeting, and with what object it had been convened. This official, instead of making his investigations at the head of a body of troops, proceeded alone to the house where the revolutionary meeting was believed to be taking place. While the owner of the house parleyed with his unwelcome visitor, the guests, who numbered about sixty officers, and who had assembled to discuss their future plans, escaped through another door. When the governmental spy entered the house, he therefore found nothing more unusual than a game of bridge taking place; but he did not realise that the Military League was already a live institution.

The organisation of the Greek Military League, like that of the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress, remains more or less a mystery. The Young Greek officers, full well knowing that the efficiency of the Army had been and still was considered as a thing of but small importance by the Greek statesmen of all political parties, and having as an example the success of the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress, decided to form an organisation somewhat on the same lines as that already existing in the Ottoman Dominions. It is probable that some of the Greek officers, who have undoubtedly so often played a prominent part in Macedonian affairs, and who must, therefore, have been cognisant about, if not actually members of, the Committee of Union and Progress, on their return to Greece

helped to form the Military League. When, however, the Committee of Union and Progress and the Military League are compared, it must be remembered that the former body was composed of and organised by both military and civil members of the Ottoman population, in order to overthrow a despotic and absolute Government of the worst possible nature, and to establish some more liberal form of administration ; whilst the Greek Military League was formed in order to overthrow a nominally constitutional, even if corrupt, Government, and to establish what practically amounted to an absolute Government under the control of a military body.

The League, which was in the first instance supported by the great Greek guilds, and was at once backed up by almost the entire Press, quickly increased its numbers and grew in importance. While at first but 200 officers belonged to this organisation, when I returned to Athens in January, 1910, after an absence of five months, I found that nearly the whole of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the Army had thrown in their lot with the Greek agitators. The control of this organisation was entrusted to a General Committee at Athens. This Committee consisted of General Zorbas and seven or nine officers whose names and military appointments it was difficult to ascertain. As far as I could find out after careful investigation, there were about twelve provincial districts, each of which was organised under a president, assisted by a local council of five or six members. In addition, a branch of the League existed in almost every regiment. The presidents of all the branches were elected by the local members. When any important decision had to be arrived at, each branch was nominally asked whether it agreed with the proposals made by the Central Committee.

General Zorbas is a man possessed of comparatively

moderate ideas. It is said that the revolution would have been more violent had he not been entrusted with the leadership of the League. In a conversation which I had with the General, he hastened to affirm that the military movement was not directed against the Royal Family, but was aimed at the party politicians who had for years misgoverned the country. The General assured me that the Military League, which he said was not even at that time governing the country, but which only submitted its ideas to the Government, would not long continue to use its influence, but was obliged to see its programme carried out. I ventured to intimate that many people thought that as the League had rendered constitutional government impossible, its leaders might have undertaken the responsibilities of power themselves, and in particular that he (the General) could have taken over the duties of either the Prime Minister or Minister of War. To these suggestions the General could give no satisfactory reply. In answer to my questions concerning the extra taxation which would be put upon the country, in order to enable the Government to carry out the programme of the League, the General asserted that the people could sustain the extra burden.

After the Military League began to exert its power openly at the end of August, the Greek Constitution became absolutely non-existent in anything but name. I have already explained the reasons which led to the fall of M. Theotokis in July. As a result of the representations made by the Military League, M. Rallis, who had then been in power for only a little over a month, was compelled to sanction the meeting of the Chamber during September. Not content with this concession on the part of the Premier, the Young Greeks, as a result of M. Rallis's refusal to receive a memorandum from the League at the hands of three young officers, whom he said had insulted him, organised a great

military demonstration against the Government at Goudi—a hill outside Athens—during the night of August 27th-28th. All the members of the Military League, supported by the greater part of the military garrison of Athens, took part in the demonstration. After endeavouring to make terms with the revolutionaries for some hours, M. Rallis, being unable to accept the programme of the League, and fearing that resistance might cause bloodshed, tendered his resignation to King George.

After the enforced resignation of M. Rallis, the only course which remained open to his Majesty was either to ask General Zorbas to form a Government or to find some politician who would be able and willing to nominate a Ministry which would be under the control of the League. M. Mavromichalis, who was originally a member of the Rallist party, and who possessed only between thirty and forty supporters in the Chamber, undertook the difficult task, during the closing days of August. Although this statesman is often criticised for accepting office under conditions which really rendered his Government little more than an agent of the League, yet it is impossible for patriotic Greeks, and for unbiassed observers, not to understand that M. Mavromichalis, with the support of but a small section of the Chamber, undertook to be the medium whose name preserved the Constitution, largely in order that he might negotiate with the revolutionaries, and effect a compromise with them. Besides, the action of M. Mavromichalis enabled King George to remain in Athens, and, therefore, avoided the disastrous effects for Greece which would undoubtedly have been brought about by any change in the Dynasty, at a juncture when the future of the country hung in the balance, and when the presence of a monarch who, whatever may have been his attitude towards the internal affairs of his country, undoubtedly always had

been, was, and still is, the object of the friendly sentiments of the monarchs of the most important European countries.

The programme of the Military League was issued by the officers in the form of a manifesto to the King, and to the Government, on August 27th. This document asked that radical reforms should be introduced in the administration of the country, and especially that the Army and the Navy should be reorganised in order that Greece might not be subjected to any further humiliations. The League demanded, moreover, that the Crown Prince and the other royal princes should no longer hold their privileged positions in the Army, and that the posts of Ministers of War and of Marine should henceforth be held by a soldier and by a sailor, and not by a civilian as heretofore. In addition, besides other demands of lesser importance, the League insisted that a battleship of not less than 10,000 tons should be purchased by the Government, and that the reserves should be more effectively trained.

In order to cover the expense occasioned by the extra expenditure proposed, the Military League suggested that large economies should be made in the general Budget of the country. In order to effect these economies, the programme of M. Eftaxias (the Minister of Finance), laid before the Chamber in October, 1909, suggested that the expenses of the Ministries of Justice, Finance, and Foreign Affairs should be reduced, that taxes should be better collected, and that plans should be drawn up for exploiting the forests of the country. In addition it was proposed that the lower and middle classes, who had in the past been burdened by taxes upon the necessities of life, should be at least somewhat relieved, and that arrangements should be made for charging the upper classes with the proper proportion of the taxes of the country. The Budget was actually passed by the Cabinet of M. Dragoumis. Although,

according to the estimates—proposed during the autumn—M. Eftaxias considered that the receipts would amount to more than £5,900,000, yet in face of the opposition of the people many of the new duties had to be diminished or repealed altogether, and a consequent reduction in the proposed expenditure of the country had to be effected. It is doubtful, therefore, whether the Budget actually voted, which amounts approximately to £5,589,000, will not, in fact, result in a deficit.

The first act of M. Mavromichalis' Government which accepted office while the garrison of Athens was still at Goudi, was to promise to adopt all the main points contained in the programme of the League, and to pardon the seven officers who had been imprisoned by the previous Government. After M. Mavromichalis had formed his Government, it remained with M. Theotokis, who, with over 100 supporters, led the majority in the Chamber, to settle whether his party should uphold the new Prime Minister or not. M. Theotokis, who was at Corfu at the time of the military outbreak, and who at first threatened to retire from public life and to leave all his followers to vote as they thought best, returned to Athens two days after the opening of the Chamber. After some consideration, M. Theotokis seems to have decided that, on national grounds, as he was forced by one of two evils, the lesser would be to support M. Mavromichalis, and, therefore, he subsequently voted with the Government, which for months existed solely under the auspices of the Military League. Although his Excellency, who in the past had not only been Prime Minister, but also Minister of War, was undoubtedly placed in a very difficult position by being compelled to vote in favour of the suppression of the post of Commander-in-Chief, which he had himself created for the Crown Prince, yet it is difficult to sympathise with the position held



CAVALRY OF THE GREEK ARMY.

by the leader and members of the party constituting the majority of the Assembly, who had had ample time during years of power to take some measures which, by reforming the administration of the country, might have altogether avoided the revolution in Greece.

M. Rallis, a determined statesman of great ability and experience, from the first openly demonstrated his contempt for the submissive Government which was formed under the leadership of M. Mavromichalis. As an alternative to the subservient Government of M. Mavromichalis, as early as October 7th, M. Rallis advocated a Cabinet d'Affaires, made up of non-party politicians, and led by General Zorbas. Apparently with this object in view, but unquestionably acting in opposition to the Government in power, M. Rallis worked consistently throughout the autumn and early winter of 1909-10. Owing, however, to the fact that the League was deficient in competent leaders, and as none of its members knew anything about the affairs of state, these would-be reformers avoided the responsibility of dispensing with the Chamber, and of governing the country with what would have amounted to a military dictatorship.

The only other men whose conduct throughout the movement deserves special mention are M. Dragoumis and Colonel Koumoundouros. M. Dragoumis, who often held the post of Foreign Minister under M. Tricoupis, is at present allied with no political party. Colonel Koumoundouros and M. Dragoumis, who must strike anybody who meets him as obviously a man to lead a country through a period of adversity, and who is one of the most able, far-seeing, and honourable of Greek statesmen, refused to attend the Chamber for months, and consequently have not registered their votes for or against most of the measures which were dictated to it by the Military

League.¹ Whatever might have been the result to the country had the majority of deputies followed the example of M. Dragoumis and of Colonel Koumoundouros, it is impossible not to respect men who openly say that they refuse to assist in furthering matters with which they are known to disagree.

Almost immediately after the formation of a Cabinet by M. Mavromichalis, the League demonstrated its want of moderation by actually attempting to insist on the trial of certain officers who had refused to break their oath of allegiance to the King, and who had been loath to take part in the demonstrations in favour of the Military League. In addition, the Crown Prince and Prince Nicholas, who had actually requested to be placed on the unattached list, and Princes Andrew and Christopher, who had applied for long leave as soon as it was clear that their privileged positions in the Army were against the will of the majority of the people, were practically dismissed from the service by a Bill which was sanctioned by the Chamber almost without discussion. By expelling the royal princes from the service, instead of allowing them to retire quietly, the League inflicted a quite unnecessary indignity upon his Majesty and upon the remainder of the Royal Family.

Although the supporters of the League never lost any opportunity of affirming that M. Mavromichalis was at the head of a constitutional Government, yet his Excellency was on more than one occasion compelled by General Zorbas and his companions to dispense with the services of ministers who were serving under him. At the end of December some most intemperate remarks made in Parliament by M. Lapa-

¹ When I was in Athens early in January, although Parliament had only sat for fifty-four hours, it had passed over 160 laws, mostly without any discussion whatever. On one occasion 23 Bills were disposed of in one hour.

thiotis, then Minister of War, brought about an acute crisis at Athens. In spite of this, the offending Minister was not removed from his office as a result of his immoderate remarks in the Chamber, but M. Mavromichalis was subsequently ordered by General Zorbas to dispense with the War Minister's services at a moment's notice because he (the War Minister) ventured to authorise the publication of an announcement concerning the promotion of certain officers at a time which the League considered was unpropitious. A few days later, on January 11th, the Military League, not content with the dismissal of the Minister of War, actually sent representatives to the Chamber with dictatorial messages to the Prime Minister and to the leaders of the two opposition parties demanding, amongst other things, that Parliament should sit throughout the Christmas holidays, and that certain specific measures should be immediately voted. Not many hours after the Chamber had conceded to these demands the hot-headed officers of the League addressed another order to M. Mavromichalis, insisting that for no adequate reason M. Triantaphyllakos, the Minister of the Interior, should be removed from the Cabinet. The Prime Minister, having refused to consent to the dismissal of his colleague without consulting his supporters, was informed that the retirement of the Minister of the Interior must be effected within twenty-four hours. M. Mavromichalis then tendered his resignation to the King, and was only persuaded to remain in office when his Majesty represented the serious consequences which would undoubtedly have followed the fall of the Ministry under such circumstances.

In marked contrast to the manner in which the royal princes and the members of the Cabinet were treated by the League is the lenient attitude which General Zorbas and his friends took up towards Com-

mander Typaldos and his revolutionary colleagues. Commander Typaldos, a young naval officer, who played an important rôle in the formation of the League, and who took a prominent part in the demonstration at Goudi on August 27th, had always been favourably disposed to more extreme measures on the part of the League. It appears that towards the end of October Typaldos suggested the formation of a Government possessing at least two military members, and that after the rejection of this idea by General Zorbas, the head of the Young Navy movement, who was in command of the torpedo flotilla, formulated the idea that the junior officers of the Navy had resolved to insist on the dismissal of a large number of their seniors. General Zorbas agreed to lay the proposals of Commander Typaldos before the Government, which in its turn undertook to sanction all the more moderate demands of the young naval officers, but refused to allow the reinstatement of Sub-Lieutenant Kokorris, who had been guilty of gross insubordination during the Græco-Turkish War of 1897.

Not content with the concessions which had been promised to his party by the members of the Government, Commander Typaldos renewed his demands at a subsequent meeting of the League, and finally resorted to violence at Salamis on October 29th. Although this so-called battle only lasted about twenty minutes, and although only six men perished in the engagement, yet, unless Typaldos was justified in his action by some circumstance which is unknown to the public, he certainly ought not first to have remained untried for many months, and then to have been granted a free amnesty for himself and his supporters. It is rumoured that Typaldos was thus leniently treated by the Military League because he possessed certain information which a high official of the League feared might become public if a trial were instituted.

Undoubtedly, during the many months of unrest in Greece, various reforms were introduced and a certain number of much needed measures were passed by the Chamber—measures which almost certainly would never have been sanctioned by Parliament, had it not been for the military pressure which was on more than one occasion forcibly brought to bear upon the deputies when they showed signs of retarding the proposals of the League. One of the most important Bills passed under the above circumstances is the law which enlarges the electoral areas of the country, and thus diminishes not only the influence which candidates for election can bring to bear upon their constituents, but also largely frees the deputies from the constant pressure formerly exercised by their constituents. Under the auspices of the League, too, regulations have been made which allot certain days for questions in the Chamber, thereby avoiding considerable delay which has often occurred in administering the affairs of the country.

Whatever may have been the position of the Military League during the earlier days or weeks of the movement, it is certain that the Young Greeks lost a large number of their supporters when the populace realised that many of the reforms promised by the leaders of the movement could only be carried out at the cost of great personal sacrifice to the entire population. The power of the League also decreased, because the Greeks, every one of whom is a politician, not only when a General Election is imminent but throughout the year, expected a great many things to be done in a few weeks which could as a fact only be accomplished after a lapse of years. As time wore on, the breach between the Army and the Navy became wider. However far, too, Commander Typaldos actually voiced the opinion of his colleagues in the maritime service of the Empire, a tendency certainly increased in the Navy after the Battle of Salamis to consider that

this service should be consulted before any momentous decisions were arrived at concerning, not only the naval programme but also the political affairs of the country. The naval officers who were loyal to the League considered that Commander Typaldos should have been properly tried, whilst his supporters believed he should have at once been set free. As I have already said, neither course was fearlessly adopted. The military chiefs were playing the part of amateur statesmen instead of reorganising the Army, whilst the regimental officers were accused on the one hand of meddling in the politics of the country, and on the other of only taking interest in matters which pertained to the reorganisation of the Army. The military zealots themselves sometimes changed their minds and demanded the repeal of measures which they had furiously thrust upon the Government at the point of the bayonet.

When I visited Athens for the second time during the crisis, everything pointed to some change in the government of the country. At first M. Mavromichalis had sympathised with the League. His Excellency even informed me that he thought by means of the support of the League many good laws had been passed which otherwise would never have been sanctioned by the Chamber. As the League became more dictatorial, relations between its leaders and the Government became less cordial, and as time wore on it was obvious that a rupture must occur. Nobody knew what to expect from day to day, or in fact from hour to hour. Everybody was anxiously expectant.

Owing to the fact that the life of the Chamber was legally bound to come to an end early in April, 1910, the Military League, loath to allow M. Mavromichalis to remain in power during the long recess which was rendered necessary by the attitude of the Cretan people, was faced by one of two courses. Either a military dictatorship could be established, or a Ministry

composed of men allied with no political party, but in general sympathy with the League, might be nominated. If the former alternative had been adopted, not only would the position of the King as a constitutional sovereign have been untenable, but, owing to the lack of a strong man to act as a dictator, such a measure would have been doomed to failure.

On January 26th the League decided to secure what they hoped would be a still more subservient Government than that led by M. Mavromichalis. M. Venezelos,¹ the able, skilful, and moderate Cretan politician, was therefore again asked to come to the assistance of the military reformers, and was at the same time authorised by the League to negotiate terms with the various party leaders. M. Venezelos, who actually belongs to an old Athenian family, and is, technically speaking, a Greek subject, consequently proposed that a National Assembly should be convoked which would not only enable the League to retire into the background, but would also possess the advantage of postponing the danger of an ordinary General Election. The party leaders, faced by the disastrous prospects of the continued rule of the League, or of summoning what was under the circumstances a non-constitutional assembly, finally decided to accept the latter alternative, and a Cabinet d'Affaires, composed of many members and nominees of the League (General Zorbas assumed the duties of Minister of War), was therefore formed under the able leadership of M. Dragoumis to carry on the government of the country and to make arrangements for the meeting of the National Assembly.

Although the Constitution of 1864 only allows the alteration of certain of its non-fundamental provisions, after the Chamber, by two-thirds the total number of deputies in two successive parliaments, has voted in

¹ Monsieur Venezelos had been invited by the League to come to Athens in August, 1909.

favour of the convocation of a National Assembly, yet, faced by the two alternatives which I have already mentioned, King George, after due consideration and consultation with the leading Athenian politicians, finally consented to what was undoubtedly a breach of the existing Constitution, and agreed to summon a National Assembly provided the consent of the then existing Parliament was obtained. As a result, therefore, of a vote in the Chamber early in March, 1910, the King read his proclamation to Parliament at its last sitting on March 30th, and on the same day the Military League, in accordance with the condition enforced upon the officers by M. Theotokis, when he agreed to the convocation of a National Assembly, issued a manifesto to the country practically stating, as its work was now complete, and as it was necessary for the officers to resume their military duties, that the League was dissolved, but that nevertheless the Army would remain the custodian of the national honour and prestige.

Although under ordinary circumstances the proposed changes in the Constitution would hardly have merited the convocation of a National Assembly, which, as I have already said, was proposed by M. Venezelos in order to avoid the danger of an ordinary General Election, and at the same time to secure parliamentary government to the country, yet the programme of measures to be laid before this body contains alterations in the Constitution which, if sanctioned, will doubtless be of benefit to the country. The privileges of the Crown are to remain unaltered, but considerable changes are to be introduced in the rules which govern the conduct of the Chamber. The clause in the Constitution which enacts that "the Chamber cannot deliberate or pass a resolution unless half plus one of its members is present" is to be changed, and in future a legal quorum is to consist of one-third of the total number of Members of Parliament. The advent of this change

will greatly facilitate the business of the House, and will render the Government in power much more independent than it has been in the past. Regulations are to be passed forbidding officers of the Army and the Navy to become parliamentary candidates, and depriving soldiers of the right to vote during their period of military service. Public officials are to be guaranteed against the danger of being removed from their offices as each fresh political party takes over the reins of government.

During the summer of 1910 Greek statesmen and politicians were occupied in making preparations for the elections to the National Assembly. These elections, which were carried out in the new electoral areas on August 21st, resulted in the return of 358 deputies. Out of this total, the combined Theotokis-Rallis party possessed 190 representatives, whilst of the remainder, 80 deputies were members of the so-called Independent party, between 35 and 40 were Socialists, and 45 belonged to the Thessalian Agrarian party, who have as the chief plank of their programme the adoption of measures which will be favourable to the tenant rather than the landed proprietor in Thessaly. Five Cretans were elected as deputies. Whilst two of these, M. Venezelos and M. Pologeorges, who are technically Greek subjects, accepted their seats in the Chamber, the remaining three, largely in order to avoid external complications, refused to accept the mandate of their constituencies.

The National Assembly was opened by King George, accompanied by the Crown Prince Constantine, on September 14th. Immediately after the meeting of the Chamber the question was raised as to whether the National Assembly was to be a constituent or a revisionist Assembly. Subsequently the party in favour of a revisionist Assembly secured a small majority in the Chamber, largely owing to the support of M.

Venezelos, who was in favour of this course, not only on account of the dangers which would be connected with the creation of a constituent Assembly, but also because he (M. Venezelos) in originally suggesting a National Assembly, had promised the King, in the name of the Military League, that the National Assembly should only revise the non-fundamental clauses of the Constitution.

When the National Assembly had been open for a month—about the middle of October—M. Dragoumis tendered his resignation to the King, who after some consideration asked M. Venezelos to form a Ministry. The task which this renowned Cretan leader decided to undertake was far from an easy one. Not only was M. Venezelos encountered by the difficulty of carrying on the Government with a personal following of only about eighty deputies, but in view of the manner in which his nomination to office was received in Constantinople, the new Prime Minister was faced by the ever-increasing difficulties of the external situation. After M. Venezelos, who occupied the position of Minister of War and of Marine in his own Cabinet, had been in power but a week, he was left without a quorum in the Chamber at a moment when a vote of confidence in the Government was necessary. As a result of this crisis, which occurred owing to the action of the party leaders and of their supporters, who abstained from voting, the resignation of the Government was tendered by M. Venezelos to King George, who refused to accept it. Subsequently M. Venezelos actually secured a majority in the Chamber on October 25th. In spite of this majority, as the support of many of those who voted for the Government on this occasion could not be counted upon in the future, the King, on the advice of M. Venezelos, decided to dissolve the Assembly. On October 25th, therefore, a Royal Decree was published at Athens dissolving the Revisionary Chamber and fixing

December 11th as the date for the elections for a new Revisionary Chamber, which is to meet on January 21st, 1911.¹

Although at the time of completing these few pages, in which I have endeavoured to give my readers some idea of the military revolution in Greece, the turn which future events are likely to take is far from clear, yet it seems probable that M. Venezelos, acting in conjunction with the King, will be able to vanquish the forces of reaction. Not only does M. Venezelos seem to be supported by a large proportion of the population of Greece, but he appears, by his moderation and by his wisdom, to have gained the confidence of King George. As a result, whatever may have been his original attitude towards the League, his Majesty now seems determined to use his influence in favour of the reform movement in order to effect the downfall of the party leaders for the good of the country in general.

Whether or not the League has been of service to the country, and whether or not the military revolution which began in Greece in August, 1909, has been adroitly and cleverly conducted, are questions of opinion, and matters which only time can really prove. However these things may be, and whatever may be the future effect of the movement, it is quite impossible for any fair-minded man to withhold his sympathy from a people who have been subject to a corrupt government for years, and whose leaders, when opportunities presented themselves, have neglected to realise the greatest of Hellenic national aspirations—an aspiration for which the country foolishly embarked upon a war when no favourable opportunity presented itself—an ideal for which the people have lived for many a decade.

¹ Although at these elections M. Venezelos certainly secured a large majority, the exact number of his supporters will be uncertain until the election of the President of the Chamber.

X

THE GREEK ARMY AND THE CRETAN MILITIA

Terms of service in, and organisation of, the Greek Army prior to 1909
—Re-organisation scheme proposed by the Military League—
Officers of the Greek Army—The Greek Navy—The Cretan
Gendarmerie—The Cretan Militia—The discipline of the Cretan
troops.

I AM not prompted by any political reasons or pro-Greek sentiments to collect my accounts of the Greek Army and of the Cretan troops in the same chapter of this book; I do so simply as a matter of convenience, and because after my visit to Crete I felt the military forces of the Island were so thoroughly Hellenic, that they might well be considered in the same atmosphere as the Army of King George.

The Greek Army.

Since the year 1867, when a law was passed enforcing universal service, various measures have been introduced dealing with the liability to and duration of military training in Greece. Under the old organisation (prior to 1909) military service was nominally compulsory and universal. Liability to serve began at twenty-one and lasted for thirty years. A large number of exemptions were, however, made, many of these being conditional upon the payment of a military tax. In addition as a fact many conscripts did not finish their full period of colour service, in order that the money thus saved might be devoted to the training of men in excess of the annual contingent of recruits. For a like reason during the harvest the Minister of War was authorised to grant furloughs up to half the strength of the Army.

For some time prior to 1909 the Army of Greece has been nominally undergoing a process of reorganisation. A law was passed in 1904 under which the Army was to be remodelled. By this statute, which was laid on one side in 1906, it was arranged amongst other changes that the number of men actually with the colours was to vary at different seasons of the year, and the money thus saved was to be expended in providing a larger number of trained men in case of necessity. Subsequent to 1906, it was not until the advent of the Military League, in August, 1909, that any endeavours were made to introduce reforms into the fighting forces of the country.

Formerly the Greek Army was made up of three divisions, with headquarters respectively at Athens, Larissa, and Missolonghi. Each division was composed of—

1. Two Infantry brigades, each of two regiments.
2. A regiment of Artillery of six batteries.
3. A regiment of Cavalry of six squadrons.
4. One brigade of Engineers.
5. Two battalions of *Evzones* (Light Infantry).

Whilst a regiment of Infantry was made up of three battalions each of four companies, there were six Krupp guns and nine wagons in each battery of Artillery.

Under this organisation it appears that any batteries of mountain artillery which existed were extra-divisional. The Army then possessed a peace strength of nearly 33,000 men, and the numbers actually available for war could not have exceeded 70,000 all told.

As I said before, the reorganisation of the Army had been considered before the Military League came into existence, but few endeavours had really been made to put these good intentions into execution. By the new recruiting regulations every able-bodied Greek has now to enter the Army. The law embodying the new organisation, of which I propose to give a brief outline, had not actually been passed by the Chamber


when I left Athens, but was sanctioned before the dissolution of the Chamber in the spring of 1910.

According to this new law the military service of a Greek is divided as follows: At the age of nineteen a recruit joins the Army. A conscript is in future to spend two years with the colours, after which he will enter the reserve of the active Army, where he will remain for twelve years in the first ban and seven years in the second ban. After being twenty-one years in the active Army the Greek will pass through the two bans of the Territorial forces, in each of which he will spend seven years. There is a scheme to modify the above regulations to some extent by allowing recruits who produce a certificate as to various degrees of efficiency only to serve six, twelve, or eighteen months with the colours. Although from a financial point of view it is apparent that some method of this kind must be found if the system of drawing lots is to be abolished, yet the authorities consider that before any modification can be introduced, many difficulties will have to be overcome in order to institute a satisfactory system of preliminary training, and to make certain that the certificates thus obtained really guarantee that their owners have attained some degree of efficiency.

Under the new organisation the following will be the composition of the Greek Army:

Three divisions, each with headquarters at the same towns as formerly. Each division will, however, be composed of—

1. Three Infantry brigades, each of two regiments.
2. One regiment of Artillery.
3. One battalion of Mountain Artillery.
4. Three battalions of *Evzones* (Light Infantry).
5. One regiment and two squadrons of Cavalry.
6. One battalion of Engineers.
7. Details.



A GREEK MOUNTAIN GUN.

To face p. 267.

In war these three divisions are supposed to expand to six, and consequently would form three Army Corps. The Greek authorities confidently state that after the reorganisation has been completed they will be able to place 200,000 men in the field almost at a moment's notice. Time alone will prove whether this ideal can be realised or not.

Every regiment of infantry is to consist of three or four battalions in case of war. A battalion possesses four companies, each with an approximate peace strength of sixty men and a war establishment of 220 men. The infantry are armed with the Mannlicher-Schönauer rifle of the 1903 pattern, of which weapons there are about 120,000 in the country. The Greeks are making great endeavours to make up for lost time, and the men are being steadily drilled and are carrying out firing practices on the ranges. From the opportunities which were afforded to me during my stay in Athens, it appeared to me that the non-commissioned officers were, relatively speaking, less efficient than their men. The barrack-rooms, each of which is capable of accommodating a company, are clean and orderly.

A regiment of artillery contains nine batteries, each composed of four guns. Sufficient new Schneider-Canet guns, of 7.5 cm. calibre, have been delivered in Greece to rearm thirty-six field batteries. It seems doubtful whether twelve of these batteries will be allotted to each infantry division, or whether nine batteries will be retained to form a separate force of artillery. New barracks have been constructed at Athens to provide accommodation for the twelve batteries which, at any rate provisionally, will be allotted to the Athenian division.

The mountain artillery is to be organised in three battalions. Each battalion will contain six batteries, composed of six 7.5 cm. Schneider-Canet guns, provided with a special barrel invented by a Greek officer. In war a mountain battery will be made up of nearly

200 men and about 150 mules, whilst in peace it will only possess about 60 or 70 men. At the present moment sufficient guns to arm six mountain batteries have actually been delivered in Greece. Owing to the courtesy of Colonel Constantanedes, who was Minister of War at the time of my visit to Athens, I was enabled to inspect the men of both field and mountain batteries who were busily occupied in training. The drill and manner of carrying out the exercises appeared to be good.

The heavy batteries of the Greek Army consist of :

One battery of 17 cm. guns.

” ” ” 15 ” ”

” ” ” 10'5 ” ”

Two batteries of howitzers.

It is said that these batteries, which do not form part of the divisional organisation, and which, in order to effect economies during recent years, have been without either horses or men, are now to be rehorsed and remanned.

A regiment of cavalry is composed of six squadrons, each made up of about 105 men. The cavalry is armed with the Mannlicher-Schönauer carbine of the same model as that used by the infantry. The country is said to possess about 30,000 of these weapons. Although the horses for the cavalry, which are for the most part purchased in Hungary, appear to be in fairly good condition, yet there are not nearly enough animals to horse all the batteries of artillery as well as to provide mounts for all the cavalry in case of mobilisation for war.

The military transport is in bad condition, but a law has recently been passed enabling the Government to impress all horses, wagons, and carts in case of necessity. Each division possesses one company of the Army Medical Corps. In addition to six second-class hospitals, there are four military hospitals of the first-class, two at Athens and one at each of the head-

quarters of the other divisions. The hospital which I visited at Athens, and which contains about 150 beds, was in excellent order. It is under the charge of an English matron, assisted by two or three English sisters.

The manner in which officers are at present recruited for the Army seems to leave much to be desired. The commissioned ranks are filled by young men who have passed through the Military School at Athens, and in certain cases by those who are promoted from the non-commissioned ranks. All officers for the cavalry and artillery and engineers are obliged to pass through a five years' course at the Military School, which usually contains about seventy cadets, and which is entered by boys between the ages of sixteen and eighteen after passing an examination. Many of the present-day infantry officers have been promoted from the ranks after a course at the school for non-commissioned officers. This school, which is in the same building and under the same control as that for the military cadets, accommodates 140 students, who are not allowed to enter this establishment until they have served three years in the Army. After their course of three years' instruction these men become second lieutenants. It is obvious that a dual system of obtaining officers for any army is undesirable ; but it is specially undesirable in a small country which possesses many rich men. As a cadet is obliged to pay about £40 per year to cover the cost of instruction at the Military School and also to be provided with a private allowance in order to enable him to live, it is probable that the officers thus recruited are entirely drawn from the richer branches of society, and it is consequently apparent that there will always be a tendency to maintain a difference between the officers obtained by the two systems.

However patriotic may have been the motives which inspired a large number of Greek officers to bring about the military revolution in Greece, it is safe to

assert that the efficiency of the gentlemen who fill the commissioned ranks of the Greek Army leaves much to be desired. The officers are certainly less efficient than those over whom they are placed. From early morning till late at night the streets and cafés of Athens are filled with officers chatting to one another instead of perfecting their knowledge of the science of war by which alone victories could be achieved should the misfortune of hostilities overtake the country. Whilst in Athens I was afforded a striking opportunity of witnessing the manner in which Greek officers carry out their every-day duties. On the occasion of the fire at the royal palace soldiers were occupied in carrying earth in their great-coats from the palace garden to keep the fire in check. Throughout the evening and far into the night the work was admirably carried out by the men—almost uncontrolled and unaccompanied by their officers, who appeared to prefer to form little groups and play the rôle of interested spectators rather than to assist in checking what was to the country a national calamity.

One of the greatest difficulties to be surmounted by the Greek authorities before the Army can be effectively increased is to obtain a sufficient supply of reserve officers. The reserve of officers is recruited from gentlemen who—

1. Have attained the age limit, and have therefore retired from the active list.
2. Have retired from the Army under ordinary circumstances.
3. Have passed through the school for reserve officers at Corfu, and then served for a year in a regiment.

Prior to the outbreak of the revolution in Greece, the office of Minister of War was a political appointment. At that time it was decided that this post was in future to be held by a military officer, who need not, of necessity, be a member of the Chamber. As

a result of this decision, both in the Cabinets of M. Mavromichalis and of M. Dragoumis, the Minister of War was a soldier. After the meeting of the first National Assembly, however, and subsequent to the resignation of M. Dragoumis, M. Venezelos undertook the duties of Minister of War and of Marine in addition to being Prime Minister. Prior to the advent of the Military League the active Army was under a single Commander-in-Chief, who was appointed by a law passed in 1900. The post, as I have said elsewhere, was occupied by the Crown Prince Constantine, who as Inspector-General of the Army was not only charged with the responsibility of inspecting the whole Army once a year, but also possessed authority over practically all branches of the military forces of the country. Since the abolition of the post of Commander-in-Chief it seems uncertain who has really taken over his duties. It has been arranged that a Council of War, made up of the three generals commanding divisions, should meet to discuss certain military affairs, and it is said that in case of war the senior of these three generals would assume supreme command of the Army.

The manner in which officers are to be obtained for the general staff is at present under consideration. There is no Greek "Staff" College from which suitable candidates can be obtained, and, therefore, the proposed scheme is that after passing an examination in Athens, about thirty officers shall annually be granted leave to proceed abroad. If these men pass their final examinations at a foreign Military School, they will be eligible for the Greek general staff.

To assist in the reorganisation of the Greek Army, the services of eleven French officers have been secured. These gentlemen, three of whom belong to the French General Staff, will probably have arrived in Athens before this book is published. In spite of his treatment by the Military League, it is said that the Crown Prince Constantine will preside over this committee of reform.

It is impossible, without accompanying an army into the field, to form any reliable estimate as to its real value as a fighting machine. The physique of the Greek soldier is good, his appearance is smart, and he possesses the national faculty of being able to assimilate rapidly what it is necessary for him to learn. The unbiassed observer who knows the history of the Græco-Turkish War, and who has already heard some detailed account of the Hellenic Army, cannot fail to be pleasantly surprised by the appearance of the men, by the manner in which drill movements are carried out, and by the condition of the barracks.

Although, undoubtedly, the Greek Army would be no match for the Turkish fighting-machine, and although the Ottoman forces could certainly rapidly swarm across the Greek frontier, it seems probable that the task which they would be obliged to encounter would not be as easily accomplished as it was in 1897. Moreover, in 1897 the Greeks of Macedonia were but little prepared to play their rôle in the war between the country in which they lived and that to which their sympathies were extended. Although since the advent of the Constitution in Turkey but few bands have ravaged the mountain valleys and rugged hilltops of Macedonia, it must not be forgotten that Greek political (revolutionary) organisations probably still exist in the European Provinces of the Sultan, and that their members would only be too pleased to do their utmost to forward what is to them the great cause of Hellenism.

Notwithstanding the fact that Colonel Lapathiotes (then Minister of War) informed the Greek Chamber in October, 1909, that under the new scheme the strength of the active Army would be increased to 216,000, and further that, including the reserves and the National Guard, the country would be able to rely upon the services of 450,000 men, yet it seems hardly possible that Greece can or even could in the near future count upon the services of so large a force in case of war. The most

important advantages gained by the reorganisation will be the increase in size and efficiency of the cadres and the steps which will be taken to ensure the more thorough training of the reserves. In order to bring about these and the other proposed changes it will be necessary to augment the annual military expenditure of the last few years, which amounted to about £650,000, to about £975,000. This extra expense must prove a considerable burden to the taxpayers of Greece. Already, before the reorganisation had been commenced, the civilian element of the public complained that it was unnecessary to spend money upon forming cadres for the reserve regiments of the Army during peace time, when these things could be done after war had broken out !


According, too, to the programme formulated in the manifesto issued by the League at the outbreak of the revolution, the Government was asked to acquire a warship of over 10,000 tons, besides eight destroyers. Arrangements were made during the winter of 1909-10 for the purchase of a ship of just over 10,000 tons from Messrs. Orlando & Company, of Livorno in Italy. This ship is the *George Averoff*, which is a medium-sized armoured cruiser very similar to the Italian cruiser *Pisa* (laid down in 1904) but slightly smaller, slower, and less heavily armed. A new ship of this type, with a life of twenty-five years in her, will probably cost about £700,000. Although this sum has been in part provided by a legacy of £300,000 bequeathed by M. Averoff, a rich Greek, yet the balance will have to be supplied from a loan. The *George Averoff* was launched on March 10th, 1910. This addition to the Greek Navy, which at present consists of three small battleships and some destroyers, would certainly have rendered the maritime forces of Greece superior to those of Turkey had not the Ottoman Government purchased two battleships from Germany. These two ships, which have already reached the

Bosphorus, are, however, probably in themselves a match for the whole Greek fleet, even with the addition of the *George Averoff*, when she actually arrives in Greek waters.

Owing to the exposed state of the Greek frontier, if the country is to rely on defensive measures at all it is undoubtedly necessary to maintain a serviceable, even if only a small, Army. Assuming, therefore, that it is advisable for the Greek Government to increase its military Budget so largely, it is obvious that Turkey is in a position to move four or five steps forward towards perfecting her Navy while Greece can only afford to take one. Although undoubtedly it would be an advantage to the people of Greece, who not only possess so many compatriots domiciled in the islands of the Ægean, but who are also face to face with the complications which surround the Cretan Question, to be able to maintain an efficient Navy, yet as they can never hope to be in a position to force the Dardanelles, it will be wiser for them to realise that they only require a fleet sufficiently powerful to render it dangerous for the Turks to attempt any aggressive naval action, or to endeavour to land troops on the coast of Greece. To continue in the course of endeavouring to provide the necessary funds for an efficient Army and an effective Navy must either reduce the country almost, if not quite, to a state of bankruptcy, or it must bring on a disastrous war to gratify the minds of the people, who would be compelled to submit to taxes in order to support preparations the object of which they were unable to discern.

The Military Forces of Crete.

Until the year 1898 Turkish troops formed the garrison of Crete. It was in that year, as I have explained elsewhere, that the four Protecting Powers occupied the Island with military detachments. During the international occupation of the Island, which lasted about eleven years, national troops have been gradually formed.



GREEK OFFICERS OF THE CRISTAN MUTTA AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE ANCIENT FORT AT CANDIA.

The Cretan military forces are now made up of the gendarmerie and the militia. The gendarmerie was first organised under Italian officers in 1899, soon after Prince George had been nominated as High Commissioner of the Island. However, in December, 1906, after M. Zaïmis had assumed the duties of High Commissioner, these Italian officers were withdrawn, and eight Greek officers took over the control of the gendarmerie. These eight gentlemen were soon joined by four more compatriots, and the gendarmerie was at the same time reorganised. At the present moment there are, in addition to these twelve Greek officers, twenty-nine Cretan officers who have been promoted from the ranks after passing an examination.

The strength of the gendarmerie in the Island is now about 1,200 of all ranks. Out of this total, forty-eight men who are mounted are utilised for escort duty when required. The remainder of the force is divided into five companies, with headquarters at the most important towns in the Island. The physique of the men composing the gendarmerie is excellent. A Cretan who remains in this force for a period varying in length from three to five years, on first joining the gendarmerie actually spends three months at a training establishment at Canea. The course at this school is divided into practical and theoretical instruction. The gendarmes, who are very intelligent people, often speak at least one foreign language. One or two of these men who remained in the fort at Canea after it was occupied by the landing parties from the international fleet in August, 1909, not only worked with, but appeared very soon to understand, the language of the foreign sailors.

The militia is composed of two battalions, one with headquarters at Canea, the other at Candia. This force has been most efficiently organised since 1907, by Greek officers "seconded" from the Hellenic Army. The Greek officers, who number about twenty-six, are assisted by about fifty Greek non-commissioned officers.

All male Cretans are liable to service in the militia between the ages of twenty-one and thirty. About 6,000 young men reach the age of twenty-one every year. The actual period of colour service lasts a year, but a man can be called out for any period indefinite in length (during his liability to service), should the circumstances necessitate such a step being taken.

A battalion, which nominally consists of 500 men, is divided into five companies. The training of each company is carried out by two Greek officers. When I visited Crete in 1909 I found that battalions were above strength, because men had been retained with the colours beyond their period of ordinary training. The battalion which has its headquarters at Canea had actually attained a strength of 950 of all ranks, whilst at the same time the Candia battalion was nearly 700 strong. As it is impossible for obvious reasons to increase the number of Greek officers, the work of these gentlemen has been so magnified that recently it has been very difficult for them to carry out their duties efficiently.

The militia is armed with the Mannlicher-Steyr rifle of the 1907 pattern. It is said that there are 7,000 of these weapons in the Island. (In addition, every peasant has his own rifle or revolver.) The rifle, which is sighted up to 2,000 metres, is reported to have beaten the rifles of all the European contingents (stationed in Crete) in a competition which was held in 1908. The militiamen are taught to look after their arms well, and those which I inspected were in excellent condition. I understand that the Cretan Government possesses about 3,000,000 rounds of ammunition for these rifles. The ordinary uniform worn by the militia is khaki drill jacket and trousers, with knee boots and a peaked cap. Mohammedan recruits, of whom there are no large number, mix in every way with their Christian brothers, but wear a round cap without a peak. For ceremonial purposes a French

grey uniform is provided. A serviceable overcoat is carried across the shoulder like a bandolier. The belts and equipment of the men are good, and a short steel bayonet is carried in a metal scabbard.

Thanks to the courtesy of Major Rosetti (the Greek officer commanding the battalion at Canea), it was possible for me to visit the barracks of the men of that battalion. I have consequently been able to form my own opinion as to the efficiency of the organisation and the thoroughness of the training. The Greek officers are to be congratulated on the result of their work. The men march well, and are extremely smart and clean in appearance. The barrack-rooms, each of which provides accommodation for one company, are all well arranged. The men's kits are placed upon shelves expressly provided for that purpose. So up-to-date are the Greek arrangements, that the non-commissioned officers even occupy separate compartments partitioned off from the barrack-rooms of which they are in charge.

The expense of the gendarmerie and of the militia is said by some of the more advanced politicians of the Island to be too heavy a drain upon the finances of the country. These gentlemen urge that the militia is useless, as with it alone the Island could never be defended against a determined attack by any Foreign Power. From an economical and commercial point of view, these men who say that the money which has been expended upon the equipment and training of the militia should have been used to make roads and railways and to develop the country, are probably right. These people must, however, always remember that according to the diplomatic notes delivered by the Consul-General of the Great Powers to the Cretan Government in March, 1905, and in July, 1906, the organisation of an effective gendarmerie and militia was more or less made a condition which the Cretans were bound to fulfil before the strength of the international military contingents could be reduced and finally withdrawn.

The discipline of the Cretan troops is good, provided they are not ordered to do anything which they feel to be in opposition to their national aspirations. As long as this state of things exists the militia and the gendarmerie, which could, of course, never fight with foreign armies, can be of but little service to the Government. If discipline could be really improved even by the introduction of more Greek or other foreign officers, and if the Cretan Government could consequently rely upon the support of the military forces of the Island to assist in quelling local disturbances, it would enable it (the Government) to enforce orders and measures which every far-seeing man, whatever be his politics, must see would not only be an immediate advantage to the inhabitants of the Island, but which would, in the end, hasten the realisation of that state of things for which every Cretan longs. As a fact, although the majority of the Cretan politicians were in favour of the people of the Island removing the Greek flag which had been placed on the fort at Canea after the departure of the last international contingent during the summer of 1909, the Government then in power was unable to enforce its wishes upon the people, largely because it could not rely upon the support of the military forces of the Island. As a consequence the Government retired, and it was necessary to establish a provisional régime at Canea. Although the offending flag was quietly removed by an international party provided by two warships sent by each of the four Protecting Powers to Canea, yet the incident could not have passed unnoticed, nor will it be easily forgotten by the statesmen of the four Powers who were compelled to make an international demonstration at Canea in order to enforce an order which the people would have done well to obey, even if that obedience had meant to them some sacrifice of personal feeling.

XI

THE INDEPENDENCE OF BULGARIA

A drive across the Bulgarian frontier—Proposed railway from Kumanavo to Grueschevo—The Gueshoff incident—The Bulgarian occupation of the Oriental railways—History of the construction of the Bulgarian section of Oriental railways by Baron Hirsch—Claims made against Bulgaria by the Turkish Government—Details of the arrangement by which Russia acted as the peace preserver between Bulgaria and Turkey—Advantages accruing to Bulgaria owing to her independence—New Railways in Bulgaria—Disadvantages of independence to the country—Some questions still unsettled between Bulgaria and Turkey.

DURING the early days of October, 1908, two most glaring infringements of an international treaty were perpetrated by Austria and by Bulgaria. Whilst the twenty-first article of the Treaty of Berlin defined the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the first and subsequent clauses of the same document laid down the position which Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia were then destined to hold amongst the countries of the Near East. Although the Austrians and Bulgarians both deliberately broke the obligations which they respectively owed to Europe under this Treaty, yet it is certain that those who were responsible for defining the status of the Occupied Provinces in 1878 could hardly have meant to do otherwise than to prepare for the eventual annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, whilst the substitution of the Treaty of Berlin for that of San Stefano was so disadvantageous to Bulgaria that it was natural for her

to endeavour to regain the prestige which she had lost by the abrogation of the treaty signed at San Stefano on March 3rd, 1878.

Since the Bulgarian declaration of independence I have paid two visits to Sofia. Whilst on the first occasion I only had the opportunity of discussing the negotiations which were then in progress between Turkey and Bulgaria, and which at that time threatened to result in an open rupture between the two countries, on the second I was enabled to examine in detail the exact terms on which Prince Ferdinand was recognised as Tsar of the Bulgarians, and to ascertain the relative advantages and disadvantages which will accrue to Bulgaria owing to her declaration of independence. The Bulgarians are certainly to be highly commended for their calm behaviour throughout the crisis. In October, 1908, it would have been easy for the Army of the new Kingdom to have captured Adrianople, if not actually to have reached the very walls of the Turkish capital. Notwithstanding this opportunity of deciding the Macedonian Question once and for all to its own advantage, the Bulgarian Government, rightly or wrongly (in view of the then attitude of the Great Powers towards the Young Turks, I think rightly), determined to endeavour to settle peacefully the differences between itself and the Sublime Porte.

After the main Orient Express route (which enters Bulgaria from Turkey at Mustafa Pasha), perhaps the most important highway from one country to the other is the road from Ushub via Kumanavo and Egri Palanka to Kostendil. It was by this highway that I entered Bulgaria in order to pay my second visit to Sofia since the Bulgarian declaration of independence. Even if the railway which it is proposed should follow this route, and which I shall discuss later on, is never completed, yet if war ever broke out between the two countries, the Ottoman Army could make what would

probably be a flank march from Salonika upon the Bulgarian capital, or the Bulgarians could by this line of advance throw an army into the heart of Macedonia, either with the object of attacking Salonika or rendering assistance to their Ottoman kinsmen domiciled across the frontier.

The first stage of my drive to Kostendil was somewhat wearisome. The fifteen hours spent in traversing the third-rate road from Uskub to Egri Palanka are a day's work rather pleasanter to look back upon than to pass through. The only town of any importance between Uskub and Egri Palanka is Kumanavo. Here the highway by which I travelled into Bulgaria finally bifurcates from the railway and road which follows the valley of the Morava to Nish. Many of the mountains, which are visible from the road, greatly resemble enormous detached sugar-loaf kopjes. Much of the arable ground produces tobacco, whilst the remainder is devoted to the cultivation of maize. The country is sparsely populated, principally by Bulgarians; the name of an occasional village even betrays that its inhabitants are Pomaks (Moslem Bulgarians), who are numerous in certain districts of the Rhodope Balkans.

After passing the night in an extremely dirty hotel in Egri Palanka—a town situated on the side of a hill—I started on the morrow up the gorge-like valley of the River Kriva. This valley is too narrow to admit of any cultivation except at rare intervals. Only now and then, where the rock-like hills recede a few yards, a house or small group of houses, surrounded by a picturesque, ill-kept orchard of plum-trees, is nestled near the river's bank. Having followed the valley for about two hours along one of the worst roads I have ever traversed, my route ascended the mountains by steep zigzags towards the frontier. This mountainous locality, known as the Dévé Baiyir district, forms part of a linking chain between the Rhodope Balkans and

the main Balkan range, and is made up of wood-covered peaks, separated by valleys cloaked with trees, at that time covered with leaves of a rich green colour.

As one gradually mounts the winding road which crosses this range a line of small, whitewashed, turreted houses becomes visible. One of these Turkish look-out stations (each of which accommodates five men) occupies every prominent peak and guards each passable valley. The Bulgarian blockhouses (each of which contains five men) are situated only a few yards distant from the Turkish posts, but, owing to being located slightly below the crest-line, are not visible until the top of the pass is attained. When the road has all but reached the summit of the range it suddenly turns a corner, and the buildings which accommodate the Turkish garrison of twenty-two men become visible. The Bulgarian guard-house, which only contains an officer and nine men, is situated but 100 yards distant from the Turkish barrack. The two sentries face one another upon the road from week's end to week's end. After crossing the frontier the road at once descends into the valley of Kostendil. The village of Grueschevo, which is situated at a distance of about three miles from the frontier, is the present terminus of the railway which runs south-west from Sofia. Here buildings have been put up on a sufficiently extensive plan to accommodate the necessary custom-house officials if this ever becomes a frontier railway-station. A two hours' drive from Grueschevo across the plain brings the traveller to Kostendil—a town which is noted for the quality of its fruit, and which possesses a population of about 12,000 inhabitants.

The route which I have described above may possibly be destined to be followed by the first line that will establish through connection between the Danube and the Adriatic. The distance from Grueschevo to Kumanovo is about fifty miles. No serious engineering



THE GUARD-HOUSES ON THE TURKO-BULGARIAN FRONTIER.

On the left appears the Bulgarian guard-house, whilst on the right are the buildings which accommodate the Turkish frontier garrison.

difficulties exist, and the only portion of the line that will be costly to construct is the tunnel piercing the Dévé Baiyir Mountain. It is obvious if Sofia and Uskub were united by a railway passing through Kostendil that the first great Danube-Adriatic line would probably go by way of Bulgaria instead of by Servia. If the line from the Bulgarian frontier to Kumanavo is ever constructed, the Government of King Ferdinand is anxious that the Danubian line should either abut upon the Adriatic at Durazzo or, preferably, that a railway should be built from Kupruli via Monastir to Avlona. Either of these lines would possess great political importance for the Bulgarians. In times of peace Bulgarian influence in Macedonia would thereby be increased, whilst in the unfortunate event of war a railway would enable an army to be rapidly pushed south-west from the newly created Kingdom into the heart of Macedonia.

The Turks are at present unwilling to build or to allow to be built a line from the frontier via Egri-Palanka to Kumanavo, and as an alternative, for obvious strategical reasons, desire the construction of a railway from Demir Hissar to Djuma Balia by way of the Struma Valley. It seems probable, too, that French influence might be directed in favour of the building of this railway because it would prove an important feeder to the "Salonika Junction" line—the property of a French company—which, passing through Demir Hissar, connects Dédé Agatch with Salonika. In order to unite Djuma Balia with Sofia, the Bulgarians are willing to build a line via Dubnitsa to Kotcharenavo (the Bulgarian frontier village in the Struma Valley), always on condition that the Turks agree to the construction of their section of the great Danube-Adriatic line from the Turko-Bulgarian frontier at least as far as Kumanavo.

It is interesting to note the enormous differences

which become markedly apparent after entering Bulgaria. Even my Moslem driver (who was most orthodox and carefully fulfilled the obligations imposed upon him by his religion) alluded to these differences of his own free will. This man went so far as to show his feelings of partiality for Bulgaria by stating that "where the Government is good all goes well." The Bulgarian road is not only well laid out, but it is maintained in a good state of repair. Carriages may trot along, hardly jolting the traveller any more than he would be on an English country road. The fields are well cultivated. The ground, which much resembles heavy, rich English soil, is made the best use of. Animals of all kinds are contentedly grazing in the pastures, instead of, as in Turkey, being allowed to wander in all directions, thereby trampling down the standing corn or crossing the newly-ploughed fallows. Hay and corn crops are carefully collected in small, round, thatched ricks. The forests are systematically cut, and trees are replanted to replace those removed for sale or every-day use. Since the liberation of the Principality in 1878, the prosperity of the State has gradually increased. The population has steadily become greater, the Bulgarian Army has been effectively organised, numerous railways have been constructed, and the value of the annual exports from the country has advanced by leaps and bounds. Sofia, which in 1878 was hardly more than a collection of mud huts, is now a prosperous modern city. Each village has its national school and the education of the people is improving from day to day. Thus in 1908 Bulgaria had undoubtedly shown herself worthy of occupying a powerful position in the Near East.

The Bulgarians who in 1908 had so entirely thrown off the control of Russia, and who had so greatly increased the prosperity of their country, have always been, and still are, discontented that through the inter-

vention of Europe and the consequent abrogation of the Treaty of San Stefano, they have lost the districts of Pirot and Vrania, which were handed over to Servia. Besides these areas lost to Bulgaria, large portions of the Turkish vilayets of Kossovo, Monastir, Salonika, and Adrianople were returned to Turkey. Under the Treaty of San Stefano, too, Bulgaria would even have possessed her great national ideal—about 100 miles of sea coast, including the port of Kavala on the Ægean. The same arrangement would likewise have included Uskub within the boundaries of the Principality.

I have only enumerated the foregoing well-known historical facts in order to prove that in 1908 King Ferdinand and his people, who fully realised all the difficulties which had been put in the way of the development of a powerful Bulgaria, could hardly have been expected to view with pleasure the possibility of the birth of a strong Ottoman Empire. If such a Turkish ideal were once realised, it was immediately apparent to every Bulgarian that not only would all hope of the restoration of the Treaty of San Stefano be dashed to the ground, but that the possibility of claiming the long looked forward to independence would be put off, if not for ever laid on one side. In spite, however, of the undoubted misgivings which must from the first have been prevalent in Bulgaria, the people viewed the Turkish revolution with that calmness and dignity which not only constitute the very spirit of the nation, but which have played so prominent a part in bringing the country to that position of importance which it holds in the Balkan Peninsula to-day.

During the month of September, 1908, the actual and future status of Bulgaria was opened to discussion by the Gueshoff incident. The omission to invite M. Gueshoff—the Bulgarian Diplomatic Agent then accredited to the Sublime Porte—to a diplomatic entertainment at Constantinople must either have been a

mistake on the part of the Turkish Foreign Minister, or else a wilful insult to the Bulgarian people perpetrated in order to show them the position which a vassal Bulgaria was destined to hold under the Ottoman Empire when governed by the Young Turks. Although this omission to invite M. Gueshoff to a mere social entertainment was in itself of but little importance, yet as the Sublime Porte justified its omission by informing the Bulgarians that only the representatives of "Sovereign" States were in future to be included in diplomatic banquets—a rule of etiquette which in the past had never been enforced at Constantinople—it was not unnatural that the Bulgarians should make arrangements to resort to the strongest measures in order to demonstrate to Europe their displeasure at the introduction of what was to them a direct infringement of their national prestige.

The next step in the direction of independence was taken when, as a result of a strike among the employees of the Oriental Railway Company, the Bulgarians occupied those sections of that Company's line which were within the frontiers of Eastern Roumelia, and which were not already administered by the Bulgarian Government. Whatever excuses could be urged in support of the temporary occupation of the line during the strike, as soon as the employees of the Company were willing to resume work, the Government was faced by the choice of either deciding to persist in retaining possession of the line—a course which practically amounted to an assertion of national independence—or of withdrawing its officials from the railway over which, on more than one previous occasion, the Bulgarians had been anxious to gain control. The former alternative was adopted. This act of robbery—for even if committed for the advantage of the State, robbery it was—was defended by the Bulgarians on the ground that the occupation of the line was necessary,



BULGARIAN PEASANTS RETURNING FROM MARKET.

not only in order to render them more able to defend themselves in case of war, but also in the general interest of the country, whose inhabitants had already shown an aptitude for improving the conditions under which they lived. Although the Bulgarians may have been foolish in seizing the line before they formally declared their independence, yet when the final decision was taken to maintain control over the railway, the Government at once undertook to safeguard the interests of the Company and to enter into negotiations as to the amount of money payable for the railway thus forcibly taken over.

As a result of a Cabinet Council held at Rustchuk during the night of October 4th-5th, the actual declaration of Bulgarian independence was made by King Ferdinand at Tirnovo, the ancient capital of Bulgaria, on October 5th, 1908. Prior to this declaration, whether or not any formal agreement had been arrived at between the Austro-Hungarian Government and Prince Ferdinand concerning the annexation of the then only "occupied" provinces and the declaration of Bulgarian independence cannot even now be decided with any degree of certainty. However this may be, and however vehemently both the parties who tore up the Treaty of Berlin in October, 1908, may deny that any arrangement was made, it is certain that when Prince Ferdinand arrived at Buda Pesth on September 23rd, he was received by the Emperor Francis Joseph with royal honours. There is no doubt, too, that the proclamation of Bulgarian independence at an early date was actually decided upon by Prince Ferdinand during his visit to Vienna at the end of September. The question whether, and if so when, Count Aerenthal was actually officially informed of the Bulgarian programme is extremely delicate. Although, on October 3rd the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister officially denied to the British Ambassador at Vienna

all knowledge of the impending declaration of Bulgarian independence, yet the Ambassador of the Dual Monarchy in Paris, when presenting the letter announcing the forthcoming annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to President Fallières on October 3rd, actually informed his Excellency of the imminent declaration of Bulgarian independence. Whatever may have been the knowledge officially possessed by the Austro-Hungarian Government as to the imminence of the Bulgarian declaration of independence, it is possible that Prince Ferdinand, probably even in possession of Austro-Hungarian assurances that a declaration of independence would subsequently be permitted, if the Bulgarian people remained calm during what were expected would only be formalities concerning the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, may not unwisely have considered it advisable to make good his opportunity, and effect his national *coup d'état*, while the statesmen of the Dual Monarchy were still putting the finishing touches upon their arrangements for the formal annexation of the already "occupied" provinces.

Before entering upon a discussion concerning the various phases of the negotiations which took place with regard to the terms on which Bulgarian independence was to be recognised, not only by Turkey, but by the Great Powers of Europe, I propose to describe very briefly the manner in which the disputed railways were originally constructed, and also to explain the complex nature of the problems which had to be solved before the 310 kilometres of railway—built under the arrangements described below—could finally be acquired by Bulgaria. Although, too, the railway which was originally constructed in Turkish territory—territory which for all practical purposes passed into the hands of Bulgaria in 1885 as a result of the revolution of Philippopolis—was still the property of the Ottoman

Government, yet the capital with which the line had actually been built and the Company by which it was and had been exploited were foreign. The Bulgarians were consequently beset by the difficulty of compensating Turkey for her proprietary rights in the railway and at the same time of making good the loss of the Company, which held a concession to work the line for a given number of years.

It was in 1869 that Baron Hirsch originally succeeded in obtaining a concession to build certain railways in Turkey. Amongst other important lines contracted for under this arrangement was the one which passes through Adrianople, and thus connects Constantinople with Bellova in Bulgaria. A contract was at the same time made for the branch from Tirnova Semenli to Yamboli. In payment for the work which he was to carry out, Baron Hirsch received from the Turkish Government an annual rent which he subsequently capitalised in order to obtain the actual money with which to undertake the work of construction. The interest on the bonds which were afterwards issued by Baron Hirsch was guaranteed by the Turkish Government.

When the line was completed, Baron Hirsch entered into a formal agreement with the Sublime Porte by which he was to form a company or syndicate to work the line on behalf of the Turkish Government under a concession at that time granted for fifty but subsequently prolonged to ninety years. The arrangement originally made between the lessees of the line (the Oriental Railway Company) and the proprietors (the Ottoman Government) was that the Company, in order to cover working expenses, was to have all the receipts until a certain sum was reached. The annual receipts in excess of the sum fixed for working expenses was to be divided between the Company and the Ottoman Government.

The section of railway—forty-six kilometres in length, —which connects Bellova with Vakarel, likewise destined to be affected by the Bulgarian declaration of independence, was also built under the auspices of the Turkish Government. Notwithstanding the fact that arrangements for building this line had been made before the union of Eastern Roumelia with Bulgaria in 1885, the work of construction was not actually completed until Northern and Southern Bulgaria were for all practical purposes one country. It was in 1888 that this line was seized by the Bulgarians, who exploited it without any arrangement with Turkey until 1894, in which year a convention was signed between the two countries under which Turkey authorised Bulgaria to work the railway for a period of ten years in exchange for an annual rent of about 104,000 francs. In the same year the Bulgarian State entered into an arrangement with the Sublime Porte to work the small section of line from Bellova to Sarambey. Although the convention dealing with the Bellova-Vakarel line was supposed to terminate in 1904, it, in fact, continued in force until the Bulgarian declaration of independence in 1908.

From the moment of the declaration of her independence Bulgaria was willing to compensate Turkey and those interested in the railway for all material losses which they had suffered or would suffer, but she was not willing to pay anything for damage which she considered Turkey had not really sustained. After some delay, therefore, M. Dimitrof—the well-known Councillor of the Bulgarian Foreign Office—proceeded to Constantinople to find out whether the Sublime Porte was willing to entertain a reasonable offer in order to ensure the maintenance of peace. Subsequently a small governmental mission, headed by M. Liaptchef—Minister of Commerce—left Bulgaria for Constantinople in order to discuss formal terms. The

negotiations which were in progress during the winter of 1908-9 were mainly directed with the object of determining, (1) whether Bulgaria was to take over part of the Turkish National Debt, and whether she should pay a lump sum in order to capitalise a tribute nominally due to Turkey for the Principality of Bulgaria; (2) the proper sum to be paid as the capitalisation of the annual tribute paid for Eastern Roumelia; (3) the amount to be paid for the section of the Oriental Railway taken over by the Bulgarian Government; (4) the sum of money to be paid by Bulgaria in lieu of certain *vakoufs*, or tithes, which the Turks asserted that they had a right to collect in Bulgaria.

According to the Treaty of Berlin, the annual tribute payable to Turkey for the Principality of Bulgaria, and the share of the Ottoman debt to be taken over by that State should have been fixed by an agreement between the Powers signatory of that treaty. Moreover, these financial arrangements should have been made at the close of the first year of the working of the new organisation laid down in the Treaty of Berlin. In spite of the distinct phraseology of this international document, and although at the time of the declaration of Bulgarian independence about thirty years had elapsed, neither of the above-mentioned sums had ever been fixed, and no commission had even been assembled to decide their amount. As no tribute had, therefore, been paid by the Principality of Bulgaria, and as no share of the Ottoman debt had ever been allotted to that State, in spite of the claims put forward by Turkey and her supporters, it cannot be wondered at that the Bulgarians refused to capitalise annual payments which they had never made.

The second claim made by the Turkish Government was the capitalisation of the tribute for Eastern Roumelia. In lieu of this tribute, which roughly

amounted to 2,925,000 francs annually, Bulgaria offered to pay a sum of 40,000,000 francs. In addition the Government of the newly-created State agreed to undertake a special debt (amounting to about 28,000,000 francs), due to Russia for the temporary occupation of Eastern Roumelia by Russian troops directly after the signature of the Treaty of Berlin.

The third point which was open to discussion between Turkey and Bulgaria, as a result of the independence of the latter country, was the amount to be paid for the section of the Oriental Railway which lay within the boundaries of Eastern Roumelia. Throughout the negotiations which were in progress at the time of my visit to Sofia during the winter of 1908-9, the Bulgarian Government was willing to pay either what the line cost to construct or a sum sufficient to bring in an income equal to the profits of the line. The annual revenue of the railway was about 2,000,000 francs. The Bulgarians offered to capitalise this by paying to the Turks 40,000,000 francs, which at 5 per cent. brings in 2,000,000 francs per year. A further 2,000,000 francs was offered for the line from Bellova to Vakarel, which, as I have already said, in addition to the section from Bellova to Serambey, had in the past been worked by the Bulgarian Government. Throughout the winter the Company, backed up by the Turkish Government, or perhaps the Turkish Government supported by the Governments whose subjects were shareholders possessing a financial interest in the line, were not content with these offers. Amongst other things, those interested in the line claimed that as the receipts were wont to increase every year, the amount to be paid by Bulgaria should have been calculated on the possible income of the railway at some future date. Although, in view of the ninety years' concession under which the railway was being exploited, under some circumstances this might have



A BULGARIAN INFANTRYMAN.

been a reasonable claim, yet in this case it could carry no weight, as the Bulgarian Government always had the right to construct through Eastern Roumelia a parallel line to that owned by the Oriental Railway Company. As a result of this right possessed by Bulgaria, when the construction of this opposition line was threatened and, in fact, actually begun in 1897, the Turkish Government offered to sell their line for a sum vastly less than that offered by Bulgaria during the winter of 1908-9.

The question of the *vakoufs* was always regarded at Sofia as comparatively insignificant, and one which could easily be settled by negotiation between Bulgaria and Turkey when the main outlines of the agreement between the two countries had been arrived at.

By the end of 1908 Bulgaria had already offered to pay 82,000,000 francs to Turkey as a recompense for the losses sustained by the Ottoman Government. Although this sum, as I have already shown, practically compensated Turkey for all material losses which she had sustained, it did not cover the moral disadvantages which the Ottoman Government said would accrue to the Empire owing to the discontinuance of its suzerainty over the Principality of Bulgaria, and owing to the changed status of the province of Eastern Roumelia. As a matter of fact, to cover the total damage which she considered she had sustained, Turkey claimed from Bulgaria the sum of 125,000,000 francs.

Early in February, 1909, when the negotiations between Bulgaria and Turkey had reached a deadlock, and when, to those who were cognisant of the facts, it seemed difficult to see how war could well be averted, Russia suddenly intervened, and in the interest of preserving the peace of Europe, addressed a circular note to the Great Powers signifying her willingness to come to some arrangement with Bulgaria and Turkey, which would make good to Turkey the difference

between the 82,000,000 francs tendered by Bulgaria and the 125,000,000 francs claimed by the Ottoman Government. In order to effect this object, Russia proposed to cancel enough of the then remaining seventy-four annuities due to her from Turkey, in respect of the war indemnity fixed by the Convention signed at Constantinople on May 14th, 1882, and to collect from Bulgaria the 82,000,000 francs which she had already offered to Turkey in payment of the claims put forward by the Ottoman Government. Whilst this proposal was designed to empower Turkey to borrow the sum (125,000,000 francs) which she claimed from Bulgaria, as I shall explain below, it also possessed the advantage of enabling the Bulgarians to meet their liabilities on easier terms than could otherwise have been the case.

After some negotiations as to the exact stipulations which were to be entered into, an agreement was finally signed between Turkey and Russia at St. Petersburg on March 16th, 1909, by which Russia definitely gave up forty of the seventy-four still remaining annuities of the war indemnity. As Turkey had paid all the annuities up to December, 1908, this renunciation took effect from January 1st, 1909. At the same time, too, Russia agreed to allow Turkey, should she decide to do so before July 1st, 1909, to capitalise the thirty-four annuities remaining over and above the forty abandoned annuities. If this course were followed by Turkey, which it was not, the present value of these annuities was to be calculated at 4 per cent. As it was not adopted, Turkey possesses the right to capitalise the thirty-four remaining indemnities at the end of the fortieth year, under arrangements to be made between Turkey and Russia—arrangements which are to depend upon the then rate of the credit of the Ottoman Empire.

By the above agreement between Russia and Turkey it was also stipulated that the 125,000,000 francs should

be distributed as follows : 40,000,000 francs as the capitalisation of the annual tribute for Eastern Roumelia ; 40,000,000 francs in compensation for the loss of the railway of which Bulgaria had taken possession ; 2,000,000 francs as the value of the line from Bellova to Vakarel ; and the balance, 43,000,000 francs, to cover the expense of repurchasing the " Domaines " of the Ottoman State. A stipulation was also made in the agreement that the direct claims which the Oriental Company had made against Bulgaria, both in respect of the rolling stock seized and of the daily indemnity due to the Company between the occupation of the line and the date of the signature of the Turko-Bulgarian agreement, should be met by a direct payment made by Bulgaria. This stipulation also applied to certain Turkish claims in respect of the *vakoufs*, interest on the Eastern Roumelian tribute, and sundry details which M. Liaptcheff, during his negotiations at Constantinople, had agreed to leave outside the main features of the agreement to be made between Bulgaria and Turkey.

As a result of this arrangement, Bulgaria undertook to pay to Russia the 82,000,000 francs which she had already offered to Turkey in exchange for the losses suffered by the Ottoman Government. Instead, however, of this sum being given to Russia all at one time, it was agreed between the Governments of St. Petersburg and of Sofia that payment might be spread over a period of seventy-five years, by means of an annuity amounting to 4,020,000 francs, which was to cover the interest upon and a sinking fund for the 82,000,000 francs. This adjustment of the Turkish claim against Bulgaria possessed the dual advantage of empowering the new-born Kingdom to meet her liabilities on easy terms, and also of enabling Bulgaria to secure the recognition of her independence in exchange for what amounted to the payment of the actual sum which she

had already offered to Turkey. Had King Ferdinand and his Ministers been compelled to borrow a large sum of money to pay off the 82,000,000 francs offered to Turkey, instead of simply increasing the annual Budget of Bulgaria by 4,020,000 francs, it would not only have prevented them from subsequently obtaining the loan of £4,000,000 on the advantageous terms which they actually secured in December, 1909, but it would certainly, ere this, have necessitated the establishment of some form of foreign control over the finances of Bulgaria.

Although for the moment, at any rate materially speaking, Russia is certainly the loser by this arrangement—for forty years she is to receive an annual payment of 4,020,000 francs from Bulgaria, instead of, roughly, 7,950,000 francs from Turkey—yet for thirty-four out of the remaining thirty-five years over which the Bulgarian liability will still extend Russia will receive, in addition to the Bulgarian 4,020,000 francs, either the annual payment by Turkey of nearly 7,950,000 francs or a lump sum in lieu thereof. Again, even if Russia did materially lose something by her agreement with Turkey and with Bulgaria, yet she certainly gained credit in the arena of European politics by being the means of preventing an outbreak of hostilities in the Near East. At a moment, too, when it seemed possible that the attitude of Russia towards the political future of one group of southern Slavs—the Servians, Montenegrins, and Bosniaks—might bring the Cabinet into disfavour in the country itself, intervention on behalf of Bulgaria—a State originally created by Russian support—helped to re-establish the prestige so much required by the Government of the Tsar.

In order to fulfil the terms of the arrangement made between Turkey and Russia on March 16th, an agreement was signed at Constantinople on April 19th, by the representatives of the Sublime Porte and of the

Tsar of the Bulgarians. It was by this document that the new political status of Bulgaria was officially recognised by the Ottoman Government, and it was by this agreement that the amounts of the various sums due direct from Bulgaria to Turkey were definitely decided. In exchange for the formal recognition of national independence, the Bulgarian Government undertook to pay to Turkey, within fifteen days, 110,000 francs for post-office stock, 180,307 francs for light-houses situated in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, which in the past had been administered under a concession originally granted by the Turks to a French company, and approximately 9,680 francs for certain sanitary and quarantine buildings owned by the Turks at the ports of Varna and of Bourgas. In addition to these items, the Bulgarians at the same time agreed to pay interest from October, 1908, to April, 1909, on the 40,000,000 francs paid to Russia as the capitalisation of the tribute for Eastern Roumelia, and to accede to certain claims made on behalf of the Oriental Railway Company for losses sustained between 1908 and 1909.

When the independence of Bulgaria was recognised by Turkey, arrangements were made in order to secure the satisfactory treatment of Moslems still residing in the dominions of King Ferdinand. It was agreed, not only that the name of the Sultan—as Caliph—was still to be mentioned in the public prayers at the mosques, but that a Mufti-in-Chief should reside at the capital, to act as an intermediary between the Muftis of Bulgaria and the Minister of Public Works at Sofia. This Mufti-in-Chief was not only authorised to inspect Moslem schools and to make arrangements for the creation of educational establishments in places where they did not then exist, but it was settled by the Turko-Bulgarian agreement that a sufficient sum was to continue to be allotted out of the Bulgarian Budget for the purpose

of keeping up the Moslem schools and the mosques in Bulgaria. Moslem places of worship are not to be demolished except in case of national necessity, and only then after a piece of land has been given and when a sum of money has been provided with which to replace the demolished building.

In the limited space which I have devoted to the subject I have endeavoured, firstly, to show very briefly the state of Bulgaria at the time of her declaration of independence, and, secondly, to explain the terms on which the recognition of that independence was secured by the advisers of King Ferdinand. In the following few pages of this chapter I hope to be able to describe, and to discuss, some of the advantages and disadvantages which have accrued to Bulgaria as a result of her independence, and then to mention a few of the outstanding questions which have still to be decided between Bulgaria and Turkey.

During my visit to Sofia, subsequent to the final recognition of the new status of Bulgaria, I had the opportunity of discussing the affairs of the State with those men who know what has happened, and who can therefore judge what have been and will be the probable results of the declaration of independence.

Although this independence has brought about hardly any changes which are noticeable by the passing visitor to the dominions of the new Tsar—perhaps the most apparent is the fact that Bulgarian railway officials and Bulgarian engines take the mail trains as far as Mustafa Pasha (the Turko-Bulgarian frontier), instead of being exchanged for those of the Oriental Railway Company at Serambey—yet men belonging to practically every political party in Bulgaria agree that the declaration of independence on the whole has certainly carried with it advantages to the State. As a result of the formal recognition of Bulgarian independence, there will in future be no question of King

Ferdinand and his advisers being obliged to enter into negotiations with or through Turkey (except as a Foreign Power) concerning any questions which may affect either Northern or Southern Bulgaria. The Tsar of the Bulgarians now being a reigning monarch, his representatives abroad will consequently rank with the representatives of other royal houses. Although, too, for many years the Capitulations have not been a real restriction in the way of carrying out justice in Bulgaria (most of them have not been enforced by the Great Powers), yet it will doubtless be an advantage to the State that they shall be withdrawn altogether. The Bulgarians hold, moreover, that a moral gain of considerable importance is that the authority of a Kingdom will be much greater with all Bulgarians residing abroad than that of a Principality ever was.


Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia are now one kingdom, and are consequently for all purposes on equal terms. Previous to the declaration and recognition of independence, the status of Eastern Roumelia was more or less uncertain. Whatever he may have been in practice, officially the Prince had only been Governor-General of Eastern Roumelia. Although, too, since the revolution of Philippopolis, in 1885, the two divisions of the country have, for all internal affairs, formed one State, yet when entering into negotiations with Turkey or the Great Powers, the Bulgarian Government—at least concerning certain matters—was always faced by the danger of being asked to deal with the two provinces separately. Moreover, in spite of a declaration made by the Sultan that he did not at present intend to garrison the Balkan Range, according to the Treaty of Berlin, Turkey actually possessed the right of providing for the defence of Eastern Roumelia by erecting fortifications and maintaining troops upon the frontiers of that Province.

As a result of their independence, it is held by

Bulgarians that they can now be on better terms with Turkey, as both countries possess equal rights under which to negotiate treaties or to make alliances. Both diplomats and statesmen alike are anxious to explain that the Bulgarian attitude toward the Young Turks is one of intense friendship. This seems to be true, and will probably remain the policy of Bulgaria so long as the Young Turks make any endeavour to carry out the programme which they have undertaken to perform.

The Bulgarian Government now controls all the railways—the possession of which, in addition to all the ordinary direct and indirect advantages accruing thereto, gives the military authorities the power of effecting a rapid mobilisation in any locality where troops are required, either for the purpose of throwing a powerful force on to or across the most vulnerable portions of the frontier. In the past, in addition to the disadvantages of not possessing all the railways of the country, the Bulgarians were always hampered by the fact that the amount of rolling stock permitted to enter the country at Mustafa Pasha was restricted.

The fact that the Bulgarians now possess undisputed control of all the railways in Bulgaria will be a distinct encouragement to the Government to expend money upon the construction of new lines. I have already alluded to the railway which has recently been opened as far as Grueschevo on the Bulgarian frontier. A new line has also been completed which joins Sistova on the Danube to the main route from Sofia to Varna. The first part of the railway which is to cross the Balkans from Tirnovo in Northern Bulgaria to near Eski Zagora in Southern Bulgaria was opened in July, 1910. The opening of this section establishes railway communication between Tirnovo and Platchkovo, a small town just on the north of the Balkan Range. The following lines are also under construction :



THE NEW CATHEDRAL AT SOFIA IN COURSE OF CONSTRUCTION.

To face p. 300.

(1) Mezdera to Widin, with branches to Lom Palanka on the Danube and to Berkovitza. These lines, which have a length of about 300 kilometres, ought to be completed in or before the year 1912. (2) Devna to Dobric, near the coast of the Black Sea. (3) A line from Philippopolis to Tchirpan which will run almost parallel to the main Orient Express route, and which, by uniting Tchirpan with the main line, will thus shorten the journey from Sofia to Varna by about four hours. Both the commercial and strategical advantages of these lines to Bulgaria are obvious to any reader who glances at the map of the Balkan Peninsula. Whilst the railway which is destined to unite Sofia with Widin and Lom Palanka on the Danube will increase the chance of building the long talked of Danube Bridge at one or other of these towns, the line connecting Tirnovo with Eski Zagora will enable troops to be rapidly conveyed from Northern to Southern Bulgaria, or vice versa, without being compelled to pass through Sofia.

Although the Bulgarians have gained, and will gain, many advantages from the recognition of the new status of the Kingdom, yet the declaration of independence will undoubtedly carry with it certain considerable disadvantages. Since January 1st, 1907, a Commercial Treaty—drawn up in amplification of the arrangement entered into in December, 1900—has existed between Bulgaria and Turkey. By this treaty, which it was arranged should remain in force until one of its two signatories should give a year's notice to terminate the agreement, certain articles were allowed to be imported reciprocally into both Turkey and Bulgaria free of duty, whilst other merchandise was only to be subjected to reduced taxation. Bulgarian goods, too, which were being transported to the sea by way of Turkey, whether they were unloaded or not, were not to be subject to any duty. The Bulgarians did not wish to alter this

treaty after the recognition of their independence, but the Turks—perhaps backed up by some of those countries which produce the same things as Turkey or Bulgaria, and which, therefore, object to agreements between these two countries which are detrimental to foreign interests—have given notice to terminate the agreement. During the winter of 1909-10 a considerable amount of correspondence was exchanged between the Government of Sofia and the Sublime Porte as to the date of the termination of the treaty. The Ottoman Government held that the agreement was intended to be automatically terminated one year after the recognition of Bulgarian independence. The Bulgarian Government on its part argued that a year's notice was necessary. As a compromise it was agreed that the commercial arrangement should continue in force until the close of the year 1910.

As the Turks make use of a considerable quantity of Bulgarian produce—produce on which the consumer will probably have to pay the increased import tax if such an increase be enforced—they may not, at present at any rate, wish to make any important alterations in the terms of the treaty. If, however, Asia Minor is ever developed by a satisfactory system of railways, conditions will be changed. Under these circumstances, not only will Bulgaria have to face a powerful competitor in the Constantinople market, but the Turks, not being compelled to consider the disadvantages to the consumer consequent upon an increased tariff, will be able to tax more heavily goods imported from Bulgaria. The Bulgarians will naturally retaliate by raising the import duties upon Turkish goods. Although this method of revenge may be a repayment as far as the Government is concerned, yet it will not refund the individual producer or consumer the losses which he is almost certain to sustain.

As a result of the independence of Bulgaria, the

Budget of the Kingdom will almost certainly have to be increased. It is probable that the country will be called upon to provide its Tsar with a larger Civil List, and extra expense must almost certainly be incurred on account of the increased salaries which will have to be paid to many of the diplomats, and other officials abroad.

In order to realise the relative importance of the advantages and disadvantages of the change brought about in the status of the country, it is necessary to consider the various amounts which Bulgaria has paid, or is still paying, for her independence, and to compare them with the sum of the actual amounts which she paid to Turkey as tribute for Eastern Roumelia, added to the profits which she gains from the railway and other institutions taken over from Turkey. As I have already said, Bulgaria is to pay 4,020,000 francs annually to Russia for seventy-five years. On the other hand, the Bulgarian Government has now either escaped paying annually to Turkey for Eastern Roumelia and for the Vakarel-Bellova line, or receives as a direct income from what she has purchased over 5,350,000 francs. Although the difference between the amount gained and paid by Bulgaria is not clear profit to the Government (certain extras have, as I have said, been paid to Turkey and to Russia), yet, as the 5,350,000 francs were calculated on the return of the first year after the declaration of independence, it shows, when the railways pay even better than they did at first, or do at present, and when preferential railway tariffs have been arranged in order to encourage the export of all produce by way of Varna and Bourgas instead of via Adrianople, that the independence will, even during the seventy-five years of indebtedness to Russia, prove a direct financial advantage to the country.¹

¹ On December 15th, 1910, M. Liaptchef stated in the Sobranye that although Bulgaria is making an annual payment of 4,020,000 francs to Russia, she is saving under various headings, as a result of her independence, about 6,000,000 francs a year.

Although the new status of Bulgaria has been recognised by Turkey and by the Great Powers, and notwithstanding the fact that the reigning monarch has assumed the title of Tsar of the Bulgarians, yet, according to the terms of the Constitution drawn up in 1879 and amended by the fourth Grand National Assembly which met in 1893, Bulgaria is still a Principality. In order to alter the clauses of the Constitution which speak of Bulgaria as a Principality and which describe the Tsar as a Prince, or to substitute new sections for those which are not now suitable for the Government of the new Bulgaria, a Grand National Assembly must be convoked by King Ferdinand. For the purpose of assembling this special body (which is composed of twice as many members as the ordinary *Sobranie*) a dissolution of the present Parliament, which was elected in 1908, would be required. The Grand National Assembly might probably only sit a short time, and an ordinary General Election would then be necessary. As it is uncertain whether in case of a dissolution the Tsar would nominate a member of the Democratic party—now in power—as Prime Minister, and as whatever party is chosen by King Ferdinand to take over the reins of Government will be faced by two consecutive elections, in the second of which it might not obtain a majority, it is obvious that the present Ministers will do their utmost to delay the convocation of the National Assembly as long as possible. The Tsar, too, will endeavour to put off a dissolution until he thinks that the party leader to whom he desires to entrust the responsibility of the Government possesses sufficient influence to secure a majority in the country. These difficulties will, however, have to be overcome ere long (the life of the present Parliament, elected in 1908 for five years, does not expire till 1913), as it would obviously be quite unconstitutional to crown King Ferdinand as Tsar of the Bulgarians, so long as he is

described in the Constitution as a hereditary prince, and not a king.

Although the more immediate questions between Turkey and Bulgaria are now settled, yet there are several important problems which still have to be solved before the two countries can be permanently allied to one another by real bonds of friendship. In addition to the ever-burning Macedonian Question—viewed in different lights by the various political parties in Bulgaria—and the problem of where the Turkish and Bulgarian railways shall be united, in order to provide direct communication between Bulgaria and the Mediterranean, both of which questions I have already discussed, various difficulties concerning the nationality of Bulgarians have still to be overcome. A new commercial treaty, the terms of which are to be settled by a Turko-Bulgarian Commission, has yet to be drawn up, and the exact position of certain portions of the Turko-Bulgarian frontier has to be definitely decided. In addition, the question of the *vakoufs* in Bulgaria—the claims concerning which have been subjected to examination by a special commission appointed for that purpose—has yet to be settled.

The change in the legal relationship of Bulgarians towards Turkey, caused by the recognition of Bulgaria as a Kingdom, raises one of the most important problems which has yet to be permanently and satisfactorily settled between Turkey and Bulgaria. Prior to the declaration of independence, as all Bulgarians were the subjects of a State owing at least a nominal allegiance to Turkey, the question of the nationality of the Bulgarians did not arise between the two countries. It is conceivable that in the past a Macedonian—according to Bulgarian law naturalised as a Bulgarian, but still considered by the Turks to be an Ottoman subject—would do his military service in Bulgaria, whilst the Exarchist community still con-

tinued to pay the exemption tax due for him as a Christian Ottoman in lieu of military service. In other words, although Bulgaria had naturalised him as a citizen, Turkey could claim him by reason of his birth and residence on Turkish soil and of his original subjection. Moreover, in such a case the provisions of the law of each country would apply, that a naturalisation in any other country, without the consent of the country of which the person was a subject previous to naturalisation, was invalid.

Owing to the independence of Bulgaria it is obvious that a man cannot be both an Ottoman and a Bulgarian subject. In the future, therefore, in view of the new military law in Turkey, it is clear that the Bulgarian naturalised as such without the permission of the Ottoman Government, may be compelled to undertake the burdens of conscription in his own country, and also may be liable for military service in Turkey. This contingency would arise because, as I have already said, according to the Sublime Porte, the man in question cannot be naturalised without the consent of the Turkish Government, and he is therefore still an Ottoman. The result of not presenting himself to the Turkish authorities at the proper time in order to join the colours could, especially if he possessed property in Macedonia, hardly be otherwise than disastrous to the interests of the Bulgarian in question:

The nationality question is also possessed of importance owing to the manner in which it may affect the possession of and the succession to real property in Turkey. According to a law known as that of the Seventh Sefir passed in 1869, foreigners were to be allowed to enjoy the right of landed proprietorship on the same conditions as Ottoman subjects. This law granted the privilege of ownership of real property to the subjects of all the Powers who adopted it. At the same time it was enacted that all real property thus

*image
not
available*

owned was to be governed by Ottoman law, and not according to the laws of the foreigner who owned it. In other words, the foreigner was to become an Ottoman subject in all that related to the ownership of real property.

But according to Turkish law a Christian of one nationality cannot succeed to the real property of a Christian of another, and, therefore, should an Ottoman subject (in this case a Bulgarian) die and his or her heir be a naturalised or a native-born Bulgarian, there will be difficulties about the succession and the property will be confiscated by Turkey. These rules of Turkish succession, although nominally applicable to the subjects of all the Great Powers, have never been recognised by them and give rise to constant disputes.

As a result of the negotiations entered into between Bulgaria and Turkey concerning the nationality question, a temporary arrangement was agreed upon in June, 1910, which was to remain in force until a permanent convention between the two countries should have been concluded. In addition to the minor details concerning passports and other things, it has been arranged that Bulgarians who have left Turkey and become Bulgarian subjects should not be deprived of their property in the Ottoman Empire. If this arrangement had not been made, these Bulgarians of Turkey would have lost the property coming to them from Bulgarian relations who had become Bulgarian subjects. At the same time (June, 1910) the Turkish Government recognised the right of Bulgarian subjects to possess real property in Turkey, as long as the right to that property was acquired before the recognition of Bulgarian independence, or, in other words, whilst the Bulgarian was still officially an Ottoman subject. Property possessed by Bulgarians may, however, only be sold to Turkish subjects and to foreigners of such nations who, in accordance with the national conven-

tions, are endowed with the right of owning real property in Turkey.

When considering the advantages and disadvantages accruing to Bulgaria from her declaration of independence, foreign critics and Bulgarian politicians alike will do well to remember that it is easier to find fault with the manner in which that independence was declared than it was to make the arrangements for that declaration. There are men in Bulgaria who believe that the change in the status of the country might have been accomplished with less expense than that which was actually incurred, and that the railway ought not to have been occupied until the independence of Bulgaria had been formally recognised. These people contend that the line could then have been bought for a smaller price than 42,000,000 francs. However, this may be, it must not be forgotten that when the section of the Oriental Railway Company was hurriedly seized by the Bulgarian Government in September, 1908, nobody could foresee what would be the termination of the events which occurred subsequent to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the independence of Bulgaria. If the declaration of independence had been made in August or September, 1908—weeks before the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was effected—the event would probably have been attended with far more expensive results to Bulgaria than the payment of an annuity to Russia extending over seventy-five years, which amounts to less than one franc per year for every head of the population of the newly-created Kingdom.

XII

SERVIA, MONTENEGRO, AND BOSNIA IN 1910

The position of the Karageorgevitch Dynasty in Servia—The question of the accession to the Servian throne—Servian railway development—The difficulties of an *entente* between Servia and Bulgaria—The existing relationship between Servia and Montenegro—Abolition of the restrictions imposed upon Montenegro by the 29th Article of the Treaty of Berlin—The Montenegrin Jubilee—The changes effected in Bosnia owing to annexation by the Dual Monarchy—Some details of the Bosnian Constitution.

THE annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria, which was effected on October 7th, 1908, has brought about but few changes in Servia and Montenegro, or, in fact, in the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina themselves. Whilst both the Servians and the Montenegrins have, for the present at least, been compelled to give up all idea of securing a strip of territory which would unite the two countries and which would make it possible to construct the great Danube-Adriatic Railway entirely through the two Slav Kingdoms, the annexation has extended the domains directly under the sovereign rule of the Emperor Francis Joseph to the very frontier of the Ottoman Empire. Now that the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina is permanently settled the Austrians can still further improve their lines of communication in these provinces. The Government of the Dual Monarchy may even consider it worth while to relay at least some of the railways of Bosnia on the normal continental gauge. If this course is

adopted for the lines which connect Serajevo with Jaitza and with Uvac respectively, all that would be required to provide through railway communication between Vienna and Salonika, without passing through Serbia, is the construction of the short section of railway from Banjaluka to Jaitza—about forty-five miles, and the building of a line from Uvac to Mitrovitza—about 140 miles. Whether Austrian troops have been permanently or only temporarily withdrawn from the Sanjak of Novi Bazaar, and whether this evacuation was effected as a recompense to Turkey for the loss of Bosnia and Herzegovina or for other reasons, in either case it is possible that the Austrians might again revive their claim to build the railway from Uvac to Mitrovitza through this at one time much talked of district.

Since the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina I have paid two visits to Servia. When I left Belgrade during the acute crisis which followed the annexation, everybody was talking of hostilities and preparing for war. At the time of my return to the Servian capital, more than a year afterwards, it was almost inconceivable that a people who once appeared to have their national aspirations so deeply at heart had decided to resume their every-day life as if no crisis had ever occurred. Nevertheless, whatever may be said against the Servians for the turmoil which they undoubtedly caused in the world of European politics between October, 1908, and the spring of 1909, it is certain had the statesmen of King Peter not received considerable moral encouragement from at least some of the Great Powers that the crisis would have been much less prolonged. That war was averted at all is probably largely due to the influence of M. Milovanovitch, the able Servian Foreign Minister, who was himself the recipient of so many friendly assurances during his European tour in the autumn of 1908.

Since the spring of 1909 the attention of the



M. MILOVANOVITCH, FOREIGN MINISTER OF SERVIA.

people of Serbia has been, for the most part, devoted to the position occupied by the various members of the Karageorgevitch family, to the improvement of the Servian Army, and to the construction of railways. The uncertain position of King Peter upon the throne, a danger but little considered during the crisis of 1908 and 1909, has once more become a burning question in Serbia. There are many Servians with whom the King is far from popular. Some of these citizens desire to induce a foreign and, if possible, a British prince to accept the throne, whilst others think the Crown might advantageously be offered to a member of the Montenegrin Royal Family. The conduct of King Peter's eldest son, the ex-Crown Prince George, renders the situation more acute. Since the unfortunate event—the death of one of his servants—which precipitated his retirement in favour of his brother Alexander in March, 1909, Prince George has occupied the position of a sort of rival Crown Prince in Serbia.

During the many months which intervened between the declaration of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria, and the final recognition by the Great Powers of this infringement of the Treaty of Berlin, Prince George by his violent attitude towards the Austrians aroused the sympathy of a certain number of Servians. Partly as a consequence of this, his Royal Highness, who has a strong following in the Army, is now also surrounded by a considerable number of non-military supporters. Besides, as he either really is, or at least, for political purposes, he pretends to be, possessed of anti-regicide sympathies, the Prince is in favour with the Conservative and Liberal members of the Skupshtina, as well as with many Radicals who would rally round him should an opportune moment for taking decisive action arise. The regicides on their part are determined to endeavour to exclude Prince

George from the throne at all costs. In spite of this his Royal Highness, who fully realises the possibilities of the situation, will not fail to turn them to his own advantage on the first favourable opportunity.

At the present moment if Prince Alexander were to die, it is a vexed question whether Prince George would again become heir to the throne, or whether Paul, son of Prince Arsène and, therefore, nephew of King Peter, would officially be the Crown Prince. The gravity of the situation became more than ever apparent during the recent illness of Prince Alexander, when the Servian papers openly discussed who would be the rightful successor to the throne in case of the death of Prince Alexander. The anti-regicide organs declared in favour of Prince George, whilst their opponents supported the claim of Prince Paul—a boy of about seventeen, who is very popular in Servia. Had the country made Prince George a small but adequate allowance, or were King Peter reasonably generous to his son, the ex-Crown Prince might have been persuaded to live abroad, which, at least for the present, would have diminished the difficulties of the situation in Servia.

Notwithstanding the calm which at present exists, it must not be supposed that the Servians have for ever given up all idea of national aggrandisement. In spite of the first discouragement amongst the people, brought about by the annexation of Bosnia, Servia, perhaps the most important barrier in the way of an Austrian advance towards Salonika, fully realises the danger of her situation, and is arming herself in order to be able to meet it. Although in 1908 the Servians possessed a tolerably efficient and well-equipped Army and could probably have placed 230,000 men in the field in case of war, yet since the termination of the crisis extensive measures have been taken to increase its effectiveness. The Servian Government, which since

the year 1906 has expended about £2,720,000 upon war supplies, has now allotted about £2,160,000, mostly from the loan of the year 1910, to cover the expense of rearmament. Reservists of the second ban have been called up by classes for ten days' training, a course of instruction for artillery officers has been instituted, a shooting school (somewhat resembling ours at Hythe) has been formed, divisional manœuvres and cavalry exercises have been carried out, and arrangements have been made to enlarge the reserve of officers. In addition to these improvements, which have already been introduced, it has been decided that the peace Army shall be increased from five to eight divisions, and that cadres for all the reserve regiments of the active Army shall be formed. Serbia, like all other small European countries, now as in the past, is placed in the difficult position of being compelled either to invite the Great Powers of Europe to guarantee her integrity, or to expend a sum out of all proportion to her national revenue in order to safeguard her interests. Much as the changes which I have described in the Servian Army were required, it is to be hoped that the advisers of King Peter, in trying to prepare for the defence of the country, will be moderate in their policy, and that the people, on whom the burden of heavy taxation must fall, will not insist that war shall be waged in order that they may discern some return for the sacrifices which they have made.

The Servian Government is now and has of late been devoting large sums of money to railway development. At the present time three distinct kinds of railways are under construction—lines built on the normal continental gauge, narrow-gauge railways and departmental lines. Whilst the expense of the railways which come under the first two of these categories is born by the State, those classed under the third heading are constructed by the departmental authorities out of loans,

the interest upon which is guaranteed by some local tax. The most important normal gauge railway which is at present under construction is the one which is being built from Raduevatz, on the Danube, to Saitchar, in Eastern Servia. This line, which should be open in 1911, is eventually to be prolonged to Nish, by way of Kriajevatz. When this work has been completed a large part of the Servian section of the proposed Danube-Adriatic Railway will already be finished. The most important narrow-gauge lines under construction are two which run from the main Orient Express route in a westerly direction towards the frontier of Bosnia. The first of these leaves the Eastern Highway at Maidonovatz, and goes as far as Valievo, a distance of nearly sixty miles. This line has an important branch which connects it with Obrenovatz, on the southern bank of the River Save, and opens up a district of Servia hitherto inaccessible by railway. Valievo is distant from the Bosnian frontier but forty miles, and might easily be united with Simin Han, in Bosnia, should the Austrians decide to build a railway from that town to Zvornik on the frontier. A second narrow-gauge line unites Stalatz, on the railway between Belgrade and Nish, with Ushitza, in Western Servia. The terminus of this line, part of which is already open to traffic, will be situated only about twenty miles to the eastward of Vardishte, which is already connected by rail with Serajevo by way of Visegrad. Several departmental lines unite the southern banks of the Save and the Danube respectively with different towns in Servia.

Before my last visit to Belgrade, I had heard from the statesmen of the neighbouring countries a great deal about the proposed "Balkan Union." Among the official classes in Belgrade I found that the "Balkan Entente" as far as it concerned Servia and Bulgaria, was considered to be a desirable arrangement, which, however, under the circumstances could hardly be

attained. Although relations with Bulgaria are correct, yet there is no sincere friendship between the two countries. Such is the real feeling of antagonism, that while he is in Serbia the traveller becomes most unpopular if he even ventures to praise anything Bulgarian, whatever it may be. Any criticism, too, of the actions of King Ferdinand, which appears in the Bulgarian Press, is assiduously copied by the Servian papers. These feelings are more or less reciprocated at Sofia, but the Bulgarian certainly dislikes the Servian less than he is disliked by him. Servian statesmen, too, fully realise that at present it is impossible for them to advocate or to support any arrangement with Bulgaria which would be looked upon with disfavour in Turkey. Provided, therefore, that the Servians and the Bulgarians were able to arrive at some compromise concerning the Macedonian Question, in so far as it affects each of them, and even if Bulgaria were really sincere in her professed desire for friendship with her Slav neighbour, it is obvious that she can provide Serbia with but few advantages in exchange for the risk of losing the facility of importing and exporting goods by way of Turkey. Owing to the never ceasing danger of a recurrence of strained relations between Serbia and the Dual Monarchy, the Servians have found a new market in Egypt for a large portion of their goods. The fact that cattle are now exported by way of Salonika, where special arrangements have been made for their reception and isolation pending their shipment to Alexandria, renders Serbia now almost as dependent upon the goodwill of Turkey as she formerly was upon that of Austria.

Not only are the Servians and the Bulgarians divided by barriers which it will be difficult to break down, but the relationship which exists between the people of Serbia and those of Montenegro, and particularly between the royal houses of these two countries, is

none too cordial. Since Montenegro has been proclaimed a kingdom, and has been accepted as such in Europe, these feelings of antagonism, which had been more or less in abeyance during the international crisis of 1908 and 1909, have again become more acute. So strong were these sentiments in Belgrade at the time of the jubilee of King Nicholas, that at first it was doubtful whether the Servian royal house would be represented at all during the festivities at Cetinje. Finally, in spite of the fact that King Ferdinand of Bulgaria had signified his intention of going to Montenegro in person, King Peter only sent the Crown Prince, who arrived on the very eve of the great proclamation.

The royal houses of Serbia and Montenegro hate one another partly because King Peter did not receive what he considered to be his due when, before he ascended the throne of Serbia, he married the eldest daughter of King Nicholas. Moreover, Prince Mirko of Montenegro contracted an alliance which was not popular amongst certain sections of Servian society when he married, in 1902, Princess Natalie Constantinovitch, who is the nearest representative of the Obrenovitch dynasty. King Nicholas, too, always thought that a bomb which was discovered in Montenegro had been sent there by the King of Serbia, or at least with his cognisance. This was probably untrue, but at the time the idea was fanned by Austria, whose policy in the past has been to endeavour to cause enmity between Serbia and Montenegro.

Few visible changes have been effected in Montenegro since the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and these changes, such as they are, for the present, at any rate, carry with them moral rather than material advantage to the people of the State. Although by the Treaty of Berlin, the independence of Montenegro was recognised by the Great Powers, yet according to the 29th Article of that document the Austrian Govern-



KING NICHOLAS I. OF MONTENEGRO.

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ment acquired the right to police the Montenegrin coast and by the same clause Antivari was closed to all ships of war. According, however, to arrangements made between King Nicholas and the Austrian Government, through the medium of Italy, it was agreed in April, 1909, that all restrictions thus placed upon Montenegro were to be withdrawn, and that although Antivari was to retain the character of a commercial port, and was not to be fortified, yet it was to be open to ships of war. As a matter of fact, the French fleet did visit Montenegro towards the close of 1909.

At the end of August, 1910, King Nicholas celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of his accession to the Montenegrin throne, and at the same time followed the example of King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, by proclaiming himself king of the people over whom he had ruled with such cleverness, wisdom, and bravery for fifty years. Whether or not this declaration was made for purely personal reasons and simply to increase the status of Montenegro from that of a principality to that of a kingdom, or whether in the near or far distant future it is destined to be of any political importance to Montenegro or to Serbia, remains to be proved. However this may be, it must be remembered that King Nicholas has never forgotten the losses which he sustained by the substitution of the Treaty of Berlin for that of San Stefano, and that the great Montenegrin aspiration is, and for many years has been, to unite the two southern Slav countries under one ruler—a Montenegrin. Although, too, as I have already explained, the marriage of Prince Mirko, who sooner or later will probably ascend the throne of Montenegro, is unpopular with the supporters of the Karageorgevitch dynasty in Serbia, yet owing to the claim which this marriage may possibly give the son of Prince and Princess Mirko to the thrones of both Serbia and Montenegro, its importance must never be overlooked.

Owing to their annexation by Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, for all practical purposes united to the Dual Monarchy in 1878, have now been finally separated from the Turkish Empire. For this reason these provinces do not, politically speaking, any longer form part of the Balkan Peninsula, nor are they connected with the changes and problems in the Near East, except as an integral portion of the Dual Monarchy. Consequently, to give an account of the conditions prevailing in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not really part of the object of this book. In spite of this, as, geographically speaking, the newly-acquired Austrian territory must remain in the Balkan Peninsula, and as a large proportion of its inhabitants are allied by ties of race and religion to some of the peoples of the neighbouring countries, I will recall to the memory of my readers a few of the events which have recently occurred in the now annexed Provinces.

As a result of the Treaty of Berlin, Bosnia and Herzegovina were occupied by Austria-Hungary. A law including these provinces in the Austrian customs union was passed in December, 1879. The administration of this territory is and has been exercised by the Bosnian Bureau under the "Common" Austro-Hungarian Finance Minister. Military service was, and is, compulsory, the men recruited from Bosnia and Herzegovina forming part of the "Common" Army of the Dual Monarchy. Prior to the annexation, the four Bosnian regiments, which are composed of Moslems as well as Christians, even took their turn of duty in different parts of the Empire instead of always being quartered in their native country.

I have already alluded to a few of the events connected with the annexation, and I have mentioned the sum (£2,200,000) which was paid by Austria to the Ottoman Government in exchange for the loss of Turkish suzerainty over Bosnia and Herzegovina. As

far as these provinces themselves are concerned, but few real changes have at present been effected as a result of their altered status. The future position to be occupied by Bosnia and Herzegovina in and towards the Dual Monarchy as yet remains undecided. The former administrative and military regulations are to remain in force at least for the present.

In accordance with the terms of the proclamation announcing the annexation, in February, 1910, a Constitution was promulgated for Bosnia. Subsequently, elections took place and the Diet was opened at Serajevo on June 15th. Of its kind this Constitution is little short of perfect. The 800,000 Bosniak Serbs are represented by thirty-one elected deputies, and by five *ex-officio* members of the Diet. The Moslem element of the population, which amounts to somewhere between 500,000 and 600,000 souls, is voiced in the Bosnian Assembly, by twenty-four elected deputies and by five *ex-officio* members. The Roman Catholic Croats, numbering nearly 400,000 persons, possess sixteen deputies and seven *ex-officio* members, whilst one seat is reserved for a representative of the Jews. Perfect as this Constitution, which nominally authorises the Diet to deal with all provincial matters, may seem, the fact remains that not a single measure can even be discussed by it until it (the measure) has been sanctioned by both the Austrian and Hungarian Cabinets. The veto of Austria and Hungary in Bosnian affairs is thus in reality as absolute as it has been since 1878.

Prior to the formal recognition of the annexation by the Great Powers, there is no doubt that Bosnia and Herzegovina were governed by Austria against the will of the majority of their inhabitants. When I visited Serajevo and Mostar during the crisis which occurred after the declaration of annexation by Austria, I found that the Servian Orthodox community and the Moham-

medan population were agreed in common hatred of Austrian rule as it had existed in the past. So strong was this feeling and so united were the people that a few weeks before the declaration of annexation was promulgated a committee composed of Orthodox Serbs and of Moslem Bosniaks presented a petition to Baron Burián, then "Common" Minister of Finance for Austria and Hungary. This petition asked that a Constitution might be granted to the provinces without changing their status as defined by the Treaty of Berlin. The granting of the Constitution as a result of the annexation, by nominally giving the Bosniaks a voice in their own affairs, appears to have made the majority of the people realise that, for the present at least, they must endeavour by constitutional means to improve the condition of the country and to increase the prosperity of its inhabitants. In spite of this, it remains to be proved whether the Bosnian Diet, hampered as it is by the veto of Vienna and of Buda Pesth, will be able to combat and to overcome the many difficult problems which are at present awaiting solution.

The far more important international results of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the consequent reception of the Dual Monarchy into the German fold, the hostility which has been stirred up between Germany and Russia, the rivalry which exists between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance concerning the affairs of the Near East, are matters which cannot be discussed here. It remains to be proved whether, and how soon, the ill-feeling caused in Austria and Germany by the outburst of British and Russian indignation at the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be overcome, and if not, whether the affairs of the Near East—that "Danger Zone of Europe"—will or will not be the scene or the cause of a disastrous war in the future.

POSTSCRIPT

DURING the period which has necessarily intervened between the completion of the manuscript of this book and the final revision of the proofs several important events have occurred in Turkey. Although, owing to lack of space, I am not able to give my readers full details, I will briefly summarise some of the facts connected with the latest developments of the Near Eastern problem in order that when this volume appears it shall deal with events which have then only just taken place. For the purpose of making these notes the more clear I have arranged them in accordance with the order of the chapters to which they refer or in which the events with which they deal have been foretold.

The New Turkish Loan.

During the month of December, 1910, the Special Report on the Ottoman Public Debt for 1909-10, presented to the British and Dutch bondholders, was published. From this document, drawn up as it is by Sir Adam Block, the President of the Council of Administration, I have taken the following facts concerning the New Loan and the protracted negotiations which preceded its conclusion.

In July, 1910, negotiations were begun in Paris between the Ottoman Minister of Finance and a group of French financiers. Djavid Bey finally arranged for a Loan amounting to £T6,000,000, the interest being guaranteed on the receipts of the Constantinople

Customs. As a result of the French Government having refused its consent to the quotation of the Loan on the Paris Bourse delays occurred and the Turkish Minister of Finance, as the representative of the Government, raised money to the amount of £T1,500,000 on Treasury Bills. After negotiations, extending over many weeks, the French Government finally endeavoured to impose conditions on the Sublime Porte which were felt in Turkish official circles to amount to the intervention of a foreign Government in the internal affairs of the Empire. As a matter of fact, had the Loan been concluded in Paris, amongst other things, the French Government was to have a voice in appointing at least two officials in the Ministry of Finance, and certain restrictions were also to be placed upon the Turkish Government concerning the proportion of orders for munitions of war which were to be given in France.

When the French Market was closed and when London financiers had withdrawn from the negotiations the Young Turks were compelled to seek assistance in Germany and in Austria. Sir Adam Block, in his report, states that on November 9th, 1910, "the Turkish Government came to terms with a strong group of German and Austrian Banks for a Loan of £T11,000,000. The Loan is divided into two parts. The first part is a Loan for £T7,040,000 at 4 per cent. and 1 per cent. sinking fund, at 84 per cent., less expenses estimated at $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., on the Government. The annuity for the service of the Loan, amounting to £T352,000, is secured on the Customs Revenue of the 'Vilayet' of Constantinople. . . . The second part is a Loan for £T3,960,000 at 84 per cent. The Syndicate binds itself to take the Loan should the Government desire it, but the Government is free to contract the Loan elsewhere if they can obtain a higher rate than $81\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. net."


"At the same time the Syndicate, pending the issue of the Loan, takes Treasury Bonds from November 15th for £T5,500,000 at 5½ per cent. discount. . . . The Treasury Bonds are to be redeemed on the 14th of May, 1911, and the Government have the right to extend the date of redemption to the 14th of March, 1912, in which case the discount rate is to be reduced to 5 per cent."

The Turkish Army.

Since the completion of my chapter upon this subject, it has transpired that a scheme for at least the nominal reorganisation of the Turkish Army is under consideration. Instead of the seven Army Corps districts, each of which was supposed to provide, but never did really furnish, the Ottoman Government with a complete Army Corps, it is reported that in the future, for military purposes, the Turkish Empire is to be divided into four Inspectorate-Generals, two of which will probably have their headquarters in European Turkey. The division, which is to be the highest organised unit, is to be complete in infantry, cavalry, artillery, and details. Whether this reorganisation will really carry with it some of the changes which I have described as necessary in order that a rapid mobilisation in case of war could be effected or whether it will be a reorganisation solely on paper time alone will prove.

The Albanian Question.

According to the latest intelligence from Albania, the discontent amongst the people of that district is daily increasing. All the grievances which I have mentioned in the chapter devoted to this subject are still existent. The people are becoming more than ever discontented owing to the attitude of the Turkish Government concerning the Education Question in



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
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